Brennan Scott Steggall v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00359-CR

BRENNAN SCOTT STEGGALL, APPELLANT V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 43rd District Court Parker County, Texas 1

Trial Court No. CR25-0060, Honorable Craig Towson, Presiding

August 25, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Brennan Scott Steggall, Appellant, pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The jury assessed punishment at 36 years’ imprisonment and a $200,000 fine. Appellant presents two issues related to the propriety of his sentence. We reform the judgment and affirm as reformed.

1 Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by

the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket-equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of more than 200 grams but less than 400 grams, with intent to deliver. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.112(a). The applicable range of punishment for the offense is ten years to 99 years or life in prison and a fine not to exceed $100,000. Id. § 481.112(e).

However, the court’s charge instructed the jury to “assess [Appellant’s] punishment at confinement . . . for a term of Life or for any term of not more than ninety-nine (99) years or less than fifteen (15) years. In addition, there you may assess a fine not to exceed $200,000.” The verdict form repeated this erroneous range of punishment. The trial court sentenced Appellant according to the jury’s verdict, viz., 36 years’ imprisonment and a $200,000 fine. Appellant’s trial counsel made no objection to the charge or sentence.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Illegal Sentence

By his first issue, Appellant asserts that he received an illegal sentence because the sentence assessed and pronounced exceeds the applicable punishment range. Appellant seeks a new punishment hearing. The State agrees that the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed but argues that this Court may modify the judgment rather than remanding the case for a new sentencing hearing.

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“[A] sentence that is outside the range of punishment authorized by law is considered illegal.” Ex parte Pue, 552 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also Ex parte Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 336 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (per curiam) (fine outside authorized range is illegal sentence). A claim that a sentence is illegal may be raised at any time. Pue, 552 S.W.3d at 228.

Article 37.10(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes trial and appellate courts to reform a verdict containing an unauthorized punishment, providing:

If the jury assesses punishment in a case and in the verdict assesses both punishment that is authorized by law for the offense and punishment that is not authorized by law for the offense, the court shall reform the verdict to show the punishment authorized by law and to omit the punishment not authorized by law. If the trial court is required to reform a verdict under this subsection and fails to do so, the appellate court shall reform the verdict as provided by this subsection.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.10(b). Courts have applied this article to reform punishment down to an authorized term when the assessed punishment exceeds the maximum allowed by law. In Howard v. State, for example, the Second Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err in reducing an assessed fine of $2,000 to the statutory maximum of $1,000. 766 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, no pet.); see also Vance v. State, 970 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.) (trial court did not err in reducing 730-day jail term to 365-day term authorized by law). The verdict at issue includes a fine that is not authorized by law and a period of confinement that is authorized by law. We consider each in turn.

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The Fine

The fine of $200,000 assessed by the jury is not authorized by law. See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.112(e). The trial court did not reform the verdict; therefore, we may do so. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.10(b); see also Howard, 766 S.W.2d at 908 (“The obvious intent of article 37.10(b) is to authorize the court to reduce the punishment to that which is allowed by law.”). Based on the foregoing, we reform the portion of the judgment assessing a fine to reflect a fine that is allowable by law: a $100,000 fine. We sustain Appellant’s first issue as to the fine.

The Term of Confinement

The 36-year term of confinement assessed by the jury is authorized by law. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.112(e). However, the jury was erroneously instructed that the minimum term it could consider was 15 years. Because Appellant did not object to this charge error, we must determine whether the error requires reversal under the Almanza harm analysis. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (requiring defendant to show error was so egregious it deprived him of fair and impartial trial). Egregious harm is present whenever a reviewing court finds that the case for conviction or punishment “was actually made clearly and significantly more persuasive by the error.” Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We review the entire charge, the evidence, argument of counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole to determine the degree of harm. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

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As set forth above, the jury charge instructed the jury to consider a punishment range of 15 to 99 years or life imprisonment, thereby eliminating the possibility of a lesser minimum beginning at ten years. A defendant is entitled to a correct instruction on the range of punishment. Coody v. State, 812 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 818 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Other than this error, our examination reveals nothing else in the charge that affects our egregious harm analysis.

The evidence revealed that Appellant had multiple prior convictions, both felonies and misdemeanors, going back “into his 20s and even before.” The jury heard that he had a history of drug use and drug-related criminal activity. Appellant was on parole for just over a year for another possession with intent to deliver charge, for which he received a 25-year sentence, when he was charged with the instant offense. Appellant was combative towards law enforcement when he was arrested. Additionally, the evening before trial, Appellant “got drunk on homemade hooch in the jail,” “started a riot,” and demanded to negotiate with the warden. This evidence supports a sentence above the minimum and does not make it more likely that the jury-charge error harmed Appellant.

In questioning witnesses and in his closing argument, Appellant’s trial counsel referred to the sentencing range as 15 years up to 99 years or life several times. However, counsel did not argue for the minimum sentence allowable, but told the jury, “I’m not going to stand up here and say treat him like a first-time offender, because he’s not.” Counsel then noted that the high end of the sentencing range should be reserved for violent offenders. He suggested “something that’s fair in that spectrum of things.” Counsel for the State discussed Appellant’s criminal history and the many chances he

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had been given in the past. She referred to evidence that Appellant was on parole when he committed the instant offense. Counsel urged the jury to assess a “significant prison sentence” and later argued, “25 years wasn’t enough. Is 30 enough? Is 40 enough? Is 50 enough? Is 60 enough? What’s it going to take to make an impression on this man?” The arguments of counsel do not weigh in favor of a determination of egregious harm from the charge.

Finally, we review other relevant considerations. We note that the punishment assessed by the jury is within the appropriate range of punishment. See Cartwright v. State, 833 S.W.2d 134, 136–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (no egregious harm where jury assessed fine within lawful range even though charge erroneously allowed fine in excess of amount allowed by law). At 36 years, the prison term is not particularly close to either the actual minimum sentence of ten years or the erroneously stated minimum of 15 years. In Houston v. State, the Second Court of Appeals, from which the present case was transferred, conducted an egregious harm analysis concerning a jury charge that erroneously required proof that the defendant was not a repeat offender to permit the jury to consider the unenhanced range of his punishment. No. 02-17-00025-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1619, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court considered the Almanza factors, including the relevant consideration of the punishment assessed by the jury, which had the option of assessing a minimum of five years to life confinement if the defendant was not a repeat offender or 15 years to life confinement if he was. Id. at *7–12. The jury assessed punishment at 70 years’ confinement, which the court noted was “well within both ranges.” Id. at *12. The court wrote, “[W]e cannot conclude that a change at the minimum range

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from five to fifteen years’ confinement likely affected the jury’s decision to sentence [the defendant] to seventy years’ confinement,” and held that the erroneously charged minimum sentence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Similarly, the punishment of 36 years assessed here is well above both the actual minimum of ten years and stated minimum of 15 years. This suggests that the error in misstating the minimum term of confinement was not egregiously harmful. See Simms v. State, 905 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no pet.) (no egregious harm where jury’s verdict showed it was not considering minimum end of punishment range).

We conclude that when all factors are considered, though the charge contained error, it does not support a determination of egregious harm requiring reversal. Therefore, we overrule Appellant’s first issue as to the term of confinement.

Issue 2: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

By his second issue, Appellant argues that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to the jury instruction on the incorrect punishment range. The two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington requires an appellant to show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome would have been different. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

On appeal, Appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous jury charge led to Appellant “suffering a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.” He

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asserts that if the jury had been properly instructed, it would have reached a different sentencing verdict. Even assuming that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we cannot conclude that Appellant has met his burden to show a prejudicial effect on the outcome. As concerns the jury charge’s incorrect statement of the maximum fine allowed, we have reformed the judgment pursuant to article 37.10, thereby curing any harm. As concerns its incorrect statement of the minimum term of imprisonment allowed, we have determined that the error did not rise to the level of egregious harm because the record indicates that the jury did not consider a sentence near the minimum end of the punishment range. Appellant has failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to object, a different outcome would have resulted. We cannot reverse based on a claim of ineffective assistance unless both prongs of Strickland are satisfied. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court’s judgment includes a fine in excess of that allowed by law, we reform the judgment by reducing the fine to $100,000. We further reform the judgment to state that the “Degree of Offense” is “10-99/Life” rather than “15-99/Life” as stated. We affirm the judgment as modified.

Judy C. Parker

Chief Justice

Do not publish.