Brendan N. v. Tina Marie R.

2006 NY Slip Op 50819(U)
CourtNew York Family Court, Suffolk County
DecidedMay 4, 2006
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2006 NY Slip Op 50819(U) (Brendan N. v. Tina Marie R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Family Court, Suffolk County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brendan N. v. Tina Marie R., 2006 NY Slip Op 50819(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2006).

Opinion

Brendan N. v Tina Marie R. (2006 NY Slip Op 50819(U)) [*1]
Brendan N. v Tina Marie R.
2006 NY Slip Op 50819(U) [11 Misc 3d 1091(A)]
Decided on May 4, 2006
Family Court, Suffolk County
Lynaugh, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on May 4, 2006
Family Court, Suffolk County


Brendan N., Petitioner,

against

Tina Marie R., Respondent.




V-18696-03/06/E/F

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

Sari Martin Friedman, Esq.

666 Old Country Road

Suite 704

Garden City, New York 11530

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

Kevin G. McClancy, Esq.

Legal Aid Society of Suffolk County

889 East Main Street

Riverhead, New York 11901

LAW GUARDIAN

Stephen R. Hellman, Esq.

1235 Montauk Highway

Mastic Beach, New York 11950

Barbara Lynaugh, J.

Petitioner-father Brendan N. and respondent-mother Tina Marie R.. have each filed a petition seeking a modification of an order of this court (James, Ref.), dated 12/11/03, which, on consent of the parties, awarded them joint custody of their daughter, Jada Alexandra N., born 9/9/01, with residential custody to the father. Each party now seeks sole custody of Jada. Father also seeks an order of [*2]protection keeping mother away from the child, alleging that mother sexually abused the child.

Having heard the evidence offered at the hearing and having reviewed the recommendations of the Law Guardian, and with thorough and careful consideration, the court makes the following findings and conclusions.

The existing custody order is, at best, unusual, and the court questions whether it should have been entered and whether it should now be considered controlling in any meaningful way. The order provides that "physical and residential custody...shall remain with" the father, yet the parties were residing together with the child at the time, as indicated in the order, and continued to reside together for almost two years after its entry. In pertinent part, the order provides as follows:

"The parties shall have joint legal custody of the infant child and physical and residential custody of Jada Alexandra N. shall remain with the petitioner father, while both parties reside at 55 Deer Path Road, N. Great River, New York. If the petitioner father relocates away from the residence prior to the Respondent mother, physical and residential custody shall revert to the respondent mother, while she resides at said address. If the respondent mother relocates away from the residence, physical and residential custody is to remain with the petitioner father."

Notwithstanding the fact that the parties shared a residence and shared actual custody of their child at the time the order was entered, the Referee somehow awarded physical and residential custody to the father and made prospective findings as to who was to have custody of the child in the future should one of the parties leave the residence.

This, in essence, was a predetermination of Jada's best interests at some indeterminate point in the future with no provision for judicial review of the circumstances existing in the child's life at the time either mother or father decided to move out. It is doubtful that such an order should have been entered, the consent of the parties notwithstanding. For these reasons, the court now affords it little significance.

The parties resided with Jada in a small one-bedroom basement apartment in the home of paternal grandfather Robert N.. Residing in the upstairs portion of the home were father's two sisters Brianne and Caitlin and paternal grandmother, who passed away in October 2005.

The home environment became increasingly oppressive to mother as father and his family were openly hostile, critical, and controlling toward her. Paternal [*3]grandfather often left mother notes telling her how to compact the garbage, vacuum the floor, do the laundry, and how to care for Jada. One of grandfather's demeaning notes to mother compared mother's child rearing skills to those of her own mother, from whose custody she had been removed and placed in foster care.

Mother could not leave the home at will with her child, as the child's two car seats were kept locked inside family vehicles to which she had no access, and father did not approve of mother's vehicle. The times at which mother left the residence on her own, even to go to work, were closely monitored by paternal grandfather. While at home, mother frequently found herself locked downstairs while Jada played upstairs with father's family.

Mother often expressed her concerns regarding Jada's well-being to father and to paternal grandfather. Mother was concerned that father was physically rough and often impatient with Jada and would frequently ridicule Jada for her behavior. Mother objected to Jada sleeping in bed with her grandparents (grandfather continued this practice after his wife died, finding Jada to be a "comfort" to him) and that grandfather's English mastiff was allowed to remain in the home after biting Jada in the face, an injury which necessitated sixty stitches.

Neither father nor grandfather took any steps to address these concerns.

Father acknowledges his shortcomings as a parent. He finds Jada to be a "tough kid" and admits his lack of patience with her. Father is frequently scolding the child and puts her in a corner for extended punishments. Grandfather describes father as being "too guy rough" with Jada. On one occasion, Jada had to be referred to an orthopedist for a wrist injury caused by father holding her hand too tightly.

Father freely admits, at the age of 32, to needing the "guidance, counsel and benign management" of grandfather in raising Jada. Just a year ago, father wrote a "personal punch list" in which he indicated that he was "relinquishing [his] role" to grandfather and would "play the role of co-custodian." At the suggestion of grandfather, father discussed with mother his desire to transfer custody of Jada to grandfather, thereby conceding that he was not a proper custodian for this child.

For the most part, father has indeed abdicated his role as a parent to his father and relies excessively on his father for every day decision making regarding Jada, including the choice of pre-school and medical treatment, all to the exclusion of mother. Father has never lived on his own and is financially dependent upon his father. [*4]

Grandfather, who admits to being "a pompous ass" and micro-managing the child-rearing of his granddaughter (although he sees nothing wrong with that), arranged and financed mediation between mother and father at the end of 2003, with the goal of having custody of Jada awarded to himself. Mother would not consent, and the existing agreement was brokered.

A closer reading of the order reveals that only the parent who remains at grandfather's home would have custody of Jada, making it clear that grandfather was meant to remain in control of this child's life.

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Bluebook (online)
2006 NY Slip Op 50819(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brendan-n-v-tina-marie-r-nyfamctsuffolk-2006.