Branhaven Associates v. Vitrom, Inc.

671 A.2d 858, 40 Conn. App. 513, 1996 Conn. App. LEXIS 102
Connecticut Appellate Court·Decided March 5, 1996·No. 15278·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

SPEAR, J.

The plaintiff in this summary process action moves to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the defendant did not post a bond as required by General Statutes § 47a-35a (a).1 The sole issue is whether this particular bond requirement applies where premises are leased for use as a restaurant rather than as a dwelling unit. We conclude that the bond provision of § 47a-35a (a) does not apply to this appeal and, therefore, deny the motion to dismiss.

After the defendant failed to pay rent pursuant to a lease agreement between the parties, the plaintiff commenced a summary process action. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and this appeal followed.

The plaintiff argues that, pursuant to § 47a-35a (a), upon filing its appeal, the defendant was required to give a bond to guarantee payment of rents that may accrue while the appeal is pending. Section 47a-35a (a) provides in relevant part: “When any appeal is taken by the defendant occupying a dwelling unit as defined in section 47a-l in an action of summary process, he [515]*515shall, within the period allowed for taking such appeal, give a bond with surety to the adverse party to guarantee payment for all rents that may accrue during the pen-dency of such appeal . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

The defendant asserts that § 47a-35a (a) does not apply to this appeal because the defendant does not occupy a dwelling unit as defined in General Statutes § 47a-l. Section 47a-l (c) defines a dwelling unit as “any house or building, or portion thereof, which is occupied, is designed to be occupied, or is rented, leased or hired out to be occupied, as a home or residence of one or more persons.”

The parties’ lease agreement is entitled “shopping center lease” and provides for the use of the leased premises as a restaurant. Because the space was leased to the defendant for business purposes, the property does not satisfy the definition of a dwelling unit under § 47a-l and, therefore, § 47a-35a (a) does not apply.2

The motion to dismiss is denied.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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Branhaven Associates v. Vitrom, Inc., 671 A.2d 858, 40 Conn. App. 513, 1996 Conn. App. LEXIS 102 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).

671 A.2d 858 (Branhaven Associates v. Vitrom, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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