Braxton v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 211, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KIAYRE BRAXTON, § § No. 211, 2025 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 1802005743 (N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: July 24, 2025 Decided: October 1, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Kiayre Braxton appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for

the correction of an illegal sentence. The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the

judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Braxton’s opening

brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.

(2) On February 10, 2019, Braxton resolved three sets of pending criminal

charges by pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit racketeering, one

count of drug dealing (heroin), and three counts of possession of a firearm during

the commission of a felony (PFDCF). As part of the plea agreement, Braxton agreed that he was eligible to be sentenced as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b)

based on his three prior felony convictions: a 2010 conviction for escape after

conviction, a 2009 conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin, and a 2008

conviction for possession of heroin within 1000 feet of a school. In exchange, the

State dismissed Braxton’s remaining charges and asked the Court to impose the

minimum-mandatory sentence. The Superior Court immediately sentenced Braxton,

in accordance with the plea agreement, to 24 years and 6 months of incarceration

followed by decreasing levels of supervision. Braxton did not appeal his convictions

or sentence.

(3) In April 2025, Braxton moved for the correction of an illegal sentence

under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). Braxton claimed that his sentences for

PFDCF are illegal because they were enhanced based on facts not found

unanimously by a jury, in violation of Erlinger v. United States.1 The Superior Court

denied the motion, finding that Braxton “admitted to all of the facts a jury would

need to find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt for the enhancements to

apply.”2 Braxton appeals.

(4) We review the denial of a motion for correction of illegal sentence for

abuse of discretion.3 To the extent a claim involves a question of law, we review the

1 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 2 State v. Braxton, 2025 WL 1101627, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2025). 3 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 2 claim de novo.4 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates the

Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which

it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by

statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of

conviction did not authorize.5

(5) We agree with the Superior Court’s determination that Braxton’s

enhanced sentences are not illegal. When Braxton committed the PFDCF offense

for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender, Section 4214(b) provided in

relevant part:

Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State … and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony, which is the person’s first Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title, shall receive a minimum sentence of ½ of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title….6

Because PFDCF was a class B violent felony, Braxton was subject to a sentencing

range of 12 years and 6 months up to life if he had three prior felony convictions.7

4 Id. 5 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 6 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) (effective April 13, 2017, to July 10, 2018). 7 See id. § 4205(b)(2) (effective June 30, 2003, to present) (establishing a sentencing range of 2 to 25 years for a class B felony); id. § 4201(c) (effective Sept. 3, 2014, to July 30, 2023) (defining PFDCF as a violent felony); id. § 4214(b) (effective April 13, 2017, to July 10, 2018) (establishing a sentencing range for a defendant’s first Title 11 violent felony conviction of one-half of the maximum penalty otherwise provided by statute up to life if the defendant had three prior felony convictions). 3 (6) When Braxon committed all the PFDCF offenses, 11 Del. C. § 1447A

provided in relevant part:

A person convicted [of PFDCF], and who has been at least twice previously convicted of a felony in this State or elsewhere, shall receive a minimum sentence of 5 years at Level V….8

Braxton was therefore subject to a minimum-mandatory sentence of five years for

each PFDCF conviction if he had two prior felony convictions.

(7) In Erlinger, the United States Supreme Court considered a sentence

imposed under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act and stated that “[v]irtually

any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal

defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable

doubt” or “freely admitted in a guilty plea.”9 As part of his plea agreement, Braxton

admitted the facts that made him subject to habitual-offender sentencing under

Section 4214(b) and enhanced sentencing under Section 1447A. His sentence is

therefore not illegal under Erlinger.10

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to affirm

be GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice

8 11 Del. C. § 1447A(c) (effective July 9, 2001, to May 23, 2018). 9 Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 834 (citation modified). 10 Braxton has waived the arguments he raises for the first time on appeal. Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 4