Brenda O Valverde v. Meta Headquarters

D. Arizona

Brenda O Valverde v. Meta Headquarters

DecidedDecember 15, 2025

Docket2:25-cv-03223

StatusUnknown

This text of Brenda O Valverde v. Meta Headquarters (Brenda O Valverde v. Meta Headquarters) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Brenda O Valverde v. Meta Headquarters, (D. Ariz. 2025).

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Brenda O Valverde, No. CV-25-03223-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Meta Headquarters,

13 Defendant. 14 15 On September 4, 2025, Plaintiff Brenda O. Valverde (“Plaintiff”) filed her initial 16 Complaint and her Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or 17 Costs. (See Docs. 1–2). The Court granted Plaintiff’s Application but dismissed her 18 Complaint with leave to amend. (See Doc. 5). Plaintiff has now filed an Amended 19 Complaint. (Doc. 6). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint 20 (Doc. 6) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only 28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 does 5 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 9 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting 10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the 11 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 12 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 13 A complaint is frivolous if it is based on a nonexistent legal interest or delusional 14 factual scenario. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–30 (1989); see also Denton v. 15 Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (dismissal is also appropriate when the facts alleged 16 are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional”). This Court has “not only 17 the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also 18 the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those 19 claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. 20 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the 21 facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 22 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when 24 evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2014) 25

26 §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) 27 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies 28 to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”)). 1 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 2 II. Discussion 3 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to comply with the Court’s prior Order and 4 only serves to reiterate her prior allegation with some added detail. Plaintiff still seeks 5 “4.425 billion” dollars from “Meta Headquarters.” (Doc. 6 at 4). She claims that her 6 “image, likeness, and intellect has and is [sic] being used 11/11/25 to generate false 7 images.” (Id.) Plaintiff requests “.59 ¢ to every dollar Meta has earned from past (“launch 8 of”) to present.” (Id.) These claims were present in Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. (See 9 Doc. 1 at 4). 10 In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff adds that artificial intelligence is the cause of 11 the alleged infringements. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff further claims that “[a]s a citizen of the 12 United States of America [she has] the right to privacy,” and “[a]s a child of God [she has] 13 the right to speak.” (Id.) As a result of Meta’s alleged infringement of her image and 14 likeness, Plaintiff is “having an identity crisis,” and said infringement “insults [Plaintiff’s] 15 intelligence[.]” (Id. at 7). 16 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim upon 17 which relief may be granted. A “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the 18 facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there 19 are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 20 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (dismissal also appropriate when the facts alleged are “clearly baseless,” 21 “fanciful,” “fantastic,” and/or “delusional.”). Although artificial intelligence is new and 22 developing technology, Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claims about Meta’s use of artificial 23 intelligence lack any specificity or detail that would give rise to a plausible claim. Doe v. 24 Universal Music Group, 2025 WL 3251433, *7 (D. Nev. 2025) (“Plaintiff fails to offer 25 sufficient facts regarding the actual use of artificial intelligence, the fact that consumers 26 did not know or expect that artificial intelligence was being utilized, or that it resulted in 27 actual damages to himself or other consumers.”) Moreover, Plaintiff’s relies vaguely on 28 her right to privacy and rights “[a]s a child of God” (Doc. 6 at 6), and the elements of any || claim are not pled. Even liberally construed, Plaintiffs allegations fail to establish a claim. 2|| See Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (“An in forma pauperis || complaint is frivolous if it had no arguable substance in law or fact.) (internal quotations 4|| omitted). Because Plaintiff's amendments failed to remedy the Complaint’s deficiencies, || Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed. 6 Furthermore, despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)’s mandate to freely allow leave to amend, “[t]here is no reasonable basis for concluding that amendment could 8 || cure this complaint so leave to amend is inappropriate.” Marcos-Chavela v. Utah, 2022 WL 3018242, *2 (W.D. Wash. 2022); see also McHenry v. Renne,

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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Brenda O Valverde, No. CV-25-03223-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Meta Headquarters,

13 Defendant. 14 15 On September 4, 2025, Plaintiff Brenda O. Valverde (“Plaintiff”) filed her initial 16 Complaint and her Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or 17 Costs. (See Docs. 1–2). The Court granted Plaintiff’s Application but dismissed her 18 Complaint with leave to amend. (See Doc. 5). Plaintiff has now filed an Amended 19 Complaint. (Doc. 6). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint 20 (Doc. 6) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only 28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, 1 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.” 2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and plain 4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 does 5 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the 6 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 7 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 8 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 9 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting 10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the 11 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 12 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 13 A complaint is frivolous if it is based on a nonexistent legal interest or delusional 14 factual scenario. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–30 (1989); see also Denton v. 15 Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (dismissal is also appropriate when the facts alleged 16 are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional”). This Court has “not only 17 the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also 18 the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those 19 claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. 20 The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the 21 facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 22 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when 24 evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2014) 25

26 §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) 27 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies 28 to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”)). 1 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 2 II. Discussion 3 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to comply with the Court’s prior Order and 4 only serves to reiterate her prior allegation with some added detail. Plaintiff still seeks 5 “4.425 billion” dollars from “Meta Headquarters.” (Doc. 6 at 4). She claims that her 6 “image, likeness, and intellect has and is [sic] being used 11/11/25 to generate false 7 images.” (Id.) Plaintiff requests “.59 ¢ to every dollar Meta has earned from past (“launch 8 of”) to present.” (Id.) These claims were present in Plaintiff’s initial Complaint. (See 9 Doc. 1 at 4). 10 In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff adds that artificial intelligence is the cause of 11 the alleged infringements. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff further claims that “[a]s a citizen of the 12 United States of America [she has] the right to privacy,” and “[a]s a child of God [she has] 13 the right to speak.” (Id.) As a result of Meta’s alleged infringement of her image and 14 likeness, Plaintiff is “having an identity crisis,” and said infringement “insults [Plaintiff’s] 15 intelligence[.]” (Id. at 7). 16 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim upon 17 which relief may be granted. A “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the 18 facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there 19 are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 20 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (dismissal also appropriate when the facts alleged are “clearly baseless,” 21 “fanciful,” “fantastic,” and/or “delusional.”). Although artificial intelligence is new and 22 developing technology, Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claims about Meta’s use of artificial 23 intelligence lack any specificity or detail that would give rise to a plausible claim. Doe v. 24 Universal Music Group, 2025 WL 3251433, *7 (D. Nev. 2025) (“Plaintiff fails to offer 25 sufficient facts regarding the actual use of artificial intelligence, the fact that consumers 26 did not know or expect that artificial intelligence was being utilized, or that it resulted in 27 actual damages to himself or other consumers.”) Moreover, Plaintiff’s relies vaguely on 28 her right to privacy and rights “[a]s a child of God” (Doc. 6 at 6), and the elements of any || claim are not pled. Even liberally construed, Plaintiffs allegations fail to establish a claim. 2|| See Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) (“An in forma pauperis || complaint is frivolous if it had no arguable substance in law or fact.) (internal quotations 4|| omitted). Because Plaintiff's amendments failed to remedy the Complaint’s deficiencies, || Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed. 6 Furthermore, despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)’s mandate to freely allow leave to amend, “[t]here is no reasonable basis for concluding that amendment could 8 || cure this complaint so leave to amend is inappropriate.” Marcos-Chavela v. Utah, 2022 WL 3018242, *2 (W.D. Wash. 2022); see also McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th 10 || Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal with prejudice of amended complaint that did not comply 11 |} with Rule 8(a)). 12 Accordingly, 13 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) is DISMISSED || without leave to file a second amended complaint. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to 16 || terminate this matter. 17 Dated this 15th day of December, 2025. 18 19 oC. . fo 20 norable' Diang4. Huretewa 1 United States District Fudge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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