Brendan Michael McGuinness v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: March 5, 2025
• Docket: 23-1603
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1603 Filed March 5, 2025

BRENDAN MICHAEL McGUINNESS, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Patrick Greenwood,

Judge.

An applicant for postconviction relief appeals the district court’s dismissal of

his application as untimely. AFFIRMED.

Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., Langholz, J., and Carr, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025). 2

CARR, Senior Judge.

Brendan McGuinness appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

postconviction-relief (PCR) application, arguing we should adopt equitable tolling

and reinstate his application to allow for a full hearing on its merits. Upon our

review for correction of errors at law, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the

application. See Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2011) (applying

correction-of-error review to dismissal of PCR applications); Nguyen v. State, 829

N.W.2d 183, 186 (Iowa 2013) (applying correction-of-error review to statute-of-

limitations defenses).

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

McGuinness pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced on

January 18, 2017. He did not directly appeal from that conviction or sentence.

The statute of limitations for PCR expired on January 18, 2020. Iowa Code § 822.3

(2023) (“[PCR] applications must be filed within three years from the date the

conviction or decision is final.”). He filed the PCR application at issue here on

May 30, 2023. The State moved to dismiss his petition as time barred and, at the

dismissal hearing, McGuinness argued the district court should apply equitable

tolling. Following that hearing, the district court dismissed his application as

untimely.

McGuinness now appeals.

II. Discussion

Conceding that the statute of limitations has expired for his PCR application,

McGuinness argues we should adopt equitable tolling and reinstate his application

to allow for a full hearing on its merits. 3

The statute of limitation under section 822.3 “does not apply to a ground of

fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” We

have “frequently held” that equitable tolling does not apply to Iowa Code

section 822.3. Johnson v. State, 957 N.W.2d 13 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (citing Smith

v. State, No. 19-0384, 2020 WL 110398, at *1 & n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020)

(collecting cases)). And where equitable tolling does apply, the “party must show

it diligently pursued its rights and some extraordinary circumstance beyond its

control prevented timely filing.” Majors v. State, No. 12-1090, 2013 WL 2637599,

at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. June 12, 2013).

McGuinness does not argue that any ground of fact or law that could not

have been raised within the applicable time period applies here. And he admits

our court has “previously declined” to apply equitable tolling to PCR claims.

McGuinness instead urges us to look to a selection of “federal rulings as well as

rulings from other states” and depart from years of precedent. But his request

raises justifications for equitable tolling that we have previously considered and

rejected. McGuinness contends equitable tolling should be applied to his claim

because it “concerns the due process right to access to the courts” and his “right

to effective assistance of counsel.”

McGuinness claims his right to access Iowa courts was inhibited due to his

transfer to a New Jersey prison, writing in his May 30, 2023 filing that “I am now

and have been for 2½ years deprived of all/any access to Iowa Law.” He does not

describe how his transfer inhibited his access to Iowa law beyond that New Jersey

prisons “refuse to aid [him] in ferreting out cases, etc.” He does not claim that he

was denied access to such materials. And based on this claim, McGuinness would 4

have been in an Iowa prison for the entirety of the statutory period, not being

transferred to New Jersey until approximately November or December 2020—nine

or more months after the statutory period expired. Any difficulty McGuinness

encountered in accessing Iowa legal materials would have occurred after the

statutory period had run.

And McGuinness’s argument that he has a “due process right” to effective

counsel would indeed support his claim that he has an interest in safeguarding that

right through an application for PCR. Yet it does not explain why the statute of

limitations for PCR applications wrongly inhibits that right. No court ruled at any

time during the statutory period that McGuinness did not have a right to effective

counsel. Notably, he advances no ground of fact or law that could not have been

raised within the statutory period.

Because equitable tolling does not apply to section 822.3 and, even if it did,

McGuinness has not shown that he otherwise diligently pursued his rights, we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of his PCR application.

AFFIRMED.