Branson v. Commissioner

1985 T.C. Memo. 481, 50 T.C.M. 1056, 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 151
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 16, 1985
DocketDocket No. 16206-84.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1985 T.C. Memo. 481 (Branson v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Branson v. Commissioner, 1985 T.C. Memo. 481, 50 T.C.M. 1056, 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 151 (tax 1985).

Opinion

CARL B. BRANSON, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Branson v. Commissioner
Docket No. 16206-84.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1985-481; 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 151; 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1056; T.C.M. (RIA) 85481;
September 16, 1985.
Carl B. Branson, pro se.
Terence D. Woolston, for the respondent.

FAY

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

FAY, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 121, 1 and his motion for the award of damages under section 6673. 2

With respect to petitioner's Federal income tax for 1981, respondent determined a deficiency of $6,463.00 and additions to tax under section 6653(a)(1) in the amount of $323.15 and under*153 section 6653(a)(2) in an amount equal to 50 percent of the interest due on the deficiency. The issues raised by respondent's motions are whether wages and other amounts received by petitioner in 1981 are taxable, whether petitioner is liable for additions to tax under sections 6653(a)(1) and 6653(a)(2), and whether petitioner is liable for damages under section 6673.

Petitioner, Carl B. Branson, was a resident of Arizona when he filed the petition herein.

Rule 121 provides that any party may move for summary judgment upon all or part of the legal issues in controversy. A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Adickes v. Kress & Co.,398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Although the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party, Espinoza v. Commissioner,78 T.C. 412, 416 (1982), and Gulfstream Land & Development v. Commissioner,71 T.C. 587, 596 (1979), if, in response to a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party rests upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading and fails*154 to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, a decision may be entered against him. Rule 121(d). Applying these standards, we conclude that respondent has established the following facts and that his motion for summary judgment will be granted.

Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in engineering. He was employed by GTE Automatic Electric Laboratories Incorporated and earned $46,461.12 in wages during 1981.

On his 1981 Federal income tax return, petitioner claimed a deduction for purported charitable contributions to the Universal Life Church, Inc., of Modesto, Calif., in the amount of $20,071.32. In his notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed the claimed deduction and imposed additions to tax under sections 6653(a)(1) and 6653(a)(2). 3 In the petition, petitioner asserted that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, that he claimed his common law and constitutional rights, that he was not an employee pursuant to section 3401(c), that he earned no wages within the meaning of section 3401(a), and that he was not subject to the withholding provisions under sections 3402(a) through 3402(p). 4

*155 Petitioner did not raise the issue of the disallowed charitable contribution deduction in his petition; that issue is therefore deemed conceded by him. Rule 34(b)(4).

With respect to respondent's motion for summary judgment, petitioner has alleged no facts which are genuinely in dispute. He does not address respondent's deficiency determination; rather, his position consists of frivolous tax protester type statements.5 His contentions are not new to the Court and we have rejected similar attempts by other taxpayers to evade the Federal income tax, see, e.g., Weller v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo. 1985-387, Bradley v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo. 1985-364, and Zozaya v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo. 1985-60. We have repeatedly held that earnings from one's services fall within the section 61 definition of gross income.See, e.g., Rowlee v. Commissioner,80 T.C. 1111 (1983). Furthermore, "[t]he day has long since passed to object to the constitutionality of our system of taxation." United States v. McMullen,755 F.2d 65, 67 (6th Cir. 1984). Although he was given the opportunity to do so, petitioner offered*156 no evidence to dispute respondent's imposition of the additions to tax.

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Related

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.
398 U.S. 144 (Supreme Court, 1970)
United States v. Paul F. McMullen
755 F.2d 65 (Sixth Circuit, 1984)
Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Commissioner
71 T.C. 587 (U.S. Tax Court, 1979)
Espinoza v. Commissioner
78 T.C. No. 28 (U.S. Tax Court, 1982)
Rowlee v. Commissioner
80 T.C. No. 61 (U.S. Tax Court, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
1985 T.C. Memo. 481, 50 T.C.M. 1056, 1985 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/branson-v-commissioner-tax-1985.