Brenda Compton v. Pop's Chevrolet, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: January 31, 2025
• Docket: 2023-CA-1244
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JANUARY 31, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2023-CA-1244-MR

BRENDA COMPTON APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00077

POP’S CHEVROLET, INC. APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: CETRULO, L. JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

JONES, L., JUDGE: Brenda Compton (Compton) appeals from an order of the

Floyd Circuit Court that granted summary judgment in favor of Pop’s Chevrolet,

Inc. (PCI). We affirm the circuit court. Factual and Procedural Background

Compton purchased a used 2020 Dodge Charger from PCI in April

2022.1 Prior to purchasing the vehicle, PCI provided her with a history via Carfax.

Compton claims that at some point after the purchase, she took the vehicle to

another dealership where she obtained a vehicle history from Experian. The

Experian report indicated the vehicle was previously stolen, the Vehicle

Identification Number (VIN) defaced, and a fraudulent VIN placed on the vehicle.

This information had not been contained in the Carfax report. Compton filed the

underlying complaint in the circuit court in February 2023, claiming that she “did

not get the benefit of her bargain” and wanted the sales contract rescinded and her

money refunded. PCI filed a counterclaim for defamation based on alleged social

media posts Compton made about PCI.

PCI propounded discovery requests on March 28, 2023, which

included requests for admissions regarding various facts including the VIN, the

purchase contract, and that Compton was not damaged by any alleged VIN

discrepancy or any alleged prior theft of the vehicle. Compton failed to respond

and PCI filed a motion to deem truth of facts admitted pursuant to Kentucky Rule

1 Throughout the record before us and in her brief to this Court, Compton asserts the vehicle was “new.” However, the vehicle was two years old with over 14,000 miles when Compton purchased it. The record indicates the vehicle was likely used as a rental at some point in its history.

-2- of Civil Procedure (CR) 36.01.2 Compton did not file a response and did not

appear at the hearing. The circuit court entered an order granting PCI’s motion for

admission. Shortly thereafter, PCI filed a motion for summary judgment. The

parties filed briefs and the court heard that motion on August 4, 2023. On

September 13, 2023, the circuit court entered a written order granting summary

judgment in favor of PCI. This appeal followed. Further facts will be developed

as necessary.

Standard of Review

Generally, when a circuit court grants a motion for summary

judgment, the standard of review for the appellate court is de novo because only

legal issues are involved. Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705

(Ky. App. 2004). We must consider the evidence of record in the light most

favorable to the non-movant (i.e., Compton) and determine whether the circuit

court correctly found there was no genuine issues as to any material fact and that

the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916

S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). However, due to Compton’s briefing

deficiencies as explained below, we review only for manifest injustice.

2 Although this motion appears in the certified case history from the Floyd Circuit Clerk, it does not appear in the record before us.

-3- Analysis

Compton’s brief is deficient in several ways. First, there are no

citations to the record in her Statement of the Case as required by Kentucky Rules

of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 32(A)(3); nor does Compton cite to the record in her

Argument section, as required by RAP 32(A)(4). Finally, there is no preservation

statement at the beginning of her Argument, also required by RAP 32(A)(4).3

We have three options when a party fails comply with the appellate

rules: “(1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) to strike the

brief or its offending portions, [RAP 10(B)(3)]4; or (3) to review the issues raised

in the brief for manifest injustice only, Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky.

App. 1990).” Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010). The

Kentucky Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he manifest injustice standard of

review is reserved only for errors in appellate briefing related to the statement of

preservation.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021).

Manifest injustice exists where there “is probability of a different result or error so

fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.”

3 PCI argues that Compton’s arguments related to a rebuilt title are unpreserved. PCI is correct that there are no claims related to an alleged rebuilt title contained in Compton’s complaint. Our review of the record shows that Compton’s assertions regarding the title of the vehicle do not appear until she filed a response to PCI’s motion to dismiss. It was also argued extensively at the hearing on August 4, 2023. 4 Formerly CR 76.12(8)(a).

-4- Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006). “Manifest injustice is

found if the error seriously affected the ‘fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

the proceeding.’” McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 100, 112 (Ky. 2012)

(quoting Martin, 207 S.W.3d at 4). Finally, “[r]equiring a statement of

preservation saves this Court the time of canvassing the record in order to

determine if the claimed error was properly preserved for appeal.” S.T. v. Cabinet

for Health and Family Services, 585 S.W.3d 769, 777 (Ky. App. 2019) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

Thus, due to Compton’s briefing deficiencies, we review only for

manifest injustice, and, accordingly, find none. It is well-settled law in Kentucky

that “where there is no sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which

an admission is requested, or setting forth in detail why the party cannot truthfully

admit or deny those matters, they are deemed admitted and may be the basis for a

summary judgment.” Smather v. May, 379 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Ky. 1964). See also

CR 36.01(2).

It is equally well settled that:

[A]ny matter admitted under the rule is held to be conclusively established unless the trial court permits the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. CR 36.02. Thus, an inattentive party served with a request for admissions may run the risk of having judgment entered against him based upon the failure to respond.

Harris v. Stewart, 981 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. App. 1998).

-5- Because of Compton’s failure to respond to PCI’s request for

admissions, PCI conclusively established the following facts: (1) the true VIN was

located on the vehicle, in the sales contract, and in the title; and all VINs matched;

(2) the vehicle was legally titled; and (3) any prior alleged theft of the vehicle did

not cause damage to Compton. Compton did not subsequently seek withdrawal or

amendment of the admissions. As a result, there were no genuine issues of

material facts and summary judgment was appropriate.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Floyd Circuit

Court dated September 13, 2023, granting summary judgement to PCI.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Wolodymyr Cybriwsky C.V. Reynolds Prestonburg, Kentucky Lisa Stumbo Prestonburg, Kentucky

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