Brazos County, Christopher C. Kirk, Sheriff, Brazos County, Texas v. John Ray Tullous

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 7, 2004
• Docket: 10-04-00020-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-04-00020-CV

Brazos County AND

Christopher C. Kirk, Sheriff,

Brazos County, Texas,

                                                                      Appellants

 v.

John Ray Tullous,

                                                                      Appellee

From the 82nd District Court

Robertson County, Texas

Trial Court # 03-07-16727-CV

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

      This interlocutory appeal concerns a suit for false imprisonment and other state claims and for the deprivation of civil rights under Section 1983.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).  Appellants filed a plea to the jurisdiction.  The trial court denied the plea.  We will affirm.

      Appellee contends that we lack jurisdiction over Sheriff Kirk’s appeal.  The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides, “A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court . . . that . . . grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit . . . .”  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2004).  Section 51.014 has been interpreted to permit interlocutory appeals by government officials, including sheriffs.  Cornyn v. Fifty-Two Members of Schoppa Family, 70 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.); Perry v. Del Rio, 53 S.W.3d 818, 822-24 (Tex. App.—Austin), pet. dism’d, 66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001); see Nueces County v. Ferguson, 97 S.W.3d 205, 210 n.2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).  We have jurisdiction over Sheriff Kirk’s appeal.

      Appellants argue that state sovereign immunity bars Appellee’s suit against them.  We will overrule Appellants’ issue.

      If a trial court has jurisdiction over any part of a suit, then the court does not err to deny a plea to the jurisdiction.  Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Choctaw Props., 17 S.W.3d 260, 262 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.).

      Defenses to a Section 1983 claim are governed by federal law, and state law immunity defenses do not control.  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990); Thomas v. Allen, 837 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. 1992).  Under federal law, state political subdivisions are persons subject to suit under Section 1983.  Howlett at 376; see Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney, 936 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. 1996).  State sovereign immunity thus does not bar Appellee’s Section 1983 claim.

      Appellants also argue that Appellee failed to plead facts that established the trial court’s jurisdiction over his Section 1983 claim.  See County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).  Section 1983 provides for a cause of action for the deprivation of constitutional rights “under color of any . . . custom[] or usage[] of any State.”  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Appellants argue that Appellee failed to allege “a policy, practice or custom” that caused his injuries (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).  Appellee’s petition alleged, “Defendants, in this case and historically through course of conduct, have had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising . . . illegal, perverted, or improper use of . . . process.”  Appellee thus alleges injury under color of state custom.

      Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction over Appellee’s Section 1983 claim.  The trial court did not err in denying the plea to the jurisdiction.  We overrule Appellants’ issue.  We affirm.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Reyna

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed July 7, 2004

[CV06]