Bratcher, Deborah v. Yates Services, LLC

2019 TN WC 130
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedAugust 27, 2019
Docket2019-05-0373
StatusPublished

This text of 2019 TN WC 130 (Bratcher, Deborah v. Yates Services, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bratcher, Deborah v. Yates Services, LLC, 2019 TN WC 130 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2019).

Opinion

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT MURFREESBORO DEBORAH BRATCHER, ) Docket No. 2019-05-0373 Employee, ) V. ) ) YATES SERVICES, LLC, ) State File No. 21633-2018 Employer, ) And ) ) TRAVELERS INDEM. CO., ) Judge Dale Tipps Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER DENYING REQUESTED BENEFITS

This case came before the Court on August 22, 2019, for an Expedited Hearing on whether Ms. Bratcher is entitled to additional medical or temporary disability benefits. To receive these benefits, Ms. Bratcher must be likely to establish at a hearing on the merits that her time off work and her need for additional medical treatment arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. For the reasons below, the Court holds Ms. Bratcher failed to meet this burden and is not entitled to the requested benefits at this time.

History of Claim

Ms. Bratcher suffered a work injury on March 19, 2018. Yates accepted the injury and provided treatment for her neck and shoulder pain. Her first authorized provider, Premise Health, ordered shoulder and neck MRIs. It then treated Ms. Bratcher with anti- inflammatory medication and physical therapy before referring her to an orthopedist.

Yates provided an orthopedic panel, and Ms. Bratcher selected Dr. Timothy Steinagle. He first saw her on June 6 for complaints of right-shoulder pain. He noted the cervical MRI was normal, but the shoulder MRI showed mild tendinosis of the rotator cuff with no evidence of a tear. Dr. Steinagle saw no evidence of nerve root impingement and diagnosed rotator cuff strain. He administered an injection, referred

1 Ms. Bratcher to physical therapy, and assigned light-duty restrictions.

Ms. Bratcher returned to Dr. Steinagle on July 19 and reported no improvement. He noted full range of motion and good strength and concluded, “Mild rotator cuff tendinosis seen on MRI with no evidence of underlying tear or surgical pathology. Has completed an adequate amount of treatment for work related RC tendonitis. Continued subjection complaint of shoulder pain and dysfunction not substantiated by objective physical findings.” He also noted preexisting arthritis of the AC joint.’ Dr. Steinagle concluded that he had nothing further to offer Ms. Bratcher and released her. He added, “She may follow up with her personal physician for evaluation and treatment of preexisting AC arthritis.”

Ms. Bratcher sought treatment on her own from other providers and introduced several partial medical records at the hearing.” One of these is a February 5, 2019 return- to-work form signed by Dr. Jonathan Head, which noted, “Patient’s shoulder and chest pain is probably work related.” In Ms. Bratcher’s FMLA forms, Dr. Head also checked “yes” to the question, “Is the disability work related?” She further introduced a March 11 MRI report from Nashville General Hospital that states, “Question tiny avulsion of the supraspinatus tendon footprint and small labral tear.”

Ms. Bratcher testified that she returned to work after Dr. Steinagle released her but eventually requested FMLA leave because of her continuing neck and shoulder problems. Yates terminated her employment after the leave expired. She requested that the Court order Yates to provide additional medical treatment and temporary disability benefits.

Yates contended that it accepted Ms. Bratcher’s claim and provided all benefits to which she is entitled. It argued she failed to prove she is likely to establish that her need for any additional treatment arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. For these reasons, it asked the Court to deny her request.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Ms. Bratcher must provide sufficient evidence from which this Court might determine she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 239(d)(1) (2018); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015). To prove a compensable injury, Ms. Bratcher must show that her alleged injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. To do so, she must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need

"Dr. Steinagle also assessed noncompliance because he understood that Ms. Bratcher failed to attend her therapy sessions. Ms. Bratcher denied this. She testified convincingly that she requested the rescheduling of the fourth week of therapy and eventually completed it. * The Court summarizes only the relevant medical records.

2 for medical treatment, considering all causes.” “Shown to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the opinion of the treating physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14).

Yates does not dispute that an injury occurred. The question, therefore, is whether Ms. Bratcher appears likely to prove at a hearing on the merits that her work injury primarily caused her current symptoms or need for treatment. The Court cannot find at this time that she is likely to meet this burden.

The Court accepted several medical records into evidence. Yates relied on Dr. Steinagle’s conclusions that: 1) Ms. Bratcher has completed an adequate amount of treatment for her work-related tendonitis; 2) the objective physical findings do not support her continued complaints; and 3) she suffers from preexisting AC joint arthritis. Because Ms. Bratcher selected Dr. Steinagle from a panel of physicians, his opinion is presumed correct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(E). Thus, the question is whether Ms. Bratcher submitted sufficient information to overcome this presumption.

To make this determination, the Court turns to the records of Dr. Head, the only other physician to comment on the cause of Ms. Bratcher’s condition. He stated that her shoulder and chest pain “is probably work related,” and he indicated on the FMLA form that her disability was work-related. However, whether an injury is related to an employee’s work is no longer the legal standard for determining compensability. Rather, as noted above, the current statute requires proof that the injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Thus, the fact that Dr. Head felt Ms. Bratcher’s condition was related to her work is insufficient, without more, to overcome the presumption of Dr. Steinagle’s opinion.

Ms. Bratcher appeared sincere in her belief that her work activities caused her current condition. However, the Court must abide by the causation requirements of the Workers’ Compensation Law and cannot infer from the mere existence of her condition that it arose primarily out of her employment. Because Ms. Bratcher failed to present any evidence that her current need for treatment arose primarily out of her work injury, the Court cannot find at this time that she appears likely to prevail on a claim for additional medical benefits.

Similarly, the Court must deny Ms. Bratcher’s request for temporary disability benefits at this time because she has not yet demonstrated that the medical restrictions that led to her termination arose primarily out of the work injury. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Ms. Bratcher’s claims against Yates and its workers’ compensation carrier for the requested medical and temporary disability benefits are denied at this time.

2.

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Related

§ 50-6
Tennessee § 50-6
§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(14)

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Bluebook (online)
2019 TN WC 130, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bratcher-deborah-v-yates-services-llc-tennworkcompcl-2019.