Brennan v. Gordon Ball, Inc.

163 Cal. App. 3d 832, 210 Cal. Rptr. 32, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1541
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 17, 1985
DocketCiv. 24204
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 163 Cal. App. 3d 832 (Brennan v. Gordon Ball, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brennan v. Gordon Ball, Inc., 163 Cal. App. 3d 832, 210 Cal. Rptr. 32, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

Opinion

CARR, J.

Plaintiffs Joseph and Keith Brennan appeal from a summary judgment entered upon the motion of defendant Gordon Ball, Inc. The undisputed facts are that on August 1, 1981, a vehicle driven by Joseph Uppleger left the roadway and crashed, killing both Uppleger and Lori Ann Brennan, a passenger in the vehicle. On March 9, 1981, defendant had made a bona fide sale of the vehicle to Uppleger. On that date, a bill of sale was executed and defendant properly indorsed the ownership certificate and presented the same to Uppleger. On March 19, 1981, defendant sent by certified mail the registration card to Uppleger at the address shown on the bill of sale. Three weeks later, however, on April 9, 1981, the registration card was returned to defendant because it had been unclaimed by Uppleger and defendant thereafter retained possession of the registration card until the time of the accident.

The record fails to disclose whether defendant at any time delivered or mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) a notice of the sale of the vehicle. As there is no evidence to the contrary we assume the records of the Department continued to list defendant as the legal and registered owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. (See C.T. 17-25.) Plaintiffs 1 brought this wrongful death action against the estate of Uppleger and defendant.

The sole issue on appeal is whether defendant, at the time of the accident, was the owner of the vehicle driven by Uppleger within the meaning of that term as used in section 17150 of the Vehicle Code, which imputes to the owner the negligence of another person who uses or operates the vehicle with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.

In support of its motion in the trial court, defendant successfully asserted that delivery to Uppleger of the ownership certificate at the time of sale, coupled with the certified mailing of the registration card to Uppleger’s last *835 known address, constituted substantial compliance with the provisions of Vehicle Code section 5602 and defendant was thereby relieved of any liability as the owner of the vehicle. We do not agree and reverse.

Discussion

Vehicle Code section 17150 2 provides, in part, that “ ‘Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle ... by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.’ ” For the purpose of imposing liability under section 17150, the transferor of an automobile continues to be an owner of the vehicle unless and until he complies with those conditions prescribed by other provisions of the Vehicle Code to relieve himself of liability. (Enis v. Specialty Auto Sales (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 928, 935-936 [148 Cal.Rptr. 255].) “[T]he word ‘owner’ as used in section [17150] for the purpose of creating a liability thereunder, is not synonymous with that word as used in the ordinary sense of referring to a person or persons whose title is good as against all others. Under the Vehicle Code there may be several such ‘owners’ at any one time. One or more persons may be an ‘owner,’ and thus liable for the injuries of a third party, even though no such ‘owner’ possesses all of the normal incidents of ownership [citation].” (Stoddart v. Peirce (1959) 53 Cal.2d 105, 115 [346 P.2d 774].)

Plaintiffs contend defendant was the “owner” of the vehicle at the time of the accident in that it chose one of several methods accorded by the law, upon the sale of a vehicle, to terminate any imputed liability for subsequent negligent operation but ineffectually complied with that method. Defendant did not prior to the accident deliver to Uppleger both the ownership certificate and the registration card as required by section 5602, subdivision (a), and, plaintiffs assert, the unsuccessful mailing does not constitute delivery of the required documents within the meaning of the revelant Vehicle Code provisions. Further that defendant had an alternative method of terminating liability under section 17150, that of delivering or mailing to the Department a notice of the sale, giving the date of the sale, the names and addresses of the owner and the transferee, and a description of the vehicle. (§ 5900.) Plaintiffs urge that defendant’s failure to deliver all the required documents to Uppleger, coupled with the failure to otherwise give notice of the transfer to the Department, compels a finding that defendant was the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident within the meaning of section 17150. In our view, plaintiffs’ argument has merit.

*836 The revelant statutes governing transfer of title to a vehicle are found in chapter 2, articles 1-4 of the Vehicle Code, beginning with section 5600. The pertinent provisions of section 5600 provide: “No transfer of the title or any interest in or to a vehicle registered under this code shall pass, and any attempted transfer shall not be effective, until the parties thereto have fulfilled either of the following requirements:

“(a) The transferor has made proper endorsement and delivery of the certificate of ownership and delivery of the registration card to the transferee as provided in this code and the transferee has delivered to the department or has placed the certificate and card in the United States mail addressed to the department ....

“(b) The transferor has delivered to the department or has placed in the United States mail addressed to the department the appropriate documents for the registration or transfer of registration of the vehicle pursuant to the sale or transfer except as provided in Section 5602.”

Two methods of effectuating ownership are set forth; one requiring action by the buyer and the other by the seller. If the seller relies upon the method of transfer prescribed by subdivision (a) of section 5600 to avoid liability premised upon ownership, he depends upon the buyer to complete the transaction. {Rainey v. Ross (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 286, 289 [235 P.2d 45]; Weinberg v. Whitebone (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 319, 326 [196 P.2d 963].) Nothing in the record demonstrates that Uppleger completed the transaction prior to the accident. The record is barren of any evidence that Uppleger either delivered or mailed any of the required documents to the Department prior to the accident. Obviously, he could not have mailed the registration card to the Department as it remained in defendant’s possession following defendant’s unsuccessful mailing of that document to Uppleger.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
163 Cal. App. 3d 832, 210 Cal. Rptr. 32, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brennan-v-gordon-ball-inc-calctapp-1985.