Braulio Roman Salgado v. Merrick Garland

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 17, 2023
Docket20-71485
StatusUnpublished

This text of Braulio Roman Salgado v. Merrick Garland (Braulio Roman Salgado v. Merrick Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Braulio Roman Salgado v. Merrick Garland, (9th Cir. 2023).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 17 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRAULIO ROMAN SALGADO, Nos. 20-71485 20-73580 Petitioner, 21-1295

v. Agency No. A200-552-283

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 12, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: HURWITZ and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and KANE,*** District Judge.

Braulio Roman Salgado petitions for review of a decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversing an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. granting cancellation of removal. Roman also petitions for review of the BIA’s

denial of reopening and reconsideration of the denial of reopening. We dismiss in

part and deny in part the petition for review in No. 20-71485 and deny the petitions

in Nos. 20-73580 and 21-1295.

1. Even assuming that Roman’s challenge to the BIA’s hardship

determination in No. 20-71485 presents a reviewable legal question, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D), the BIA also denied cancellation in the exercise of its discretion,

which we cannot review, id. § 1252(a)(2)(B). The BIA’s citation to In re Castillo-

Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664 (A.G. 2019), in its discretionary analysis does not give

rise to a colorable legal argument over which we have jurisdiction. The BIA did not

apply Castillo’s holding that multiple drunk driving offenses give rise to a

presumption against good moral character but rather considered that opinion’s

“discussion of the dangerous nature of drunk driving” when addressing the equities

of Roman’s case. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.

2005) (holding that a “claim must have some possible validity” to be “colorable”

(citation omitted)).

2. We deny the petition in No. 20-71485 insofar as it challenges the BIA’s

sua sponte denial of voluntary departure. The IJ’s “decision” on cancellation, see 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(b), vested the BIA with jurisdiction to deny voluntary departure in

the exercise of its discretion. 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (authorizing de novo review

2 over discretionary determinations); see also Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d

1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2019). Roman has also not shown prejudice from any lack of

notice. See In re Arguelles-Campos, 22 I. & N. Dec. 811, 817 (B.I.A. 1999) (stating

that “the existence, seriousness, and recency of any criminal record” is relevant to

the voluntary departure decision).

3. We deny the petition in No. 20-73580 because the BIA did not err by

denying reopening. Roman has not shown that his prior legal entry could not have

been discovered earlier. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Roman’s purported

estrangement from his mother did not prevent her from submitting documents in

support of his application for cancellation or from being present at that hearing.

4. We deny the petition in No. 21-1295 because the BIA did not err by

denying reconsideration of its denial of reopening. The BIA addressed every

argument that Roman now raises, and he has not shown why the missing page from

his mother’s declaration was the type of “highly probative or potentially dispositive

evidence” that would require a remand. See Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1064

(9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

Petition for Review in No. 20-71485 DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED

IN PART. Petitions for Review in Nos. 20-73580, 21-1295 DENIED.

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Related

Vitug v. Holder
723 F.3d 1056 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Fernando Menendez-Gonzalez v. William Barr
929 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
CASTILLO-PEREZ
27 I. & N. Dec. 664 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2019)
ARGUELLES
22 I. & N. Dec. 811 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 1999)

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