Brenda Woods v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 19, 2024
DocketAT-0752-18-0697-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Brenda Woods v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Brenda Woods v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brenda Woods v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BRENDA LYNN WOODS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-0752-18-0697-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 19, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Brenda Lynn Woods , Memphis, Tennessee, pro se.

Lois F. Prince and Bradley Flippin , Nashville, Tennessee, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW Effective April 15, 2018, the agency appointed the appellant under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3) to an excepted service appointment subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 10. According to the Standard Form 50 documenting her appointment, the appellant is preference eligible. Id. Effective August 6, 2018, the agency terminated her for “unacceptable conduct.” Id. at 7-8. The appellant filed an appeal and the administrative judge issued Burgess 2 notice appropriate to a preference-eligible probationer in the excepted service. IAF, Tabs 1, 3. In response, the appellant asserted that the Board had jurisdiction over her appeal because she alleged that the agency committed prohibited personnel practices in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(5), (8), and (10). IAF, Tab 7. In its response to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional notice, the agency submitted evidence that the appellant resigned from her position on the date her termination would have been effective. IAF, Tab 9 at 28-33.

2 An appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 3

The administrative judge issued a decision on the written record in which he dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 4. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to show that she was an employee with appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B), and thus had no right to appeal either a probationary termination or an involuntary resignation. ID at 2-3. He also found that the appellant could not appeal her separation as an individual right of action (IRA) appeal because she did not allege that she exhausted her administrative remedies with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). ID at 4. Finally, he found that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s claims of prohibited personnel practices absent jurisdiction over the underlying personnel action. ID at 3-4. The appellant petitions for review of the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency responds in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review and the appellant replies to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. The basis for the appellant’s assertion that the agency terminated her because of alleged whistleblowing is not entirely clear. In her pleadings below, she states that the agency terminated her to prevent her from whistleblowing rather than that it retaliated against her for protected disclosures she had already made. IAF, Tab 7 at 6. The administrative judge did not issue any Burgess notice appropriate to a whistleblowing claim, and the agency did not address IRA jurisdiction in any of its pleadings. However, the Board has held that, when the initial decision itself provides proper Burgess notice such that the appellant has an opportunity to establish jurisdiction in her petition for review, the Board’s obligation to provide notice is satisfied. Caracciolo v. Department of the Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 663, ¶ 11 (2007), overruled on other grounds by Brookins v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 3, ¶ 8. To the extent that the appellant raised a colorable IRA claim, the administrative judge’s finding in the initial decision that she was required to establish exhaustion and did not do so, ID at 4, 4

was sufficient to put the appellant on notice that she must submit evidence of exhaustion with her petition for review in order to show jurisdiction over her purported IRA claim. On review, the appellant asserts that she filed a complaint with OSC and that OSC informed her that it would be unable to take any action on her complaint for three to six months. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant does not state when she filed an OSC complaint, she does not submit a copy of any OSC complaint or any correspondence from OSC, and she does not specify whether her complaint was of whistleblower reprisal (which is a prerequisite for an IRA appeal) or of prohibited personnel practices (which requires an otherwise appealable action to fall within the Board’s purview). Therefore, the appellant’s bare assertion that she made an unspecified filing with OSC on an unspecified date does not overcome the administrative judge’s finding that she failed to show by preponderant evidence that she exhausted her administrative remedies. As to her separation from service, the appellant was a preference-eligible probationer in the excepted service, appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3). The Office of Personnel Management’s regulations at 5 C.F.R. subpart 315 apply only to competitive service appointments and to excepted service Veterans Recruitment Appointments. They do not apply to the appellant. See Barrand v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R.

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Related

Celia A. Wren v. Merit Systems Protection Board
681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Circuit, 1982)
Bridgett L. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board
758 F.2d 641 (Federal Circuit, 1985)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Karl Brookins v. Department of the Interior
2023 MSPB 3 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Brenda Woods v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brenda-woods-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.