Brennan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Evansville

695 N.E.2d 983, 1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 902, 1998 WL 299428
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 8, 1998
Docket82A01-9708-CV-272
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 695 N.E.2d 983 (Brennan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Evansville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brennan v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Evansville, 695 N.E.2d 983, 1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 902, 1998 WL 299428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

*985 OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 10, 1996, United Caring Shelters, Inc. (“United Caring”) petitioned the Board of Zoning Appeals of Evansville and Vander-burgh County (“BZA”) for a special use permit for charitable and philanthropic institutions (“SU-5 permit”) in order to operate a homeless shelter (“the shelter”) in a vacant building located in an area of downtown Evansville which is zoned C-4. 1 A hearing was held on July 18, 1996, and evidence was presented by United Caring, several local citizens who spoke on behalf of the shelter and other citizens who testified against the issuance of the SU-5 permit. After a “no action vote” 2 by the board members, consideration of the petition was continued until the next meeting. A second hearing was held on August 15, 1996, during which the BZA heard evidence and voted six-to-zero to grant the SU-5 permit. The BZA later issued its findings of fact.

On September 13, 1996, Robert Brennan, Scott Anderson, Carl Smith and Jack Kinkel (collectively “Remonstrators”) filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Judicial Review with the Vanderburgh Superior Court. 3 After a hearing, the trial court entered special findings in favor of the BZA. Remonstrators now appeal.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Remonstrators present several issues on appeal which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court properly applied the provisions of the Evansville, Ind., Code (“Zoning Code”) to uphold the BZA’s decision.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it upheld the BZA’s decision to grant the special use permit to United Caring.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Standard of Review

Judicial review of an administrative decision is limited to a determination of whether the agency lacked subject matter jurisdiction or employed improper procedures, or whether the decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or was arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of constitutional, statutory or legal principles. John Malone Enterprises, Inc., v. Schaeffer, 674 N.E.2d 599, 605 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The court must review the record of the proceedings in the light most favorable to the administrative proceeding and cannot reweigh the evidence. Id. The party asserting the invalidity of the agency action bears the burden of establishing its invalidity. Id.; Ind.Code § 4-21.5-5-14. When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, appellate courts stand in the same position as the trial court. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n. v. Edwards, 659 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). A reviewing court may vacate a board or commission decision only if the evidence, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates that the conclusions reached by it are clearly erroneous. Cun diff v. Schmitt Development Co., 649 N.E.2d 1063, 1066 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (citing Yater v. Hancock County Planning Comm’n, 614 N.E.2d 568 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied, cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1019, 114 S.Ct. 1401, 128 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994)).

An agency’s interpretation of statutes and regulations which it is charged with enforcing is entitled to some weight. Ad Craft, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Evansville and Vanderburgh County, 693 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). However, courts *986 are charged with the responsibility of statutory construction and are not bound by the agency’s interpretation.' Id.

Issue One: Interpretation

Remonstrators contend that the trial court misapplied the clear provisions of the Zoning Code in upholding the BZA’s decision. When asked to interpret an ordinance, this court will apply the same rules as those employed for the construction of state statutes. City of Evansville v. Zirkelbach, 662 N.E.2d 651, 653 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Generally, this court may not construe a statute that is unambiguous. Id.

A. Use Groups

The parties agree that the Zoning Code is not ambiguous. However, they disagree about which provisions of the Zoning Code apply in this case. Remonstrators claim that the shelter is a “group home or similar facility” as described in Use Group 6 of the Zoning Code and, thus, that the BZA should not have granted the SU-5 permit. Specifically, Remonstrators contend that the proper procedure in this case would have been for United Caring to apply to the City Council to have the site rezoned. The BZA counters that the shelter does not fall squarely within the parameters of any of the use groups listed in the Zoning Code and, thus, that a special use permit is required.

Zoning Code § 15.153.04.067 provides that the “[u]ses enumerated in this chapter are subject to the restrictions in each district in which the use group is permitted and any restrictions in the table and other chapters in this code.” Zoning Code §§ 15.153.04.068 through 15.153.04.080 define fifteen “Use Groups.” Each use group is prefaced with a list of the districts in which that group is permitted. Use Group 6, which is the group that Remonstrators claim is applicable, provides:

List of uses permitted in R-4, R-5, CO-1, CO-2, C — 1, C-2 and C-3 Districts, which meet the requirements and restrictions of that zone.
Givup home/community residential facility and similar facilities which provide residential services for persons in a supervised group living program Sororities and fraternities.

Evansville, Ind., Code § 15.153.04.073 (emphasis added).

Remonstrators claim that the BZA incorrectly determined that the shelter was not a “group home or similar facility.” The Zoning Code does not define the term “group home.” The fact that a word or phrase is not defined by a statute does not render that word or phrase ambiguous; rather, courts are to give the words of a statute their common and ordinary meaning. Linville v. Hoosier Trim Products, 664 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Group homes are generally single dwelling residences with a family-like atmosphere.

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Bluebook (online)
695 N.E.2d 983, 1998 Ind. App. LEXIS 902, 1998 WL 299428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brennan-v-board-of-zoning-appeals-of-evansville-indctapp-1998.