BREWER v. SMITH

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 22, 2024
Docket2:20-cv-01203
StatusUnknown

This text of BREWER v. SMITH (BREWER v. SMITH) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BREWER v. SMITH, (W.D. Pa. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA PITTSBURGH

DONTE BREWER, ) ) ) 2:20-CV-01203-JFC Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) K. SHEA, CAPTAIN; B. KOVAK, ) LIEUTENANT; -. SHAFFER, ) ) CORRECTOIN OFFICER; AND -. OWENS, ) CORRECTIONS OFFICER, SUED IN ) THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; ) ) ) Defendants, )

MEMORANDUM ORDER CYNTHIA REED EDDY, United States Magistrate Judge Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and for Sanctions (“Motion”). (ECF No. 116). Defendants Shea, Kovak, Shaffer, and Owens (collectively “Corrections Defendants”) responded. (ECF No. 122). For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. A. Legal Standard

Rulings regarding the proper discovery scope, and the extent which further discovery responses may be compelled, are matters committed to the court’s judgment and discretion. Robinson v. Folino, No. CV 14-227, 2016 WL 4678340, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2016) (citation omitted); see Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Still that discretion is limited by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), which reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Accordingly, “[t]he Court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues is therefore restricted by valid claims of relevance and privilege.” Robinson, 2016 WL 4678340, at *2 (citing Jackson v. Beard, No. 3:CV-11-1431, 2014 WL 3868228, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2014) (“[a]lthough the scope of relevance in discovery is far broader than that allowed for evidentiary purposes, it is not without its limits . . . . Courts will not permit discovery where a request is made in bad faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject matter of the action, or related to confidential or privileged information.”)).

The general framework for determining the scope of allowable discovery for cases in federal courts is provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). For instance, (b) Discovery Scope and Limits.

(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

(2) Limitations on Frequency and Extent.

(A) When permitted. By order, the court may alter the limits in these rules on the number of depositions and interrogatories or on the length of depositions under Rule 30. By order or local rule, the court may also limit the number of requests under Rule 36.

(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.

(C) When required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:

(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;

(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or

(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Generally, courts afford considerable latitude in discovery to ensure that litigation proceeds with “the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). The polestar of discovery is relevance, which, for discovery purposes, is interpreted broadly. “[A]ll relevant material is discoverable unless an applicable evidentiary privilege is asserted.” Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2000). Evidence is considered relevant “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. When there is no doubt about relevance, a court should tend toward permitting discovery. Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 556 (7th Cir. 1984)). Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 requires a party served with document requests to either produce them or state a specific objection for each item or category objected to. The burden is upon the party objecting to discovery to state the grounds for the objection with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P.

34(b)(2). See Momah v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 164 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“Mere recitation of the familiar litany that an interrogatory or a document production request is overly broad, burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant will not suffice.”) (quoting Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982)). The objecting party must demonstrate in specific terms why a particular discovery request falls outside the broad scope of discovery or is otherwise privileged or improper. Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“[T]he party resisting discovery . . . must demonstrate ‘specifically’ how the request is burdensome.”) (citation omitted). After an objection is articulated, the burden rests with the party seeking discovery to show that a discovery request lies within the bounds of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Momah, 164 F.R.D. at 417. The

party opposing discovery must then convince the court why discovery should not be had. Id.

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BREWER v. SMITH, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brewer-v-smith-pawd-2024.