BRETT LIRETTE * NO. 2025-CA-0650
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL JASON C. ADAMS, STATE * FARM MUTUAL FOURTH CIRCUIT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE * COMPANY, GEICO STATE OF LOUISIANA CASUALTY COMPANY, & ******* AXIS VENTURES, LLC
CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
BRETT LIRETTE NO. 2025-CA-0651
VERSUS
JASON C. ADAMS, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, & AXIS VENTURES, LLC CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
BRETT LIRETTE NO. 2025-CA-0708
JASON C. ADAMS, ET AL CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
BRETT LIRETTE NO. 2025-CA-0710
JASON C. ADAMS, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY & AXIS VENTURES, LLC
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH NO. 2016-05383, DIVISION “N-8” Honorable Ethel Simms Julien ****** Judge Monique G. Morial ****** (Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Monique G. Morial)
LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT Steven A. DeBosier James Hilton Peltier, Jr. Adras Paul LaBorde III DUDLEY DEBOSIER INJURY LAWYERS 1075 Government Street Baton Rouge, LA 70802
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Joseph M. Messina Bradley S. Groce LOBMAN CARNAHAN BATT ANGELLE & NADER 400 Poydras Street Suite 2300 New Orleans, LA 70130
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
Kevin C. O'Bryon Marta-Ann Schnabel O'BRYON & SCHNABEL, PLC 935 Gravier Street Suite 900 New Orleans, LA 70112
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
APPEALS DISMISSED MARCH 3, 2026 This is a civil action arising out of a motor vehicle accident with a MGM complicated procedural history. The appeals at issue concern the district court’s TGC determination, on remand from this Court, that a policy issued by Defendant,
Geico Casualty Insurance Company (“GEICO”), provided coverage for the
accident at issue, as well as the district court’s granting of a JNOV which reduced
the jury verdict awards rendered against Defendant-driver Jason C. Adams (“Mr.
Adams”). As discussed more fully below, upon review of this matter, we find that
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeals. We accordingly
dismiss the appeals and remand this matter to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying factual and procedural background was provided by this
Court in our prior opinion, Lirette v. Adams, 2023-0527 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/10/24),
399 So.3d 468, 474–75 (“Lirette II”):
“On May 4, 2016, Kristi Lirette was a passenger in a [black] 2015 Lamborghini Huracan driven by Mr. Adams.” “The vehicle collided
1 with a flood wall on Tchoupitoulas Street in New Orleans, and Kristi Lirette died from the injuries she sustained in the accident.” Id. At the time of the subject accident, Mr. Adams and his business partner, Dr. Alireza Sadeghi (“Dr. Sadeghi”), each leased a [black] 2015 Lamborghini Huracan [together] with their business, Axis Ventures, LLC (“Axis”). “Only after the accident did Mr. Adams realize that he was inadvertently driving the vehicle leased to Dr. Sadeghi and Axis (“Lamborghini [A]”), and not the vehicle leased to him and Axis (“Lamborghini [B]”).”
Mr. Lirette filed a petition for damages on May 27, 2016, in which he named Mr. Adams, GEICO Casualty Company (“GEICO”), State Farm, and Axis as defendants. Germane to our review, “Mr. Lirette alleged, in pertinent part, that an insurance policy issued by GEICO (“GEICO Policy”) was in full force and effect at the time of the subject accident and rendered GEICO jointly and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Mr. Adams.” “Additionally, Mr. Lirette [alleged] that two insurance policies issued by State Farm were in full force and effect at the time of the subject accident and rendered State Farm jointly and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Mr. Adams.” These two policies were: State Farm Policy Number 286- 8850-F23-18A (“State Farm Policy A”), with named insureds Dr. Sadeghi and Axis for the use of Lamborghini A; and State Farm Policy Number 282-7788-D17-18B (“State Farm Policy B”), with named insureds Mr. Adams and Axis for the use of Lamborghini B.
After answering the petition and conducting some limited discovery, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment on October 26, 2017, seeking to be dismissed as liability insurer for Mr. Adams’ collision under State Farm Policy B. Shortly thereafter, on November 16, 2017, GEICO filed its own motion for summary judgment, arguing that, while it did have a policy affording coverage to Mr. Adams at the time of the collision, that policy was for two of Mr. Adams’ personal vehicles—a 2015 Chevy Tahoe and a 2016 Land Rover/Range Rover—and that Lamborghini A did not qualify as a “non-owned auto” or a “temporary substitute auto” under the GEICO policy; thus, no coverage was provided to Mr. Adams under that policy for the collision involving Lamborghini A.
* * *
Another hearing was conducted for these and several other pending motions on April 1, 2022. The district court issued its judgment on June 16, 2022, in which all of the Parents’ claims against GEICO were dismissed with prejudice. In the same judgment, the district court also dismissed with prejudice any of the Parents’ claims pertaining to State Farm's liability for Mr. Adams’ accident under
2 State Farm Policy B. State Farm conceded that there was coverage for the accident under State Farm Policy A.
Separately, both Mr. Adams and the Parents devolutively appealed the June 16, 2022 judgment to this Court, which was the subject of Lirette I [Lirette v. Adams, 22-0552 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/23), 382 So.3d 122]. We then granted GEICO’s unopposed motion to consolidate the two appeals, but explained that because of the dissimilar procedural posture of the issues presented, we would review them separately. After review, we found that the portion of the judgment dismissing with prejudice State Farm’s liability under Policy B was interlocutory and non-appealable because it did not dismiss all claims against State Farm that were still pending related to Policy A. More notably, we determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether Lamborghini A did, in fact, qualify as a “non-owned auto” under the terms of the GEICO policy. As a result, we reversed the portion of the district court’s June 16, 2022 judgment that granted GEICO’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Parents’ claims against GEICO with prejudice, and remanded the matter back to the district court. We published our opinion in Lirette I on January 31, 2023.
Precisely three months earlier, the Parents’ suit for damages came for jury trial on October 31, 2022, and concluded on November 7, 2022, with a jury verdict in favor of the Parents and against Mr. Adams and State Farm. Because GEICO had been dismissed as a defendant in the June 16, 2022 judgment, it made only a limited appearance and did not meaningfully participate in the trial.5 The district court adopted the jury's liability findings and damage awards in its February 27, 2023 judgment, which cast Mr. Adams in judgment for the following amounts:
(1) $12,000,000.00 in wrongful death damages to Brett Lirette; (2) $12,000,000.00 in wrongful death damages to Diana King; (3) $2,000,000.00 in survival damages of Kristi Lirette; and (4) $25,000,000.00 in punitive damages against Mr. Adams.
Additionally, State Farm was cast in judgment for $250,000.00—the limits of its coverage provided under State Farm Policy A. On March 8, 2023, Mr. Adams filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Remittitur, or in the alternative, Motion for New Trial (“motion for JNOV and motion for new trial”) which, after a hearing on April 28, 2023, the district court denied.
Lirette v. Adams, 23-0527, pp. 2-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/10/24), 399 So.3d 468, 474– 476 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
3 In that appeal, Lirette II, this Court determined that the district court judge
legally erred when she opined that the jury damages awarded were unreasonably
high but nevertheless subsequently denied the JNOV. This Court reversed the
district court’s denial of the JNOV, and remanded the matter to the district court to
make an independent assessment of the damages awarded.
On remand, the district court, pursuant to this Court’s instructions in Lirette
II, (1) considered and granted the JNOV and (2) proceeded to a bench trial on the
issue of whether GEICO provided coverage for the accident at issue. On April 29,
2025, the district court issued a written judgment. The April 29, 2025 judgment
granted the JNOV, finding the original jury awards to be “excessively high,” and
reduced the awards for the wrongful death damages awarded to each parent as well
as the survival damages and punitive damages awarded.1
Concerning Plaintiffs’ claims against GEICO, the April 29, 2025 judgment
found that “the automobile liability insurance policy issued by Defendant, GEICO
Casualty Company, to Defendant, Jason C. Adams, provides liability insurance
coverage to Defendant, Jason C. Adams, for the May 4, 2016, crash and resulting
damages” subject to its “liability insurance limits of $250,000.00.” That April 29,
2025 judgment further awarded court costs against GEICO and “pre-judgment
judicial interest from date of judicial demand (May 27, 2016) until date of trial
Judgment (February 27, 2023) on the amount of $250,000.00, which amount of
pre-judgment judicial interest totals $78,565.80 and post[-]judgment judicial
interest from date of trial Judgment (February 27, 2023) on the amount of 1 The April 29, 2025 judgment reduced the jury verdict awards as follows:
(1) $12,000,000.00 in wrongful death damages to Brett Lirette reduced to $5,000,000.00; (2) $12,000,000.00 in wrongful death damages to Diana King reduced to $5,000,000.00; (3) $2,000,000.00 in survival damages of Kristi Lirette reduced to $1,000,000.00; and (4) $25,000,000.00 in punitive damages against Mr. Adams reduced to $5,000,000.00.
4 $15,750,000.00 to April 21, 2025, which amount of post[-]judgment judicial
interest totals $2,637,154.11 and for post[-]judgment judicial interest after April
21, 2025, on the amount of $15,750,000.00 accruing at a daily rate of $3,559.93
(subject to increase of the judicial interest rate).”
On May 8, 2025, GEICO filed a motion for new trial as to the April 29, 2025
judgment, challenging the finding that GEICO’s policy provided coverage for the
accident at issue and further challenging the calculation or amount of pre and post
judgment judicial interest awarded in the April 29, 2025 judgment. Plaintiffs
opposed the motion for new trial, which the district court set for a June 11, 2025
hearing.
On July 8, 2025, the district court issued a written judgment stating only the
following: (1) “IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Lamborghini was not furnished for Mr. Adams ‘regular use, but was used at
random and sporadic times which would allow for coverage under the ‘non-owned
auto’ GEICO policy’ ” and (2) “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED that the judicial interest under the GEICO policy limits of
liability runs from the date of judicial demand until paid or the money is deposited
into the registry of the court.”
The July 8, 2025 judgment did not grant or reference the filing of a motion
for new trial. Further, the July 8, 2025 judgment did not vacate the original April
29, 2025 judgment or reference any amendment to the April 29, 2025 judgment.
GEICO timely filed a motion and order for appeal from the April 29, 2025 and
July 8, 2025 judgements, which the district court granted on August 11, 2025.2
2 Defendant Mr. Adams also filed a motion for appeal, which the district court granted on
September 12, 2025.
5 On August 12, 2025, after the signing of the order of appeal and the posting
of the appeal bond, GEICO filed a “motion to amend” the July 8, 2025 and April
29, 2025 judgments to modify and combine both judgments into one final
judgment to reflect decretal language disposing of both GEICO’s liability
following trial, as well as the district court’s ruling on remand of the JNOV
reducing the jury verdict awards.
On October 30, 2025, the district court judge executed an “Amended Final
Judgment” substantively modifying, combining, and amending the previous April
29, 2025 and July 8, 2025 judgments.3
Jurisdictional Issue
“Prior to addressing the merits of an appeal, appellate courts have the duty to
determine sua sponte whether their appellate court jurisdiction has been properly
invoked by a valid, final judgment.” May v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc.,
2024-0272, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/11/25), 421 So.3d 211, 214, writ denied, 2025-
00884 (La. 10/14/25), 418 So.3d 903, and writ denied, 2025-00886 (La. 10/14/25),
418 So.3d 904 (citing Safford v. New Orleans Fire Dept., 2023-0495, p. 18 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 2/1/24), 384 So.3d 909, 924-25 ). This Court cannot consider the
merits of an appeal unless and until our jurisdiction is properly invoked by a valid,
final judgment. Urquhart v. Spencer, 2015-1354, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/16),
204 So.3d 1074, 1077. “For a judgment to be a ‘valid final judgment,’ it must
contain specific ‘decretal language.’ ” Id. (citing Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana
State Univ. v. Mid City Holdings, L.L.C., 2014–0506, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir.
10/15/14), 151 So.3d 908, 910). Moreover, “ ‘[t]he specific relief granted should
3There does not appear to be a motion and order for appeal related to the October 30, 2025
judgment.
6 be determinable from the judgment without reference to an extrinsic source such as
pleadings or reasons for judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v.
Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., 2010–477, pp. 12–13 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10),
52 So.3d 909, 915–16).
“ ‘A valid judgment must be precise, definite and certain. ... The decree
alone indicates the decision. ... The result decreed must be spelled out in lucid,
unmistakable language. ... The quality of definiteness is essential to a proper
judgment.’ ” Urquhart v. Spencer, 2015-1354, p. 3, 204 So.3d at 1077 (quoting
Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., 2010–477, pp.
12–13, 52 So.3d at 915–16). In the absence of the necessary decretal language, the
judgment is not final and appealable. Id (citing Tsegaye v. City of New Orleans,
2015–0676, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/18/15), 183 So.3d 705, 710.
Moreover, La. C.C.P. art. 2088 provides that “[t]he jurisdiction of the trial
court over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that
of the appellate court attaches, on the granting of the order of appeal and the timely
filing of the appeal bond, in the case of a suspensive appeal, or on the granting of
the order of appeal, in the case of a devolutive appeal.” “Once a judgment becomes
final and definitive and acquires the authority of the thing adjudged, no court has
jurisdiction, in the sense of power and authority, to modify, revise or reverse the
judgment, regardless of the magnitude of the error in the final judgment.” Abbott,
Price, Benjamin & Rue LLC v. Kodiak Partners LLC, 2025-0183, p. 4 (La. App. 4
Cir. 8/21/25), 419 So.3d 829, 832 (quoting Alonso v. Admin. Patient’s Comp.
Fund, 2020-211, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 310 So.3d 297, 302).
Upon the granting of a motion for a suspensive appeal and the posting of the
appeal bond, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction, with limited exceptions.
7 Dailey v. The Home Furnishings Store, 2002-1225, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/17/03),
857 So.2d 1051, 1054-55. After the granting of an appeal, jurisdiction over the
issues on appeal lies with the appellate court and “every action taken and the
judgments rendered by the trial court” thereafter are nullities. Id.
First, as to the “Amended Final Judgment” issued on October 30, 2025,
more than two months after the granting of the order of appeal and posting of the
appeal bond, we find the district court lacked jurisdiction to execute that judgment.
Accordingly, the October 30, 2025 judgment is an absolute nullity.
Then, we are left to review the April 29, 2025 and July 8, 2025 judgments.
As to those judgments, we find this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeals
of those judgments as they lack the required definitive and decretal language to
invoke our appellate jurisdiction. The July 8, 2025 judgment presumably granted
GEICO’s motion for new trial on the issue of judicial interest; however, the
judgment does not explicitly grant the motion for new trial. Importantly, the July 8,
2025 judgment is in direct conflict with the April 29, 2025 judgment. The July 8,
2025 judgment however did not vacate the prior April 29, 2025 judgment or state
that it modified the judgment in any way. In other words, this Court is faced with
two separate, inconsistent judgements that lack decretal and definitive language.
Therefore, we find that there is no valid and final judgment before the Court for
appellate review.
DECREE
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals and remand this matter to the district
court for the amendment or issuance of a definitive, clear, final judgment, that the
parties may subsequently appeal.
APPEALS DISMISSED