Braxton v. Kuwik

114 Misc. 2d 668, 452 N.Y.S.2d 182, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3541
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedJune 30, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 114 Misc. 2d 668 (Braxton v. Kuwik) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Braxton v. Kuwik, 114 Misc. 2d 668, 452 N.Y.S.2d 182, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3541 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1982).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Joseph J. Sedita, J.

We live in a complex society in which multiple levels and groupings of governmental units attempt to work together, hopefully for the good of our various communities. One of the inherent problems in these interrelationships is the fact that the fiscal years of the various units of government do not always coincide. This fact helps to make governmental planning and the budgetary process more a matter of prognostication than scientific exactitude. To further complicate matters, one must consider the myriad of Federal and State rules and regulations imposed on municipalities and often laden with their own timing requirements. These regulations hover menacingly over local officials with the constant threat of the loss of State or Federal aid, upon which many of our local governments have come to depend. Through this bureaucratic and legal morass came slogging [669]*669the Mayor and City Council of Lackawanna, attempting to improve the city’s sewer and sanitation system in compliance with Federal mandates. It is, perhaps, no surprise that their steps may have been unsteady and perhaps imperfectly timed. This suit asks this court to review those steps and determine if they were insufficiently in tune with the supervening cadence of the law.

This proceeding challenges the adoption and implementation of a local law establishing a “sewer rent fund” and a system of sewer rents in the City of Lackawanna. Petitioners challenge various fiscal procedures effectuated by the respondents prior to and subsequent to the adoption of this local law.

The City of Lackawanna is the beneficiary of over $18 million in Federal and State aid for the improvement and maintenance of sewage treatment and water quality by the city. Receipt of these substantial funds was contingent upon compliance with various Federal regulations including the establishment of a system of sewer rents when the project reached a point at which it was 50% completed.

The Mayor and the city council, apparently aware that the project was nearing the 50% completion point, anticipated the establishment of sewer rents and estimated their amount when the 1981 city budget was adopted. When the project approached the 50% completion point a few months later, the Mayor and city council “adopted” a local law establishing a sewer rent system including a sewer rent fund and appropriate usage rates. The actual- adoption of the local law was apparently delayed additionally so that the proper rate could be determined and established at the time of the adoption of the local law. During the time prior to the adoption of the local law, moneys were advanced from the “general” fund to pay the operating expenses of the sewer district. Following the adoption of the local law, the city sought to reimburse the “general” fund out of the new “sewer rent” fund for moneys which were advanced to cover operating expenses in the interim period. Petitioners attack these fund transfers as improper as well as challenging the procedures followed in the adoption of the local law.

[670]*670The first issue to which this court must address itself is the question of whether or not the Mayor and council complied with proper procedures for the adoption of a valid local law. These procedures are primarily set forth in sections 20 and 21 of the Municipal Home Rule Law. In municipalities having an elective chief executive (as in our case) the procedures include adoption by a majority of the legislative body and approval by the elective executive after a public hearing has been held. In this case each of the substantive elements of this procedure was accomplished by the Mayor and council. The crux of the challenge here, however, is that the' public hearing was held prior to rather than after action by the council. Petitioners assert that the adoption procedure must be followed in exactly the manner in which it appears in the text of the Municipal Home Rule Law. We disagree.

Nowhere in the statute is an express requirement that the elements of adoption follow the exact order of their appearance. The statute does not even set forth each step as a separate item. The statute amalgamates the required elements for adoption within subdivisions 4 and 5 of section 20 and in section 21 of the Municipal Home Rule Law. The obvious intent of the Legislature was to insure an opportunity for public input via a public hearing prior to any final approval of a local law. In the present case public policy and the obvious intent of the Legislature were given even fuller expression than if the requirements were followed exactly as they appear in the statute. In the case before us, the public certainly had an opportunity for input prior to final approval and that input (public hearing) was held even before the council voted on the proposed local law. The citizens were given an opportunity to express themselves before action was taken by any of their elected representatives.

Section 51 of the Municipal Home Rule Law admonishes the court that “This chapter shall be liberally construed.” The procedures for adoption of local laws are, of course, also part of the Municipal Home Rule Law to which liberal construction is mandated. Additionally, we note that the statutory rules for the construction and interpretation of statutes do not require strict compliance unless the essence [671]*671or substance of the legislative intent has been vitiated. (See McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, §§ 171-174.) The adoption procedures were substantially complied with and the court can find no prejudice having inured to the public from any alleged deviation from the procedural time requirements. (See McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 172; Matter of 121-129 Broadway Realty v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 43 AD2d 754.) The same analysis would apply to the alleged imperfection in the notice of the public hearing. Once again, the defect was nonsubstantial in nature. (See Morin v Foster, 93 Misc 2d 10.) And finally, we do not feel that the establishment of sewer rents is subject to a permissive referendum pursuant to section 24 of the Municipal Home Rule Law. Even if this matter were subject to a permissive referendum, the time within which to file the requisite petition for a referendum had long expired before this present action was even commenced. For all of the above reasons, it is the considered opinion of this court that the requirements of the law for the adoption of this local law were sufficiently and substantially complied with by the city officials. This court is compelled to uphold this local law.

Having ruled that this local law was properly enacted, we must now deal with the question of fund transfers and budget provisions which have been questioned by the petitioners herein.

As we noted in the introduction to this opinion, fiscal years of the various levels of government do not always coincide, and the timing of various Federal or State requirements do not always mesh in a neat and simple way. Modern budgets attempt to predict and guide the flow of fiscal resources with no pretensions or guarantees of perfection. Most modern budgets recognize their inherent imperfection by building into their structure a measure of flexibility.

In the case before us, the city officials had to prepare a budget before it was appropriate or practical to adopt a local law to establish sewer rents, although the city officials foresaw the adoption of such a law and the establishment of such a system within the very near future. Aware [672]

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Bluebook (online)
114 Misc. 2d 668, 452 N.Y.S.2d 182, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/braxton-v-kuwik-nysupct-1982.