Brenda L. Gray v. Stephen D. Gray

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMarch 6, 1996
Docket01A01-9508-CV-00359
StatusPublished

This text of Brenda L. Gray v. Stephen D. Gray (Brenda L. Gray v. Stephen D. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brenda L. Gray v. Stephen D. Gray, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

BRENDA L. GRAY, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9508-CV-00359 v. ) ) Sumner Circuit STEPHEN D. GRAY, ) No. 12431-C ) Defendant/Appellant. ) FILED COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE March 6, 1996

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR SUMNER COUNTY

AT GALLATIN, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE THOMAS GOODALL, JUDGE

JOE P. BINKLEY, SR. First American Center 315 Deaderick Street Suite 2395 Nashville, Tennessee 37238

JOHN BELL WHITESELL 150 Second Avenue North, Suite 300 Nashville, Tennessee 37201 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

CAROL L. SOLOMAN 214 Second Avenue North 400 Washington Square Nashville, Tennessee 37201

THOMAS F. BLOOM 500 Church Street Fifth Floor Nashville, Tennessee 37219 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Following a marriage of approximately eight years, Wife

filed a complaint for absolute divorce in November 1993. In her

complaint, she alleged adultery, inappropriate marital conduct, and

irreconcilable differences. Husband answered and filed a counter-

complaint which alleged cruel and inhuman treatment, inappropriate

marital conduct, and irreconcilable differences.

After the pre-trial conference in October 1994, the trial

court declared the parties divorced pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated section 36-4-120 and held that either party could present

evidence of fault where relevant at the final hearing. On 13 March

1995, the trial court held the final hearing and heard the parties’

arguments.

In its decree of 23 March 1995, the trial court divided the

disputed items of separate and marital property. The trial court

awarded Wife a Corvette automobile, a 1992 Cadillac automobile, and

a Clayton-Marcus sofa. In addition, the court ordered Wife to

assume responsibility for keeping proper insurance coverage on the

automobiles, to assume all indebtedness on the automobiles, and to

hold Husband harmless from any future payments on the automobiles.

The trial court equally divided the net proceeds of $60,804.00 from

the sale of the parties’ marital home. The trial court ordered

Husband to be responsible for and hold Wife harmless from all debts

incurred by Husband. As to any remaining items of marital

property, the trial court instructed the parties to submit their

proposed division for its consideration.

1 Court of Appeals Rule 10(b): The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated "MEMORANDUM OPINION," shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated case.

2 In a supplemental order entered on 28 March 1995, the court

divided the remaining marital property. The court also awarded

Wife $10,755.00 for attorney’s fees and $10,000.00 alimony in

solido as further distributions of the marital property.

Husband filed a notice of appeal as to that portion of the

decree distributing the marital property.

The parties’ marriage lasted for approximately eight years.

At the time of the divorce hearing, Wife was 44 years old and

Husband was 37 years old. There were no children born as a result

of the marriage.

At the time of the parties’ marriage in 1986, Wife worked

at Cummings Sign Company. She worked there until she was “laid

off” on 30 September 1990. After losing her job, she was unable to

find suitable work in the job market. For the next three years,

she helped Husband in every aspect of his mobile home hauling

business. Her responsibilities included escorting mobile homes,

keeping the company books, and balancing the checkbooks. She also

mowed grass, picked up parts, and did anything else that needed to

be done. At trial, Husband admitted that Wife’s work, which was

mostly uncompensated, saved money for the company. In addition to

working in the business, Wife also maintained the home and did

everything necessary to keep the house going and Husband

comfortable.

During the parties’ marriage, Husband acquired vehicles,

equipment, and assets used in the business. He also acquired race

cars and related racing tools and equipment. Wife valued all the

vehicles, equipment, and other assets used in the business as well

as the race cars and related racing tools and equipment acquired

and accumulated during the marriage at $143,000.00. Wife asked the

3 court to award her the 1972 Corvette automobile which she testified

Husband had given her as a gift during the marriage. The parties

agreed that the Corvette’s value was approximately $7,500.00.

Shortly after their marriage, the parties purchased a home

for $160,000.00. Wife initially paid $26,000.00 from the sale of

her pre-marriage home as a down payment for the marital home.

Husband’s testimony was that he initially paid $7,000.00 or

$8,000.00 down on the marital home and that he later added

improvements. Even though Wife’s initial investment of pre-marital

assets into the marital home was approximately three times that of

Husband’s, Wife agreed to split the net proceeds from the sale of

the marital home equally with Husband.

The parties had only one joint debt which was on the

Cadillac automobile. Husband, however, argued that both of the

parties were responsible for a VISA credit card debt of some

$4,000.00. He admitted that the VISA account was solely in his

name and that the Wife had never used the VISA card. Nevertheless,

he asked the court to split the indebtedness between the parties

because he claimed to have used the card to pay off “household

stuff” and to make a house payment on one occasion. Husband was

unable to substantiate these claims.

It was Wife’s testimony that the VISA card debt belonged

solely to Husband. She explained that Husband had used his credit

card exclusively to make purchases for himself. She also testified

regarding his purchase of a race motor using a $4,000.00 credit

card cash advance. The trial court held that Husband was

responsible for and would pay the VISA credit card debt.

During the marriage, the parties owned two certificates of

deposit each with a value of $10,000.00, not including the amount

4 of interest accrued during the marriage. Husband cashed the

certificates in March 1994 even though they were the joint property

of the parties. Wife never ascertained what Husband did with the

proceeds of the certificates of deposit; however, at the hearing,

it was shown that Husband had paid $20,500.00 as a down payment

toward the purchase of a house in January 1995.

Husband’s own proof of his income contradicted his testimony

regarding the source of the down payment. He testified that he

received the $20,500.00, which he used for the down payment on the

house, from Luv Homes for contract labor he had performed. In that

same hearing, however, he testified that he was destitute and

introduced an income and expense statement to show that he had an

income of only $25,000.00 before taxes in 1994. The irony of this

testimony lies in the fact that less than one month after Husband’s

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