breault v. capital city auto

• Court: Vermont Superior Court
• Decided: May 9, 2024
• Docket: 145-3-19 wncv
• Status: Published

Opinion

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Washington Unit Case No. 145-3-19 Wncv 65 State Street Montpelier VT 05602 802-828-2091 www.vermontjudiciary.org

Raynal Breault vs. Capital City Auto Mart, Inc.

Ruling on Defendant’s Motion in Limine

Plaintiff Raynal Breault alleges in this case, among other things, that Defendant

Capital City Auto Mart, Inc., (Capital City), a motor vehicle dealer, misrepresented the

condition of the truck that it sold to him. In relation to the transaction between Mr.

Breault and Capital City, the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) assessed

Capital City a $500 penalty for “[m]isrepresentation of known vehicle defects to

purchaser prior to sale.” In response, Capital City and the DMV stipulated that Capital

City would pay the penalty, and it would not be treated as an admission of guilt. Capital

City has filed a motion in limine in this case requesting that the Court exclude from trial

any reference to the DMV proceeding or its outcome, which it characterizes as a “nolo

contendre plea.”

As support for its motion, Capital City seeks to take advantage of protections

related to nolo pleas as described in Vt. R. Crim. P. 11. It further argues that the DMV’s

assessment was for a violation of the wholly inapplicable rules that apply to the Motor

Vehicle Arbitration Board and that, after a diligent search for any statutory basis for the

penalty, none has been found. Capital City, thus, concludes that the assessment could

not have had any legitimate legal basis. It also maintains that, if Mr. Breault had a

problem with the nolo contendre nature of the stipulation, then he should have

Order Page 1 of 4 145-3-19 Wncv Raynal Breault vs. Capital City Auto Mart, Inc. challenged it in the administrative case, and it is now too late to do so. Additionally, ¶ 5

of the stipulation resolving the administrative penalty provides that “Dealer’s No Contest

plea cannot be used as evidence against Dealership in a civil case or any other proceeding

against Dealership.” It is unclear the extent to which Capital City is attempting to rely

on that provision in support of its claim as it is not the subject of extensive briefing. The

Court will address each contention in turn.

Capital City’s motion is denied. It has come forward with no applicable legal

authority that would bar references to the administrative proceeding and its outcome in

this case. Criminal Rule 11, by its express terms, did not apply to the DMV proceeding,

which was a noncriminal, administrative proceeding, and has also no applicability here.

Its citation of support from other types of administrative proceedings also has no

applicability here.

Capital City’s assertion that the assessment was for a purported violation of the

wholly inapplicable Administrative Rule 51, which applies to the Motor Vehicle

Arbitration Board, seeks to take unfair advantage of an obvious typographical error in

the assessment notice. While citing Rule 51, the notice used the correct language from

the plainly applicable Rule 50 (Vermont Dealer Licensing and Schedule of Penalties and

Suspension) with which Capital City, a dealer, is presumably well acquainted.

As for a statutory basis for the assessment, the notice generally cites 23 V.S.A. §

475. Section 475(a) authorizes the DMV to “impose an administrative penalty of not

more than $500.00 for each violation against a dealer or a transporter who violates the

provisions of this subchapter.” The reference is to Subchapter 4 of Chapter 7 of Title 23,

which includes 23 V.S.A. § 462. Section 462(a) bars “fraudulent or unlawful practices

Order Page 2 of 4 145-3-19 Wncv Raynal Breault vs. Capital City Auto Mart, Inc. related to the purchase, sale, or exchange of vehicles.” The Court concludes that Section

462 is broad enough to encompass misrepresentations made in connection with the sale

of a motor vehicle, as was asserted in the administrative proceeding against Capital City.

Capital City’s argument that the time and place for any objection by Mr. Breault

to the stipulation was in the administrative case is baseless. Mr. Breault was not a party

to the administrative case, and Capital City has not come forward with any legal grounds

on which he would have had the ability or standing to intervene and object to the

resolution of that proceeding.

No doubt, ¶ 5 of the stipulation is supportive of the notion that the DMV and

Capital City agreed that the stipulation would not be employed in, at least, some civil

cases. But, while that provision may be enforceable as to civil proceedings between

Capital City and the DMV, the agreeing parties, it cannot bind Mr. Breault or the Court

in this matter.

In the end, the Court sees no lawful basis to exclude all references to the DMV

proceeding in the trial of this case. By the express terms of the stipulation, the payment

of the penalty purports not to be an admission of guilt. Mr. Breault remains free to point

to it as potential evidence of guilt. Capital City remains free to provide innocent reasons

for settling, such as that doing so was expedient and avoided the expense of challenging

the penalty until the matter could be heard by a jury. Cf. Colosi v. Foley, 849 N.Y.S.2d

745, 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (“We note, however, that defendant at trial must

be given an opportunity to ‘explain his [nolo] plea [from the administrative case] so that

the jury [in the civil case] may decide whether to give it any weight.’”). The jury can

determine what weight the matter deserves.

Order Page 3 of 4 145-3-19 Wncv Raynal Breault vs. Capital City Auto Mart, Inc. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Capital City’s motion in limine is denied.

Electronically signed on Wednesday, March 27, 2024, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).

_______________________ Timothy B. Tomasi Superior Court Judge

Order Page 4 of 4 145-3-19 Wncv Raynal Breault vs. Capital City Auto Mart, Inc.