Brazie v. State Bd. of Edn.

2025 Ohio 3000

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 30439
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Brazie v. State Bd. of Edn., 2025-Ohio-3000.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

DEREK BRAZIE : : C.A. No. 30439 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CV 02766 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION : Court) : Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION

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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 22, 2025, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

MARY K. HUFFMAN, JUDGE

EPLEY, P.J., and LEWIS, J., concur. -2- OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30439

GEORGE A. KATCHMER, Attorney for Appellant ELIZABETH H. SMITH, Attorney for Appellee

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Derek Brazie appeals from the decision of the trial court overruling his “Motion

to Re-Open,” which under the authority of Civ.R. 60(B) had sought to “reopen” his

administrative appeal following its dismissal for failure to prosecute. Because we conclude

that Civ.R. 60(B) is not applicable in an administrative appeal, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Brazie was employed as an assistant tennis coach at Chaminade Julienne High

School, during which time he allegedly engaged in conduct unbecoming to the teaching

profession. The State Board of Education held an administrative hearing on whether to

revoke Brazie’s three-year pupil activity permit based on his alleged misconduct, and a

report and recommendation by the hearing officer followed. On April 9, 2024, the Board of

Education voted to revoke Brazie’s permit and to render him permanently ineligible to

reapply for any license, permit, or certificate issued by the Board of Education. Brazie filed

an administrative appeal of the decision in the common pleas court in accordance with

R.C. 119.12.

{¶ 3} The court issued a scheduling order establishing August 5, 2024, as the

deadline for Brazie to file his brief. No brief was submitted, and on August 19, 2024, the

court ordered Brazie to show cause within 14 days why his appeal should not be dismissed -3- for lack of prosecution. In the absence of a response, the court issued an order of dismissal

for failure to prosecute on September 3, 2024.

{¶ 4} Brazie moved under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) to “reopen” the case on October 23, 2024.

He claimed that he had not received any notices from the court “due to the Clerk’s Office

having an incorrect email address for Appellant’s counsel.” The State Board of Education

opposed the motion. Brazie replied and attached the brief that his counsel claimed he

attempted to file on August 5, 2024. According to counsel, he received no indication that the

brief had not been filed due to the confusion regarding his email address. Following several

continuances, the court conducted a hearing on Brazie’s motion on March 7, 2025. A

transcript of the hearing is not in the record.

{¶ 5} The court overruled Brazie’s motion to reopen. The court noted that the record

failed to establish “what happened with [Brazie’s] attempt to timely file a brief,” citing

counsel’s testimony that he attempted to file the brief on August 7, 2024, did not serve the

State Board of Education with a copy, and did not file an affidavit setting forth his efforts to

file the brief. The court further noted that the clerk’s office did not have the correct email

address for counsel for Brazie and was unable to advise counsel it did not receive the brief.

It was significant to the court that Brazie’s counsel was able to successfully file the

administrative appeal on May 15, 2024, yet from August 5 to September 12, 2024, he did

not take any action to prosecute the appeal, or respond to the August 19, 2024 show cause

order. Regarding Civ.R. 60(B), the court found that Brazie lacked a meritorious claim or

defense to the revocation of his three-year pupil activity permit and that he failed to show

excusable neglect. -4- Assignment of Error and Analysis

{¶ 6} Brazie’s assignment of error contends that the court erred in finding that he had

not met his burden for reopening his administrative appeal under Civ.R. 60(B)(1).

{¶ 7} R.C. Chapter 2505 applies to administrative appeals unless another chapter of

the Revised Code, such as Chapter 119, provides specific procedural rules.

R.C. 2505.03(B). In Hamblin v. Trustees of St. Clair Twp., 2024-Ohio-2525 (12th Dist.), a

firefighter sought judicial review of the decision of a township’s board of trustees that

terminated his employment with a fire department. The court of common pleas dismissed

the firefighter’s appeal without prejudice for want of prosecution and subsequently denied

the firefighter’s motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60. Id. at ¶ 7. On appeal,

Hamblin argued that the court erred in denying his Civ.R. 60 motion. Id. at ¶ 13. Before

addressing the merits of his argument, the Twelfth District addressed whether a motion for

relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(A) or (B) is authorized in an administrative appeal

before a common pleas court. Id. at ¶ 14. The court concluded that such motions are not

authorized. Id.

{¶ 8} The Twelfth District explained that under R.C. 2506.04, “in an administrative

appeal, ‘[t]he judgment of the court may be appealed by any party on questions of law as

provided in the Rules of Appellate Procedure’ and, to the extent not in conflict with those

rules, R.C. Chapter 2505.” Id. at ¶ 15. The court found that “given the plain language of the

statute,” Civ.R. 60(B) does not provide “an alternative method to challenge the court’s

judgment other than appealing the matter to the appropriate court of appeals.” Id. “This is

because, when conducting its review of administrative matters, the common pleas court is

sitting as an appellate court tasked with weighing the evidence and determining whether the

administrative decision being appealed is ‘unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, -5- unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative

evidence on the whole record.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2506.04.

{¶ 9} The Twelfth District further observed that “[t]he Civil Rules apply to all legal

proceedings except special statutory proceedings where they are clearly inapplicable.”

(Cleaned up.) Id. at ¶ 16. “‘An administrative appeal filed pursuant to statute is a special

statutory proceeding.’” Id., quoting Middlebrook v. United Collection Bur., Inc., 2017-Ohio-

8587, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.). See also Nippon Sushi and Steak LLC v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm.,

2024-Ohio-2341 (10th Dist.) (“An administrative appeal under R.C. Chapter 119 is a special

statutory proceeding.”) “Moreover, as noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, ‘[an] administrative

appeal is more akin to an appeal than a trial.’” Hamblin at ¶ 16, quoting AT&T

Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch, 2012-Ohio-1975, ¶ 14.

{¶ 10} The Twelfth District ultimately concluded that the common pleas court should

have understood Hamblin’s Civ.R. 60 motion as a motion for reconsideration under

App.R. 26, and it proceeded to analyze the common pleas court’s decision under the

standard applicable to the appellate rule. Id. at ¶ 16-19. However, the Supreme Court has

held that a motion for reconsideration of the final judgment of a common pleas court in an

administrative appeal is void, as it is “simply a legal fiction created by counsel.” Pitts v. Ohio

Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378, 381 (1981). We have previously declined to recognize

the validity of such a motion for reconsideration in an administrative appeal. Omoyosi v.

Montgomery Cty. Dept. of Job and Family Servs., 2018-Ohio-3131, ¶ 9 fn. 3 (2d Dist.).

Therefore, we decline to follow this aspect of Hamblin.

{¶ 11} Here, Brazie failed to appeal from the common pleas court’s dismissal for

failure to prosecute. His Civ.R. 60(B) motion to reopen his administrative appeal was -6- correctly overruled because the rule was not applicable to the proceeding. Accordingly, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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EPLEY, P.J., and LEWIS, J., concur.