Breazeale v. Social Security Administration

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedFebruary 12, 2025
Docket6:24-cv-00058
StatusUnknown

This text of Breazeale v. Social Security Administration (Breazeale v. Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Breazeale v. Social Security Administration, (E.D. Okla. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AMANDA MARIE BREAZEALE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. CIV-24-058-SPS ) MICHELLE A. KING, Acting ) Commissioner of the Social ) Security Administration, ) ) Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The claimant Amanda Marie Breazeale, requests judicial review of a denial of benefits by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She appeals the Commissioner’s decision and asserts that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in determining she was not disabled. For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision is hereby AFFIRMED. Social Security Law and Standard of Review Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act “only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy[.]” Id. § 423 (d)(2)(A). Social security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.1 Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal

standards were applied. See Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). See also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for the Commissioner’s. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). But the Court must review the record as a whole, and “[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See also Casias,

933 F.2d at 800-01.

1 Step one requires the claimant to establish that she is not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Step two requires the claimant to establish that she has a medically severe impairment (or combination of impairments) that significantly limits her ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, or her impairment is not medically severe, disability benefits are denied. If she does have a medically severe impairment, it is measured at step three against the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant has a listed (or “medically equivalent”) impairment, she is regarded as disabled and awarded benefits without further inquiry. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to step four, where the claimant must show that she lacks the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to her past relevant work. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there is significant work in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given her age, education, work experience, and RFC. Disability benefits are denied if the claimant can return to any of her past relevant work or if her RFC does not preclude alternative work. See generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988). Claimant’s Background Claimant was born on April 30, 1990, and was 29 years old on the alleged amended disability onset date. (Tr. 29). She was 33 years old at the time of the most recent administrative hearing. (Tr. 31). She has completed the 11th grade and has past relevant work experience working

as an assistant manager. (Tr. 29, 50). Claimant asserts she has been unable to work since January 1, 2020. (Tr. 294). Procedural History The Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Claimant applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act in 2021, alleging disability beginning on March 8, 2018. (Tr. 45). Her amended onset date is January 1, 2020. (Tr. 45, 185- 86). Claimant’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Following an administrative hearing, ALJ Deidre Dexter issued a written opinion on October 19, 2023, determining Claimant was not disabled. (Tr. 14-35). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s written opinion the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of this appeal. (Tr. 1-6).

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(d). Decision of the Administrative Law Judge The ALJ made her decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant had. severe impairments including Hashimoto’s, obesity, osteoarthritis, migraines, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 20). The ALJ assessed Claimant suffered from some nonsevere impairments, including irritable bowel syndrome, gastritis, bradycardia, and unspecified chest pains. (Tr. 21-22). Next, she found that Claimant’s impairments did not meet a listing. (Tr. 22-23). At step four, she found that Claimant retained “the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following qualifications: the claimant is able to lift, carry, push, or pull up to 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. She is able to sit up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and is able to stand and/or walk up to 4 hours in an 8-hour workday. The need to change positions can be accommodated by the 15-minute morning and afternoon break and the 30-minute lunch period. The claimant is able to occasionally climb ramps or stairs, kneel, or crawl. She is able to frequently stoop or crouch. She is able to frequently handle or finger. A job should not involve climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant is able to understand, remember, and perform simple tasks. She is able to sustain attention and concentration for up to 2 hours at a time, with routine breaks, when performing simple tasks. The claimant is able to sustain the mental demands associated with performing simple tasks throughout an ordinary workday and workweek.

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Breazeale v. Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/breazeale-v-social-security-administration-oked-2025.