Braxton v. Young

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedMarch 27, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-00585
StatusUnknown

This text of Braxton v. Young (Braxton v. Young) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Braxton v. Young, (S.D.W. Va. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT CHARLESTON

ANTHONY JAMES BRAXTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00585

DETECTIVE C.A. YOUNG, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending are motions to dismiss filed June 12, 2019 by defendants Fayette County Commission (“Fayette County”) and Fayette County Sherriff Mike Fridley (“Fridley”) (ECF No. 13), Larry E. Harrah (“Harrah”) and Brian D. Parsons (“Parsons”) (ECF No. 15), W.R. Callison (“Callison”) (ECF No. 17), and C.A. Young (“Young”) (ECF No. 19). Background This action was previously referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to the court of his Proposed Findings and Recommendation (“PF&R”) for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On May 1, 2019, the magistrate judge entered his PF&R recommending that the court dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as to defendants Magistrate Leonard Bickford and the West Virginia State Police for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See ECF No. 7. Neither party has objected to this PF&R.

On November 15, 2019, the magistrate judge entered a second PF&R recommending that the court grant the motion to dismiss filed by Fayette County and Fridley, grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss filed by Harrah and Parsons, grant in part and deny in part the motion to dismiss filed by Callison, grant the motion to dismiss filed by Young, and dismiss plaintiff’s complaint as to defendants Central West

Virginia Drug Task Force Corporation (“CWVDTFC”); Oak Hill City Police Department; Fayetteville City Police Department; City of Oak Hill, West Virginia; City of Fayetteville, West Virginia; Mount Hope City Police Department; City of Mount Hope; Ansted City Police Department; City of Ansted; Gauley Bridge City Police Department; City of Gauley Bridge; Nicholas County Commission; Nicholas County Sheriff Department; Summersville City Police Department; City of Summersville, West Virginia; Richwood City Police Department; City of Richwood; Clay County Commission; Clay County Sheriff Department; Webster County Commission; Webster County Sheriff Department; City of Webster Spring, West Virginia; Webster Spring City Police Department; City of Cowen, West Virginia; Pocahontas County Commission; Pocahontas County Sheriff Department; Marlinton City Police Department; City of Marlinton, West Virginia; and the estate of Steve Kessler (“Kessler”). See ECF No. 32.

On December 2, 2019, plaintiff filed objections regarding Fridley, Harrah and Parsons, Callison, CWVDTFC (and all of its named defendant members), Young, and Kessler. On December 5, 2019, Callison, Harrah and Parsons, Fridley, and Young all filed responses opposing plaintiff’s objections.

Discussion

Upon an objection, the court reviews a PF&R de novo. Specifically, “[t]he Federal Magistrates Act requires a district court to ‘make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (first alteration added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rules 6(d) and 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff had 17 days from the date of filing the PF&R within which to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections that identify the portions of the PF&R to which objection is made and the basis of such objection. The 17 days included 14 days for the filing of objections and an additional three days for service and mailing. See ECF No. 32 at 24–25. Therefore, the filing deadline was December 2, 2019. Insofar as Young argues that plaintiff’s objections are time-

barred, see ECF No. 51 at 2–3, the court deems the objections timely filed. A. Fayette County and Fridley

The magistrate judge found that plaintiff failed to state a claim against Fayette County and Fridley because plaintiff “alleges no facts about them at all,” let alone a policy or custom that led to the deprivation of his constitutional rights or “that Fridley was personally involved in the events detailed in the complaint or otherwise directed them so as to render him the source of any such policy or custom.” ECF No. 32 at 12–13. Plaintiff filed objections regarding Fridley in which plaintiff adds allegations as to show Fridley’s role in conspiring to target plaintiff. See ECF

No. 35. However, the complaint itself does not contain any of these allegations or any facts to support plaintiff’s claims against Fridley. The court cannot consider these new allegations in evaluating the motion to dismiss as it is “axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” See Katz v. Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., 332 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 n.9 (E.D. Va. 2004) (quoting Morgan Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989)); Car Carriers v. Ford

Motor Co., 745 F. 2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[C]onsideration of a motion to dismiss is limited to the pleadings.”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s objections as to Fridley are without merit and no objection is made as to the dismissal of Fayette County. B. Harrah and Parsons

Next, plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that Harrah and Parsons are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to plaintiff’s claims that they unlawfully prepared and proposed a settlement agreement and served discovery requests in the litigation plaintiff filed in Fayette County Circuit Court. See ECF No. 32 at 15; ECF No. 36. In his objections to the PF&R, plaintiff provides allegations

regarding the seizure of his property and the events surrounding the settlement agreement without addressing the concept of absolute prosecutorial immunity or disputing its application here. ECF No. 36. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s objections as to Harrah and Parsons are without merit.

C. Callison The November 15, 2019 PF&R also recommended denying Callison’s motion to dismiss in part and granting it in part insofar as Callison is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to his alleged failure to provide a property receipt on

February 15, 2017 in the execution of a search warrant signed that same date. ECF No. 32 at 4, 19–20. The PF&R found that “[t]o the extent Callison’s failure to provide a property receipt to Plaintiff during the execution of the search warrant constitutes a constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s right to receive a property receipt was not clearly established on February 15, 2017.” Id. at 19. In his objections regarding Callison, plaintiff states that he was denied the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of Callison’s actions of February 15, 2017 in the state court action, but he does not address the concept of qualified immunity or dispute its

application here. See ECF No. 37. Inasmuch as plaintiff does not state any specific objections to the PF&R’s findings, this objection is denied. D.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Braxton v. Young, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/braxton-v-young-wvsd-2020.