Brennan v. McCoy

34 F. Supp. 865, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2684
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. West Virginia
DecidedSeptember 26, 1940
DocketCiv. A. No. 15-M
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 34 F. Supp. 865 (Brennan v. McCoy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brennan v. McCoy, 34 F. Supp. 865, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2684 (N.D.W. Va. 1940).

Opinion

BAKER, District Judge.

Prior to the year 1890, there was organized an unincorporated association ma’de up of employees of the Baltimore and Ohio .Railroad Company, and known as “The Relief Department of The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.” In brief, the general plan of operation of the Relief Department was that employees of the railroad would contribute certain specified payments thereto, and that in return the Relief Department would pay them certain specified benefits if they became disabled by either sickness or accident, or certain payments, payable to designated beneficiaries, at the member’s death. In short, employees of the. railroad company got together and organized a private insurance company. The railroad company'acted as Trustee for the funds of the association and bore the expense of all the costs of the operation of the association. • All benefit payments, whether for sickness or accident, or for death, were made from the fund contributed by the. members of the Association; that is, the railroad company bore the cost of medical examinations, both those had upon a given employee’s application for membership in the Department, and those had to determine eligibility to receive benefits, and the expenses of conducting the offices of the association. All the money contributed by the members as| payments into the Association was used in paying benefits and maintaining a proper reserve.

The employees of the railroad, at the time they applied for membership in the Relief Department, were required to sign an application wherein they agreed to be bound by the regulations of the Department then in force, or any amendments thereafter adopted. At all times, which have any bearing to the decisions in this-case, these regulations contained provisions whereby a member, who was drawing benefits for sickness or accident, was pensioned, the sickness and accident benefits stopped as soon as the pension became operative. In other words, no member was permitted to draw sickness ánd accident benefits and a pension at the same time.

Prior to the time the various Railroad Retirement Acts, the first of which was passed in 1934, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-214, went into effect, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company had had its own pension system, under which an employee, reaching a certain age and with certain years of service, was entitled to retire upon a pension. After the passage of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228a et seq., the railroad company ceased the payment of these pensions and the administration of the pensions was assumed by the Federal Government. Owing to the necessity of the Government setting up a more or less elaborate machine to administer these pensions, in the early days of the operation of the Retirement Act it was usually eight months to a year and one-half between the time a given railroad employee would make application for a pension and the time he would actually begin to receive payments under the pension. Under the regulations of the Relief Department, the application for the pension automatically cut off any sickness or accident benefits that the employee member might be drawing from the Department. This resulted in a situation in which certain employees of the railroad, who were disabled, found their sickness and accident benefits terminated a long time before their pension payments would start. It became apparent to all that a situation would develop in which the sick or injured employees of the railroad, who had reached retirement age, would be in precarious financial circumstances, if not actually destitute. To meet this situation the Relief Department agreed with these employees that it would continue to advance them, as a loan, money equivalent to the benefits they had been receiving, upon the written agreement that the employee member would repay this loan as soon as he began to receive his pension money from the Government set-up. Of course, when the payments of the pension began, they dated back to the date of application therefor, so that the employee would be in a position to repay his loan from his first pension check without working hardship upon himself.

Some 1918 employees of the railroad availed themselves of the opportunity to procure such advances, and practically all of them repaid the advances as soon as their pension payments began.

Some of these former railroad employees, however, after making this repayment, conceived the-idea that it had not been just of the Relief Department to require them to refund the advances they had received, and began to threaten the Department with [867]*867litigation to compel it to refund to them the advances they had returned to the Department, and to continue to pay them their sick and accident benefits, even though they were drawing a pension under the Railroad Retirement Act.

The defendants, Emory McCoy, Burton H. Griffin, and Martin A. Henderson, are included in this group. They are all residents of the State of West Virginia. The plaintiffs are all residents of the State of Pennsylvania, and are all members of the Relief Department who have certificates entitling them to certain benefits therein, and -who claim an interest in maintaining the solvency of the Relief Department. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is joined as a defendant because it is Trustee of the funds of the Relief Department. The Relief Department itself and William M. Kennedy, its Superintendent, are joined as defendants.

The plaintiffs ask, in brief, that the defendants, McCoy, Griffin and Henderson, and all other persons similarly situate, be enjoined from attempting to collect the advancements repaid by them to the Relief Department, or from attempting to collect further payments under sick and accident benefits, and that the Relief Department and Kennedy, its Superintendent, be enjoined from paying to these defendants, or to any other persons similarly situate, such moneys.

The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact.

1. That the amount involved in this action exceeds the sum of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs.

2. That the plaintiffs, Samuel W. Brennan, Bernard Zell Holverstott, George B. Stombaugh, Jr., John Gross and Frank J. Flicks, are members in good standing in the Relief Department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, an unincorporated association.

3. That the defendants, Emory McCoy, Burton H. Griffin and Martin A. Henderson, were likewise for many years members of the Relief Department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and that each of the defendants received for an extended period relief benefits from the Relief Department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and that each of them are now receiving annuities under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937.

4. That the Relief Department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company was formed prior to 1890 by employees of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company with the two-fold purpose; of providing death benefits for the designated beneficiaries after the death of the employee members, and providing accident and sick benefits under conditions provided in the Regulations when by reason of accident or illness the employee member was not able to continue to work for the Company, and that the contributions made by each employee, who was a member, were designed to raise sufficient funds to cover such payments.

5.

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Related

Griffith v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
162 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Ohio, 1958)
Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company
136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Illinois, 1955)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
34 F. Supp. 865, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2684, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brennan-v-mccoy-wvnd-1940.