1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRENDA L-N.,1 Case No. 5:19-cv-01567-AFM 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION 14 ANDREW SAUL, OF THE COMMISSIONER Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff filed this action for review of the Commissioner’s final decision 19 denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 20 income. In accordance with the Court’s case management order, the parties have filed 21 briefs addressing the merits of the disputed issue. The matter is now ready for 22 decision. 23 BACKGROUND 24 On June 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance 25 benefits, alleging disability beginning August 22, 2014. (Administrative Record 26 27 1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case 28 Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 1 (“AR”) 17, 79, 184-85.) Her applications were denied initially and upon 2 reconsideration. (AR 102-06, 108-14.) Thereafter, at Plaintiff’s request, an 3 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing on August 21, 2018 – at 4 which Plaintiff (represented by counsel) and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. 5 (AR 39-62.) On August 21, 2018, the ALJ issued a partially unfavorable decision 6 finding that Plaintiff became “disabled” when she reached “Advanced Age” on 7 May 16, 2018, but not disabled before then. (AR 17-31.) Plaintiff filed a request for 8 review with the Appeals Council, which upheld the ALJ’s decision on June 20, 2019 9 (AR 1-6), Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court for review of the final decision of 10 the Commissioner. 11 DISPUTED ISSUE 12 Whether the ALJ erred in the RFC in finding that Plaintiff is limited to 13 occasional balancing yet is also capable of standing/walking for 6 hours. 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 16 determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 17 evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. See Treichler v. 18 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the 19 substantial-evidence standard, this Court asks whether the administrative record 20 contains sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s factual determinations. 21 Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). As the Supreme Court observed 22 in Biestek, “whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold 23 for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.”Id.Itmeans “more than a mere scintilla” 24 but less than a preponderance and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 25 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 26 389, 401 (1971). This Court must review the record as a whole, weighing both the 27 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 28 conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). Where 1 evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s 2 decision must be upheld. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 DISCUSSION 4 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had “severe” impairments, including obesity; 5 degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine with radiculopathy in the 6 bilateral upper extremities and left lower extremity; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; 7 bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome; bilateral supraspinatus tears; degenerative joint 8 disease of the bilateral knees; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder. (AR 19.) 9 The also ALJ found that the Claimant retained the residual functional capacity 10 (“RFC”) to: “lift or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; 11 stand or walk or sit six hours each in an eight-hour workday; must be able to use a 12 cane for ambulation outside the work area; occasionally push or pull; occasionally 13 climb, crawl, bend, kneel, and balance; never walk on uneven terrain; never climb 14 ladders; never work at unprotected heights; frequently perform fine and gross 15 manipulation bilaterally; limited to tasks with a reasoning level of three or less; and 16 no direct interaction with the public.” (AR 22 (emphasis added).) 17 Based on this RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found (i) jobs existed 18 in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed 19 before May 16, 2018, specifically office helper, routine clerk, and inspector/hand 20 packager; (ii) Plaintiff was not disabled before May 16, 2018; and (iii) Plaintiff 21 became disabled as of May 16, 2018. (AR 30-31.) 22 In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence 23 of record. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see 20 C.F.R. 24 § 404.1527(b). Residual functional capacity (“RFC”) represents “‘the most’ the 25 claimant can do, despite any limitations.” Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 405 26 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended (Feb. 5, 2016) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)). 27 When assessing RFC, an ALJ must evaluate “on a function-by-function basis” how 28 particular impairments affect a claimant's abilities to perform basic physical, mental, 1 or other work-related functions. SSR 96-8P at *1 (citing, in part, 20 C.F.R. 2 § 416.945(b)-(d)). An ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, 3 including medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of a claimant’s subjective 4 symptoms (i.e., pain), that may reasonably be attributed to a medically determinable 5 impairment. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006); see 20 6 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In addition, an ALJ must account for limitations caused by 7 all of a claimant's medically determinable impairments, even those that are “not 8 severe.” SSR 96-8P at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). An ALJ’s RFC 9 determination “must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular 10 claimant.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 11 When assessing RFC, an ALJ must “translate” the broad categories of mental 12 limitations identified at steps two and three into the detailed and “concrete” 13 functional restrictions documented in the medical evidence which reflect the most 14 the claimant can do despite such mental limitations. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 15 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008); Phillipsv. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 935, 940(N.D 16 Cal.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRENDA L-N.,1 Case No. 5:19-cv-01567-AFM 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION 14 ANDREW SAUL, OF THE COMMISSIONER Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff filed this action for review of the Commissioner’s final decision 19 denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 20 income. In accordance with the Court’s case management order, the parties have filed 21 briefs addressing the merits of the disputed issue. The matter is now ready for 22 decision. 23 BACKGROUND 24 On June 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance 25 benefits, alleging disability beginning August 22, 2014. (Administrative Record 26 27 1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case 28 Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 1 (“AR”) 17, 79, 184-85.) Her applications were denied initially and upon 2 reconsideration. (AR 102-06, 108-14.) Thereafter, at Plaintiff’s request, an 3 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing on August 21, 2018 – at 4 which Plaintiff (represented by counsel) and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. 5 (AR 39-62.) On August 21, 2018, the ALJ issued a partially unfavorable decision 6 finding that Plaintiff became “disabled” when she reached “Advanced Age” on 7 May 16, 2018, but not disabled before then. (AR 17-31.) Plaintiff filed a request for 8 review with the Appeals Council, which upheld the ALJ’s decision on June 20, 2019 9 (AR 1-6), Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court for review of the final decision of 10 the Commissioner. 11 DISPUTED ISSUE 12 Whether the ALJ erred in the RFC in finding that Plaintiff is limited to 13 occasional balancing yet is also capable of standing/walking for 6 hours. 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW 15 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 16 determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial 17 evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied. See Treichler v. 18 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the 19 substantial-evidence standard, this Court asks whether the administrative record 20 contains sufficient evidence to support the Commissioner’s factual determinations. 21 Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). As the Supreme Court observed 22 in Biestek, “whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold 23 for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.”Id.Itmeans “more than a mere scintilla” 24 but less than a preponderance and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 25 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 26 389, 401 (1971). This Court must review the record as a whole, weighing both the 27 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s 28 conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). Where 1 evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s 2 decision must be upheld. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 DISCUSSION 4 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had “severe” impairments, including obesity; 5 degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine with radiculopathy in the 6 bilateral upper extremities and left lower extremity; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; 7 bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome; bilateral supraspinatus tears; degenerative joint 8 disease of the bilateral knees; depressive disorder; and anxiety disorder. (AR 19.) 9 The also ALJ found that the Claimant retained the residual functional capacity 10 (“RFC”) to: “lift or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; 11 stand or walk or sit six hours each in an eight-hour workday; must be able to use a 12 cane for ambulation outside the work area; occasionally push or pull; occasionally 13 climb, crawl, bend, kneel, and balance; never walk on uneven terrain; never climb 14 ladders; never work at unprotected heights; frequently perform fine and gross 15 manipulation bilaterally; limited to tasks with a reasoning level of three or less; and 16 no direct interaction with the public.” (AR 22 (emphasis added).) 17 Based on this RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found (i) jobs existed 18 in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could have performed 19 before May 16, 2018, specifically office helper, routine clerk, and inspector/hand 20 packager; (ii) Plaintiff was not disabled before May 16, 2018; and (iii) Plaintiff 21 became disabled as of May 16, 2018. (AR 30-31.) 22 In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence 23 of record. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see 20 C.F.R. 24 § 404.1527(b). Residual functional capacity (“RFC”) represents “‘the most’ the 25 claimant can do, despite any limitations.” Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 405 26 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended (Feb. 5, 2016) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)). 27 When assessing RFC, an ALJ must evaluate “on a function-by-function basis” how 28 particular impairments affect a claimant's abilities to perform basic physical, mental, 1 or other work-related functions. SSR 96-8P at *1 (citing, in part, 20 C.F.R. 2 § 416.945(b)-(d)). An ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, 3 including medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of a claimant’s subjective 4 symptoms (i.e., pain), that may reasonably be attributed to a medically determinable 5 impairment. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006); see 20 6 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In addition, an ALJ must account for limitations caused by 7 all of a claimant's medically determinable impairments, even those that are “not 8 severe.” SSR 96-8P at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). An ALJ’s RFC 9 determination “must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular 10 claimant.” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 11 When assessing RFC, an ALJ must “translate” the broad categories of mental 12 limitations identified at steps two and three into the detailed and “concrete” 13 functional restrictions documented in the medical evidence which reflect the most 14 the claimant can do despite such mental limitations. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 15 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008); Phillipsv. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 935, 940(N.D 16 Cal. 2014) (“The relevant inquiry is whether the medical evidence supports a 17 particular RFC finding.”); cf. Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 18 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating 19 clinical findings into a succinct RFC.”) (citation omitted). 20 Here, Plaintiff argues that there is an internal inconsistency in the ALJ’s RFC 21 because it provides that Plaintiff can stand/walk six hours in an eight-hour day but 22 also provides that she can perform only “occasional” balancing. According to 23 Plaintiff, [t]his RFC assessment offers opposing limitations.” (ECF No. 29 at 9.) 24 Plaintiff argues that balancing is necessary for walking and standing and that 25 occasional balancing means only up to one-third of an eight-hour day – thus, at most 26 2.67 hours in an eight-hour day. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to resolve 27 an inconsistency in the VE’s testimony on this issue and that there is not substantial 28 evidence in the record to support an RFC with walking or standing more than 1/3 of 1 || the day. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s arguments are 2 || not well taken. 3 First, three consultative physicians (Drs. Karamlou, Arnold, and Scott) found 4 || that Plaintiff can walk and stand for six hours per day, while also opining to a 5 || limitation of occasional balancing. As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Karamlou further found 6 || that Plaintiff is walking with a cane “just for support on long distance ambulation.” 7 || (ECF No. 21-3 at 63, citing AR 535.) The ALJ gave significant weight to the findings 8 || of these doctors (ECF No. 21-3 at 25-26, 28), a conclusion as to weighing which 9 || Plaintiff has not challenged. 10 Second, the medical evidence reflects relatively mild physical findings 11 || regarding Plaintiff's lower extremities and supports the RFC findings regarding 12 || standing/walking and balancing. In addition to three physician opinions referenced 13 || above, the following substantial evidence supports the RFC: 14 e August 2015 examination by Dr. David Downs showed no instability of 15 knees, with x-rays showing tenderness and irritation of the patella fermoral 16 joint but minimal degenerative changes and an MRI showing no small joint 17 effusion with minimal degenerative changes. (AR 585, 596.) 18 e January 2016 evaluation by Dr. Daniel Capen reported that Plaintiff could 19 ambulate without a cane but used one for balance, her toe and heel walk 20 were intact, and an MRI for balance difficulties was normal. (AR 570-77.) 21 e February 10, 2016 consultation with Dr. T. Eric Yokoo concluded that 22 Plaintiff walked with a normal gait and could walk on her heels and toes. 23 It was also observed that Plaintiff had full strength in her lower extremities. 24 (AR 553.) 25 | That Plaintiff points to other evidence supporting greater walking/standing 26 || limitations does constitute a basis for a finding of error. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 27 | 1141, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (substantial evidence is deferential to ALJ’s findings); 28 || Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (If the evidence “‘is susceptible
1 || to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be 2 || upheld.”). Moreover, the RFC includes the limitation of “use a cane for ambulation 3 || outside the work area,” thereby acknowledging the balancing concerns reflected in 4 || the record. 5 Third, the ALJ properly consulted with the VE. In response to hypothetical 6 || from the ALJ, the VE testified that based on the DOT, someone with Plaintiff’?s RFC 7 || could perform the jobs of office helper (239.567-010), routing clerk (222.687-022), 8 || and inspector/hand packager (559.687-074) — all of which are light work. (AR 56- 9 || 57.) In response to a further question from the ALJ, the VE testified that — based on 10 || his research rather based on the DOT — those jobs could be performed by a person 11 || who uses a cane for ambulation outside the work area. (AR 59-60.) By this, the ALJ 12 || fulfilled her duty to ask the VE about any conflicts that might exist between the VE’s 13 || testimony and the DOT. See Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). 14 || The VE’s experience is a sufficient foundation for her testimony. See Bayliss v. 15 || Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). 16 For these reasons, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision as free from 17 || legal error and supported by substantial evidence. 18 ORDER 19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the 20 || decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. 21 || DATED: 11/2/2020 (dy Uf kK . as, 22 23 ALEXANDER F. MacKINNON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
25 || 2 Plaintiff attempts to infer a balancing requirement for these jobs, but as pointed out by the 26 || Commissioner, the DOT descriptions for the jobs do not require balancing. See 1991 WL 672133; 1991 WL 672232; 1991 WL 683797; see also Bryant v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1831016, at *3 (C.D. 27 || Cal. May 7, 2014) (‘The DOT does not specify that packaging machine operator jobs require fast- paced or high-production work, so it is not apparent that the VE’s testimony conflicts with the DOT 28 | on that point.”).
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