Braulio Lara v. Weeks Marine, Inc.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 30, 2007
Docket04-06-00237-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Braulio Lara v. Weeks Marine, Inc. (Braulio Lara v. Weeks Marine, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Braulio Lara v. Weeks Marine, Inc., (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION



No. 04-06-00237-CV


Braulio LARA,
Appellant


v.


WEEKS MARINE, INC.,
Appellee


From the 381st Judicial District Court, Starr County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-04-77
Honorable John A. Pope, III, Judge Presiding


Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice



Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice



Delivered and Filed: May 30, 2007



REVERSED AND REMANDED



Braulio Lara appeals a judgment rendered in his favor based on claims under the Jones Act and for maintenance and cure. In his second issue, Lara asserts that the jury's failure to award damages for past physical pain and suffering was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We agree with Lara and sustain his second issue. Because Lara's second issue is dispositive, we do not address his other issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (opinion should address every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of appeal).

Background

Lara worked as a deckhand on a vessel owned by Weeks Marine called the CAPTAIN JOHN. For some weeks before February 4, 2004, the CAPTAIN JOHN had a hole in its hull allowing the ballast tanks to take on water in rough seas. As a stopgap pending repair, Lara and another deckhand, Juan Pruneda, would pump water out of the ballast tanks every few days.

After midnight on February 4, 2004, the boat captain, Francis Olivier, ordered Pruneda to check the engine and further ordered Lara and Pruneda to pump the water. Pruneda opened the hatch in the storage room and went to check the engine. Pruneda did not close the hatch behind him. Lara went into the storage room - that was without light according to Pruneda and Lara - to retrieve the pump. (1) Lara fell through the hatch that Pruneda left open, injuring himself.

Lara sued Weeks Marine. A jury found Lara and Weeks Marine equally negligent but further found the CAPTAIN JOHN was not unseaworthy. The jury awarded Lara $230,000.00 in compensatory damages, consisting of: (1) $70,000.00 for income loss in the past; (2) $10,000.00 for impairment of earning capacity or ability in the future, including impairment in the normal progress in Braulio Lara's earning capacity due to his physical condition; (3) $100,000.00 for medical expenses in the past; and (4) $50,000.00 for medical expenses in the future. (2) The jury further found that Lara would not reach maximum medical improvement until January 1, 2006, and that Weeks Marine owed Lara $13,000.00 in maintenance and $26,000.00 in cure. The trial court rendered judgment in Lara's favor for the maintenance and cure and denied Lara's motion for new trial and motion to modify, correct or reform the judgment. (3)

Standard of Review

Because Lara attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on an issue on which he had the burden of proof, he must demonstrate that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding, we consider and weigh all of the evidence and set aside the finding only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761-62 (Tex. 2003). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and this court must not merely substitute its judgment for that of the jury's. Id. at 761. In reviewing a jury's failure to award any damages, we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and clearly state why the jury's finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias. Id. at 775; Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

When only one category of damages is challenged on the basis that the award in that category was zero or too low, a court should consider only whether the evidence unique to that category is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, shock the conscience, or clearly demonstrate bias. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 775. In some instances, the injuries are so substantial and the symptoms so objective that an award of damages for pain and suffering is clearly supported, and the failure to award such damages while simultaneously awarding medical expenses would be clearly erroneous. See, e.g. Horton v. Denny's, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2003, pet. denied); McMullen v. Jobes, No. 04-02-00789-CV, 2003 WL 22011301, at *2 (Tex. App.--San Antonio Aug. 27, 2003, no pet.); Dollison v. Hayes, 79 S.W.3d 246, 249-50 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 820 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, writ denied). When the fact of the injury and resulting damages chiefly depend upon subjective evidence, however, appellate courts are reluctant to hold the non-findings as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g. Horton, 128 S.W.3d at 260; McMullen, 2003 WL 22011301, at *2; Dollison, 79 S.W.3d at 250; Monroe, 884 S.W.2d at 820.

Evidence Relevant to Past Physical Pain and Suffering

Tom Langan, the corporate risk manager for Weeks Marine, testified that Weeks Marine paid Lara maintenance and cure for his left shoulder injury but not for his neck or back injury. Langan stated that he was not convinced that Lara sustained a neck or back injury in connection with the accident he reported. Langan agreed that there is "no dispute" that Lara sustained a fracture of the greater tuberosity of his left shoulder in his fall.

Teresa Olivo, the corporate claims manager for Weeks Marine, testified that she authorized the referral to Dr. Fitter, who is an orthopedist. Dr. Fitter reported that Lara looked a bit uncomfortable, was not in severe distress, but had quite a bit of pain with any attempt at movement of the left shoulder. Dr. Fitter prescribed Vicodin for pain and concluded that Lara would require further orthopedic follow-up. Two days after his injury, Lara went home and did not report for his next hitch until February 13, 2004. (4) When Lara returned to Dr. Fitter on February 13, 2004, Lara reported that he had developed low back and left-sided neck pain. Dr. Fitter refilled Lara's Vicodin for pain relief after work hours. Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson
116 S.W.3d 757 (Texas Supreme Court, 2003)
Pool v. Ford Motor Co.
715 S.W.2d 629 (Texas Supreme Court, 1986)
Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis
46 S.W.3d 237 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Huber v. Ryan
627 S.W.2d 145 (Texas Supreme Court, 1981)
Pilkington v. Kornell
822 S.W.2d 223 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Dollison v. Hayes
79 S.W.3d 246 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Biggs v. GSC Enterprises, Inc.
8 S.W.3d 765 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Horton v. Denny's Inc.
128 S.W.3d 256 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)
Monroe v. Grider
884 S.W.2d 811 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Braulio Lara v. Weeks Marine, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/braulio-lara-v-weeks-marine-inc-texapp-2007.