Breanna Kalaisha B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00086
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 6 Breanna Kalaisha B., Case No. 2:25-cv-00086-JCM-NJK

7 Plaintiff(s), Report and Recommendation 8 v. [Docket No. 21] 9 Frank Bisignano, 10 Defendant(s). 11 This case involves judicial review of administrative action by the Commissioner of Social 12 Security (“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits pursuant to Title 13 XVI of the Social Security Act. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s opening brief seeking an 14 award of benefits or remand. Docket No. 21. The Commissioner filed a responsive brief in 15 opposition. Docket No. 23. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 24. 16 I. STANDARDS 17 A. Disability Evaluation Process 18 The standard for determining disability is whether a social security claimant has an 19 “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 20 physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not 21 less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A). That 22 determination is made by following a five-step sequential evaluation process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 23 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). The first step addresses 24 whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 25 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).1 The second step addresses whether the claimant has a medically 26 determinable impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments that significantly limits 27 1 The five-step process is largely the same for both Title II and Title XVI claims. For a 28 Title II claim, however, a claimant must also meet insurance requirements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.130. 1 basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). The third step addresses whether the 2 claimant’s impairments or combination of impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of an 3 impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 4 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926. There is then a determination of the 5 claimant’s residual functional capacity, which assesses the claimant’s ability to do physical and 6 mental work-related activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step addresses 7 whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 8 §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). The fifth step addresses whether the claimant is able to do other work 9 considering the residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 10 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). 11 B. Judicial Review 12 After exhausting the administrative process, a claimant may seek judicial review of a 13 decision denying social security benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court must uphold a decision 14 denying benefits if the proper legal standard was applied and there is substantial evidence in the 15 record to support the decision. Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). Substantial 16 evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” which equates to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 17 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 18 (2019). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. 19 II. BACKGROUND 20 A. Procedural History 21 On October 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income with 22 an alleged onset date of January 1, 2016. See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 81. On August 5, 23 2023, Plaintiff’s application was denied initially. A.R. 81-89. On September 18, 2023, Plaintiff’s 24 claim was denied on reconsideration. A.R. 90-98. On January 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request 25 for a hearing before an administrative law judge. A.R. 110. On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s 26 representative, and a vocational expert appeared for a hearing before ALJ Arthur Zeidman. See 27 A.R. 34-80. On August 30, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Plaintiff 28 had not been under a disability through the date of the decision. A.R. 14-33. On November 15, 1 2024, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals 2 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. A.R. 1-6. On January 14, 2025, Plaintiff 3 commenced this suit for judicial review. Docket No. 1. 4 B. The Decision Below 5 The ALJ’s decision followed the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in 20 6 C.F.R. § 416.920. A.R. 17-28. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 7 substantial gainful activity since October 28, 2021. A.R. 19. At step two, the ALJ found that 8 Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: depression, anxiety, and impulse control disorder. 9 A.R. 19-20. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination 10 of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 11 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. A.R. 20-22. The ALJ found that, including Plaintiff’s 12 substance use, she has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 13 exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: only occasional interaction with 14 coworkers and the public. A.R. 22-26. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform 15 any past relevant work. A.R. 26. At step five, the ALJ found that jobs exist in significant numbers 16 in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform based on her age, education, work experience, 17 and residual functional capacity. A.R. 26-27. In doing so, the ALJ defined Plaintiff as a younger 18 individual (27 years old) as of the date the application was filed with at least a high school 19 education. A.R. 26. The ALJ found the transferability of job skills to be immaterial. A.R. 26. 20 The ALJ considered Medical Vocational Rules, which provide a framework for finding Plaintiff 21 not disabled, along with vocational expert testimony that an individual with the same residual 22 functional capacity and vocational factors could perform work as a laundry worker, supply worker, 23 and as a cleaner. A.R. 28. Based on all of these findings, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. 24 A.R. 42. 25 III. ANALYSIS 26 Plaintiff raises a single argument on appeal that the ALJ erred in making severity findings 27 as to mental health functioning at Step 3, but then not incorporating those findings into the residual 28 functional capacity later in the process. Docket No. 21 at 4-7; see also Docket No. 24. The 1 Commissioner responds that the Step 3 analysis is not a residual functional capacity assessment, 2 and that the ALJ properly translated the medical record into restrictions reflected in the residual 3 functional capacity. Docket No. 23 at 2-3. The Commissioner has the better argument. 4 “[R]esidual functional capacity is the most [Plaintiff] can still do despite [Plaintiff’s] 5 limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The residual functional capacity determination considers 6 all medically determinable impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 7 416.945(a). The residual functional assessment must consider all evidence in the record and 8 “contain a thorough discussion and analysis of the objective medical and other evidence . . .” 9 Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Social Security Ruling 96-8p). 10 “The RFC is an administrative assessment of the extent to which an individual’s medically 11 determinable impairments . . . may affect his or her capacity to do work-related physical and mental 12 activities.” Id. (quoting Social Security Ruling 96-8p). “[T]he ALJ is responsible for translating 13 and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 14 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). Where evidence is subject to more than one rational 15 interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusion will be upheld. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th 16 Cir. 2005). 17 “Moderate limitations do not have to be exactly mirrored in the RFC determination.” 18 Phillips v. Colvin, 61 F. Supp. 3d 925, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2014).2 “Moderate mental functional 19 limitations—specifically limitations in social functioning and adaptation—are not per se disabling, 20 nor do they preclude the performance of jobs that involve simple, repetitive tasks.” McLain v. 21 Astrue, Case No. SACV 10-1108 JC, 2011 WL 2174895, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2011) (explaining 22 that moderate limitations on social functioning and adaptation would not preclude the performance 23 of simple, repetitive tasks). Courts within the Ninth Circuit have found that moderate limitations 24 in adapting and managing oneself can be properly encompassed in a residual functional capacity 25

26 2 There are five levels of severity in this area: none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4). “Moderate” limitations are understood to mean that “[t]here is more 27 than a slight limitation in this area, but the individual can still function satisfactorily.” Rose M. E. v. Saul, Case No. 5:20-cv-01199-AFM, 2021 WL 1612091, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2021) 28 (collecting cases). 1 of simple, routine tasks. See, e.g., Kimball v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 1:21-cv-1548-EPG, 2 2022 WL 17343820, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2022).3 Courts within the Ninth Circuit have found 3 that moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information can be 4 properly encompassed in a residual functional capacity of simple, routine tasks. See, e.g., Rebecca 5 L. v. Berryhill, Case No. 6:18-cv-00500-MK, 2019 WL 857561, at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 14, 2019) 6 (affirming a “moderate” impairment in understanding, remembering, or applying being translated 7 into limitation to “simple routine, repetitive tasks”). 8 At bottom, an ALJ’s assessment of mental health limitations is adequate where it is 9 supported by the restrictions identified in the medical testimony. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 10 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no error in formulation of RFC with restriction to 11 simple tasks notwithstanding identified impairments involving “pace and the other mental 12 limitations regarding attention, concentration, and adaption”).4 By extension, courts have flatly 13 rejected blanket arguments that mental health limitations cannot, as a matter of law, be 14 encompassed by a residual functional capacity with a limitation to simple, routine tasks. See, e.g., 15 Phillips, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 940 (rejecting contention of error in failing to account for moderate 16 mental health difficulties where the claimant did not cite medical evidence requiring a more 17 restrictive residual functional capacity); see also Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 794 (9th Cir. 18

19 3 Indeed, courts have found that even a marked limitation in adapting and managing oneself can be consistent with a residual functional capacity limiting a claimant to simple, routine tasks 20 with limitations on interactions with coworkers and the public. Stevens v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 1:18-cv-1082-JLT, 2020 WL 1324497, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2020) (collecting 21 cases). 22 4 In reply, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish and limit Stubbs-Danielson as applying only to moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. See Docket No. 24 at 4-5. Although 23 the Ninth Circuit in that opinion did reference concentration, persistence, and pace most directly, the decision affirmed the ALJ’s adoption of the restrictions outlined by Dr. Eather, who had found 24 the claimant to have “a slow pace, both in thinking & actions” and to have “several moderate limitations in other mental areas.” Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173 (emphasis added). The 25 Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that “the ALJ’s RFC finding properly incorporated the limitations identified by Dr. McCollum and Dr. Eather, including those related to pace and the 26 other mental limitations regarding attention, concentration, and adaption.” Id. at 1174 (emphasis added). Courts have applied the reasoning in Stubbs-Danielson beyond the concentration, 27 persistence, and pace context. See, e.g., James H. v. Dudek, Case No. 2:24-cv-05631-GJS, 2025 WL 1202223, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2025) (addressing moderate difficulties with adapting or 28 managing oneself). 1 2022) (rejecting argument that ALJ erred in not including mild mental limitations in residual 2 functional capacity where the claimant did “not identify any particular evidence that the ALJ failed 3 to consider or explain why the record does not support the ALJ’s findings regarding her mental 4 functioning”). As recently explained in a sister district by United States Magistrate Judge Gail J. 5 Standish:

6 At its core, Plaintiff’s argument is that an RFC restriction to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks cannot constitute an accurate translation 7 or accommodation of a claimant’s moderate difficulties with adapting or managing oneself as an unassailable legal proposition, 8 not that this is so based on the particular facts of his case. Plaintiff’s “as a matter of law” type argument is unpersuasive in light of 9 Stubbs-Danielson and the numerous Ninth Circuit and District Court cases since then making clear that a step three functional limitation 10 need not be mirrored precisely in an RFC assessment as long as the medical evidence of record supports the accommodation made for 11 that limitation in the RFC. And Plaintiff has failed entirely to show any “as applied” type error, as he has not shown that the medical 12 evidence of record that was properly credited required any further restriction and accommodation in his RFC for the step three 13 functional limitation than he received. 14 James H., 2025 WL 1202223, at *6. 15 In this case, the ALJ formulated the residual functional capacity to limit Plaintiff to 16 performing simple, routine tasks with only occasional interaction with coworkers and the public. 17 See A.R. 22; see also A.R. 26. Plaintiff contends that this formulation of the residual functional 18 capacity fails as a matter of law because it does not account for her moderate limitations in 19 understanding, remembering, and applying information, as well as in adapting and managing 20 oneself. See Docket No. 21 at 4-7. Plaintiff’s opening brief declined to offer meaningful 21 discussion of the medical record or explain in meaningful fashion how the medical record supports 22 restrictions beyond those included by the ALJ in the residual functional capacity. See, e.g., Docket 23 No. 21 at 3. As explained by the Commissioner, Plaintiff’s opening brief ignores the findings of 24 Dr. Ana Olivares and Dr. Allie Wright that recognized her moderate limitations5 and expressly 25 translated them into a limitation to simple work. See Docket No. 23 at 3 (citing A.R. 87-88, 96- 26 5 To be precise with respect to understanding and remembering, Dr. Olivares and Dr. 27 Wright opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in the ability to understand and remember very short and simple instructions, but was moderately limited in the ability to understand and 28 remember detailed instructions. A.R. 87, 96. 1 97).6 The ALJ did not err in assessing a residual functional capacity supported by the restrictions 2 identified in the medical testimony7 and then identifying only simple jobs for Plaintiff. Cf. James 3 H., 2025 WL 1202223, at *6.8 4 IV. NOTICE TO COUNSEL 5 The briefing filed by both sides fell well below the standards expected by the Court. 6 Although there is significant case law addressing the specific issues involved in this appeal, the 7 briefing is entirely cursory. Plaintiff’s opening brief consists of four pages of argument devoid of 8 any mention of any case law addressing the specific issues on appeal. Docket No. 21 at 4-8.9 The 9 Commissioner’s responsive brief includes less than two pages of written text in total and the case 10 law cited is only Stubbs-Danielson. Docket No. 23 at 2-3. “The art of advocacy is not one of 11 mystery. Our adversarial system relies on the advocates to inform the discussion and raise the 12 issues to the court.” Independent Towers of Wash. v. Wash., 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). 13 Counsel are admonished moving forward that they must conduct appropriate legal research and 14 present fulsome argument in their briefing. 15 16 17 6 The ALJ’s findings were also supported by discussion of additional aspects of the medical 18 record. See A.R. 20-21, 25-26. 19 7 As Plaintiff recognizes on appeal, the ALJ’s formulation of the residual functional capacity was more favorable to her in some respects than the prior administrative medical findings. 20 “The relevant inquiry is whether the medical evidence supports a particular RFC finding.” Phillips, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 940. An ALJ does not commit reversible error by tempering extremes 21 of medical opinions in the claimant’s favor. Jessica V. v. Bisignano, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 2963455, at *4 n.3 (D. Nev. Oct. 20, 2025) (citing Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th 22 Cir. 2012)). “Courts routinely reject arguments that an ALJ erred in formulating an RFC in a manner that is better for the claimant than the conclusions reached in the medical opinions or 23 PAMFs.” Jessica V., 2025 WL 2963455, at *4 n.3 (collecting cases). 24 8 The Court also notes that Plaintiff bears the burden of showing not just that the ALJ erred, but also that the ALJ erred in a harmful manner that was consequential to the ultimate nondisability 25 determination. See Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015). Even were the Court to find that the ALJ erred, 26 Plaintiff has not made a persuasive showing that any such error would not be harmless. Cf. McLain, 2011 WL 2174895, at *6. 27 9 The opening brief cites once to one Tenth Circuit case and once to one United States 28 Supreme Court case for relatively general propositions, and cites to no other case law whatsoever. 1] V. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the decision 3] below be AFFIRMED. 4 Dated: November 13, 2025

Nancy J. Koppe 6 United Staté Mo gistrate Judge 7 8 NOTICE 9 This report and recommendation 1s submitted to the United States District Judge assigned 10] to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party who objects to this report and 11] recommendation must file a written objection supported by points and authorities within fourteen 12} days of being served with this report and recommendation. Local Rule IB 3-2(a). Failure to file 13] a timely objection may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 14} F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28