Bray v. Sinnett

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedOctober 9, 2020
Docket6:20-cv-00324
StatusUnknown

This text of Bray v. Sinnett (Bray v. Sinnett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bray v. Sinnett, (E.D. Okla. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA JEROMY DAVID BRAY,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. CIV 20-324-JFH-SPS

MIKE SINNETT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff is a pro se state prisoner who is incarcerated at the Pontotoc County Justice Center (“PCJC”) in Ada, Oklahoma. He filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations occurring at the facility [Dkt. No. 1]. The defendants are Mike Sinnett, Former PCJC Administrator; John Christian, Pontotoc County Sheriff; Larry Balcerak, Indigent Defense Attorney, Brian LNU, Jailer; and the Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff alleges that on July 19, 2020, the H-Pod population was moved to the recreation yard. He alone, however, was moved to the recreation yard and was made to sit in the mop closet adjacent to the control tower. Defendant Mike Sinnett then allegedly forced him to drop his pants and boxer shorts to his ankles, revealing his genitals. When Plaintiff then pulled up his pants, Sinnett made him pull out the band of his pants and boxers so Sinnett could see Plaintiff’s genitals. Sinnett then allegedly stuck his hand down the inside of Plaintiff’s pants and boxers, rubbing Plaintiff’s penis and testicles in the process. [Dkt. No. 1 at 9]. Plaintiff claims this incident was witnessed by Defendant Officer Brian LNU, and it was meant as an act of sexual assault and to demean him for his litigation activities after Defendant Attorney Larry Balcerak brought Plaintiff’s litigation history to Sinnett’s attention. Plaintiff requests relief in the forms of monetary damages and the arrests and criminal prosecution of Defendants Sinnett and Balcerak. Id. at 7, 10. Screening/Dismissal Standards

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various

mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).

After review of the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff must file an amended civil rights complaint on the Court’s form, as set forth below. Amended Complaint Within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff must file an amended complaint on this Court’s form. Plaintiff may use additional pages, if necessary, but he may not substitute a written narrative for completing the Court’s form. The amended complaint must set forth the full name of each person he is suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with each defendant listed in both the caption and the body of the document. Further, the names in the caption of the amended complaint must be identical to those contained in the body of the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff has named the Pontotoc County Sheriff’s Department as one of the defendants in this case. The Sheriff’s Department, however, is not a “person” under section 1983. “Courts routinely dismiss § 1983 claims that name and seek to impose liability directly upon municipal

and county police departments because police departments are not separate suable entities.” Harper v. City of Cortez, No. 14-2984-KLM, 2015 WL 4720311, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2015) (citing cases) (unpublished). See also Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds by Tyus v. Martinez, 475 U.S. 1138 (1986) (“The ‘City of Denver Police Department’ is not a separate suable entity”).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Leeke v. Timmerman
454 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Maxey v. Banks
26 F. App'x 805 (Tenth Circuit, 2001)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Gallagher v. Shelton
587 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Abdullah Dohaish v. Dale Tooley
670 F.2d 934 (Tenth Circuit, 1982)
Hayes v. County of Sullivan
853 F. Supp. 2d 400 (S.D. New York, 2012)
Martinez v. Winner
771 F.2d 424 (Tenth Circuit, 1985)
Archuleta v. McShan
897 F.2d 495 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Gilles v. United States
906 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Tyus v. Martinez
475 U.S. 1138 (Supreme Court, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Bray v. Sinnett, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bray-v-sinnett-oked-2020.