Brennaris M. Johnson v. Snohomish County Sheriff's Office, et al.

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 BRENNARIS M. JOHNSON, CASE NO. C22-1861-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 v. EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 SNOHOMISH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., 11

Defendant(s). 12

13 This matter, which was dismissed without prejudice on December 4, 2023, is now before 14 the Court on a motion for extension of time to file an amended complaint, which the Court 15 construes as a motion for reconsideration. Dkt. No. 18. The Court will deny the motion for the 16 reasons below. 17 On December 30, 2022, Plaintiff Brennaris Johnson, proceeding pro se, filed an application 18 to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a proposed complaint bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. 19 § 1983 against the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office, Snohomish County, and the City of Everett. 20 Dkt. No. 1. The Honorable S. Kate Vaughan screened Johnson’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915 and identified numerous deficiencies. See Dkt. No. 4. Judge Vaughan thus declined to serve 22 the complaint, but granted Johnson leave to amend his complaint to correct the identified 23 deficiencies. Id. at 6. On June 15, 2023, after affording Johnson eight months to submit an 24 amended complaint, Judge Vaughan granted a final extension of time for him to amend his 1 complaint. Dkt. No. 12. Judge Vaughan warned Johnson that if he failed to file an amended 2 complaint by October 27, 2023, she would recommend dismissal of his action. Id. When Johnson 3 did not file an amended complaint by that date, in line with her warning, Judge Vaughan

4 recommended dismissal. Dkt. No. 14. On December 4, 2023, the Honorable Robert J. Bryan 5 adopted Judge Vaughan’s report and recommendation (“R&R”), and entered a final judgment in 6 this matter. Dkt. Nos. 16, 17. This case has been closed since then. 7 On May 11, 2026, Johnson filed a motion for an extension of time to file his amended 8 complaint until November 1, 2026. Dkt. No. 18. Johnson asserts that he “ha[s] been occupied 9 with filing a Personal Restraint Petition,” and that he “cannot (sic) afford to pay fees again.” Id. 10 Though styled as a motion for an extension of time, because this case has already been dismissed, 11 Johnson’s motion, in effect, asks the Court to reconsider Judge Bryan’s dismissal order. The Court 12 therefore analyzes his motion as one for reconsideration.

13 Reconsideration is “an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 14 finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 15 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 16 59.30[4] (3d Ed. 2000)). The Local Rules of this district indicate that motions for reconsideration 17 are, in general, “disfavored.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(h)(1). Such motions will ordinarily 18 be denied without “a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or 19 legal authority which could not have been brought to [the court’s] attention earlier with reasonable 20 diligence.” LCR 7(h)(1). Though the Court has discretion to reconsider a prior order for manifest 21 error, a motion for reconsideration does not “provide litigants with a second bite at the apple,” and 22 “should not be used to ask a court to rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly

23 or wrongly.” Gaskill v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. C11-5847, 2012 WL 13026638, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 24 1 Mar. 28, 2012). “Mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for 2 reconsideration[.]” Id. 3 As an initial matter, Johnson’s motion is both untimely and procedurally defective. Local

4 Civil Rule 7(h)(2) requires that motions for reconsideration “be plainly labeled as such,” and “be 5 filed within fourteen days” of the pertinent order. LCR 7(h)(2). A moving party must “point out 6 with specificity the matters which the movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the 7 court,” and failure to do so “may be grounds for denial of the motion.” Id. Johnson’s motion 8 follows none of these requirements. Indeed, Johnson’s motion was filed approximately 2.5 years 9 after Judge Bryan dismissed his case, and he offers no argument regarding the merits of any order 10 that was issued in the matter. See Dkt. No. 18. 11 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Johnson’s motion. Dkt. No. 18. Should Johnson wish to 12 proceed with his claims, he may file a new lawsuit. If Johnson is unable to pay filing fees, he may

13 apply to proceed IFP in that action. This case remains closed. 14 Dated this 5th day of June, 2026. 15 A 16 Kymberly K. Evanson 17 United States District Judge

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