RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Brandywine, Inc., et al. No. 02-5507 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0066P (6th Cir.) v. City of Richmond File Name: 04a0066p.06 L. McSwain, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ON BRIEF: H. Louis Sirkin, Jennifer M. Kinsley, SIRKIN, FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ, Cincinnati, Ohio, for _________________ Appellants. Douglas L. McSwain, Bryan H. Beauman, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.
BRANDYWINE , INC. d/b/a X EXPRESSWAY VIDEO and - NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. SEWELL , - BATCHELDER, J., joined. COLE, J. (pp. 11-15), delivered - No. 02-5507 a separate dissenting opinion.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, -
> _________________ , v. - OPINION -
_________________
CITY OF RICHMOND, - KENTUCKY , - ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Brandywine, Defendant-Appellee. - Inc. and Gary R. Sewell appeal from the district court’s - dismissal of their constitutional challenge to the city of N Richmond’s zoning scheme. They maintain that the district Appeal from the United States District Court court erred when it upheld Richmond’s revocation of the for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington. business license to their adult bookstore. For the reasons No. 01-00283—Karl S. Forester, Chief District Judge. given below, the order of the district court is affirmed.
Argued: October 29, 2003 I.
Decided and Filed: March 3, 2004 On June 25, 2001, plaintiff Gary R. Sewell, owner and president of Brandywine, Inc., applied for a business license Before: NORRIS, BATCHELDER, and COLE, Circuit in the city of Richmond, Kentucky. Sewell stated on his Judges. application that his business would engage in the “Rental, Sales & Exhibition of Video, Books, Magazines, e[tc.]” He _________________ signed a statement promising that “No Movies, Books, Magazines, Novelty item or any other item of an adult nature COUNSEL will not [sic] be sold, distributed or given away or traded at this location.” City officials issued him a license. Despite his ARGUED: H. Louis Sirkin, SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV disclaimer, Sewell proceeded to open a retail store selling & SCHWARTZ, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Douglas sexually explicit books and other materials.
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On July 18, 2001, city officials notified plaintiffs by letter the appropriate use category as determined by the planning that their store was operating improperly under Richmond’s commission.” zoning rules. The letter stated that the store was located in a B-3 business zoning district, and that businesses engaged in At the time that plaintiffs applied for their license, the selling adult materials were only permitted to locate in I-2 Development Ordinance included an April 2001 amendment industrial zones. The city revoked plaintiffs’ business license that categorized “Adult Bookstores” as conditional uses in I-2 and ordered that the store be closed. zones. It was this amendment that city officials relied upon when they revoked plaintiffs’ license.
Since the time that their business was closed, plaintiffs have expressed no interest in relocating. Nor have they attempted Upon the revocation of their business license, plaintiffs to appeal their license revocation through the process brought this action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary provided by Richmond’s zoning rules. relief. They alleged that Richmond’s zoning scheme unconstitutionally restricted their ability to exercise their First II. Amendment rights. They claimed that the April amendment forced adult businesses to locate in I-2 zones, where, as Zoning in Richmond is governed by a Development conditional uses, the determination of whether they obtained Ordinance. The Ordinance divides Richmond into five licenses was subject to the unbridled discretion of the board zoning districts: agricultural, residential, business, industrial, of adjustments. They also alleged that the language of the and public/semi-public. Within each zoning district, the April amendment was unconstitutionally vague and Ordinance establishes three categories of permitted land use: overbroad, and that Richmond’s enforcement of the zoning principal/prim ar y, conditional, and accessory. scheme resulted in the unconstitutional taking of their Principal/primary uses are defined as uses “that are deemed property. to be most appropriate, and are permitted outright in a district without further review by the planning commission or the Less than one month later, in August 2001, Richmond board of adjustment.” Conditional uses are defined as “uses modified the Development Ordinance, reclassifying adult that may or may not be appropriate, dependent upon the bookstores as principal/primary uses in I-2 zones. With this situation. These uses may call for restrictions on location, change, adult bookstores would no longer have to seek size, extent, and character of performance in addition to those approval from the board of adjustments before locating in I-2 already imposed by the ordinance, and require review and zones. permitting by [sic] the conditional use requiring review by the board of adjustments.” The Ordinance gives the board of Despite the August amendment, plaintiffs continued to adjustments the power to “approve, modify or deny any pursue their lawsuit. On March 29, 2002, the district court application for a conditional use permit.” held that the Development Ordinance did not unconstitutionally restrict adult expression, and that the The Development Ordinance lists “bookstores” as language of the April amendment was neither vague nor principal/primary uses in B-3 zones, and provides that “[i]f a overbroad. It further held that plaintiffs lacked standing to specific use is not listed, the closest related use will serve as challenge the conditional use procedure applied to adult bookstores in I-2 zones, and alternatively, that the August
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amendment that classified adult bookstores as 2. Standing principal/primary uses in I-2 zones rendered plaintiffs’ complaint about the conditional use procedure moot. Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s determination that Accordingly, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ action. they lacked standing to challenge provisions of the zoning This appeal followed. scheme that applied outside of B-3 zones because they had not demonstrated an intent to relocate. Plaintiffs argue that III. standing requirements are relaxed in challenges premised on First Amendment violations, and accordingly, that they 1. Failure to Assert a Ripe Takings Claim should have been permitted to assert third party standing to challenge the conditional use procedure applied to adult Plaintiffs argue that at the time that their license was bookstores in I-2 zones. They do not appeal the denial of revoked, Richmond’s zoning scheme was unconstitutional their claim that that part of the Development Ordinance was because the April amendment only permitted adult businesses vague or overbroad. to locate in I-2 zones subject to the unbridled discretion of city officials. They contend that Richmond should have This court reviews de novo the district court’s conclusions subjected them to the Development Ordinance as it existed of law with regard to standing. United States v. Miami prior to the April amendment, when no mention was made in University, 294 F.3d 797, 806 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the the Development Ordinance of adult bookstores, and district court has dismissed for lack of standing, we “accept “bookstores” were categorized as principal/primary uses in B- as true all material allegations in the complaint, and construe 3 zones. the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
Though plaintiffs have asserted a takings claim, that claim is premature. We ascertain whether a takings claim is ripe or Under traditional requirements for standing, plaintiffs must not de novo. Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 958 F.2d establish (1) injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally 1354, 1362 (6th Cir. 1992). A takings claim is not ripe until protected interest; (2) a causal relationship between the injury “the government entity charged with implementing the and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. G & V application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm’n, 23 F.3d Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton 1071, 1074 (6th Cir. 1994). The district court correctly held Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985). Because that under these requirements, plaintiffs have standing to plaintiffs never appealed the revocation of their license, the challenge the zoning scheme’s ban on adult bookstores in B-3 city never reached a final, definitive position regarding the zones, since they were injured in fact when they were forced application of the Development Ordinance to plaintiffs’ to close their business, a causal relationship existed between business. the enforcement of the zoning scheme and the harm, and the injury was redressable by an award of monetary damages for lost business.
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However, “a plaintiff may have standing to challenge some assert third party standing in every First Amendment facial provisions of a law, but not others.” Clark v. City of challenge; rather plaintiffs may only do so in vagueness and Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001). In the instant overbreadth challenges. Accordingly, plaintiffs lack standing case, plaintiffs never alleged any intention to locate outside a to challenge any provision of Richmond’s zoning scheme B-3 zone. Therefore, under the traditional requirements, they inapplicable to B-3 zones. lack standing to challenge the provisions of the zoning scheme that do not relate to B-3 zones, including the 3. Mootness application of the conditional use procedure to adult bookstores in I-2 zones. Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s conclusion that their claims were moot. We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs argue that they should be permitted to assert third although plaintiffs had standing to challenge those provisions party standing to challenge the conditional use procedure of the zoning scheme that applied to B-3 zones, their claims because they are mounting a First Amendment facial for injunctive and declaratory relief were rendered moot by challenge to Richmond’s zoning scheme. Where plaintiffs Richmond’s enactment of the August amendment, which challenge a statute or ordinance for vagueness or overbreadth, classified adult bookstores as principal/primary uses in I-2 the Supreme Court has concluded that they have standing to zones. That amendment permitted adult bookstores to locate assert the rights of third parties whose protected speech may in I-2 zones without having to obtain permission from the have been impermissibly curtailed by the challenged board of adjustments. Plaintiffs do not challenge the prohibition, even though as applied to the plaintiffs constitutionality of the August amendment. themselves, the ordinances only curtailed unprotected expression. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. We review the district court’s conclusions of law with 50, 59 n.17 (1976). regard to mootness de novo. Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P.
v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 530 (6th Cir. 2001). Claims In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), the become moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing or parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” to challenge “civil disability provisions” that barred County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1975) individuals who had committed certain crimes or people (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). residing with those individuals from obtaining business Plaintiffs ask this court to declare unconstitutional the zoning licenses, where none of the plaintiffs had committed the listed scheme as it existed when their license was revoked and to crimes or resided with someone who had. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. enjoin Richmond from enforcing that scheme. We can at 230-36 (plurality opinion). In East Brooks Books, Inc. v. neither declare unconstitutional nor enjoin the enforcement of City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1995), this court a provision that is no longer in effect. concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain “disabling factors” that prevented them from obtaining Plaintiffs’ reliance on City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, business licenses, such as the failure to pay fees and the Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982), is misplaced. Plaintiffs cite commission of certain crimes, because none of those Aladdin’s Castle for the proposition that the repeal of “disabling factors” applied to them. East Brooks Books, 48 allegedly unconstitutional legislation does not render moot a F.3d at 227-28. These cases indicate that plaintiffs may not claim for injunctive relief from its enforcement. Critical to
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the holding in that case, however, was the fact that legislators the effect that the scheme provided them with no reasonable had publicly expressed an intention to re-enact the offending opportunity to locate anywhere in Richmond. legislation. No such threat was made in this case, so the passage of the August amendment to the Development IV. Ordinance provides sufficient assurance that the April amendment will not be re-enacted. See Kentucky Right to For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s decision is Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 645 (6th Cir. 1997). affirmed. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were properly dismissed as moot. 4. Failure to State a Valid Claim for Monetary Damages Plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages, however, was not properly dismissed as moot, because an award of monetary damages would compensate plaintiffs for the loss of the opportunity to engage in protected expression caused by the enforcement of the zoning scheme.
Though not moot, plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Constitution permits a city to require all sexually-oriented businesses to be located in a particular area within that city. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986). However, a city cannot legislate adult-oriented businesses out of existence. The First Amendment requires a city to provide a reasonable opportunity for adult speech somewhere within its borders. Id.
A claim alleging that a municipal zoning ordinance unconstitutionally restricts adult businesses would have to state that the zoning ordinance provided no reasonable opportunity for adult businesses to operate anywhere within the city. Stripped of those claims over which the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ complaint only alleges that Richmond’s zoning scheme, as modified by the April amendment, unconstitutionally restricted their right to operate in B-3 zones. Plaintiffs cannot assert a valid claim to
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______________ We can evaluate one zone without the other no more than we can measure night without day.
DISSENT ______________ Moreover, the district court’s holding that this suit could not redress Brandywine’s injury, a conclusion that the R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting. When this majority implicitly ratifies, rests on a misreading of the lawsuit commenced, adult businesses could be Ordinance. The district court determined, as the City argued, prohibited—per se or at the whim of local regulators—in the that were we to determine that the Ordinance provides entire City. As a would-be proprietor of an adult business in insufficient space for adult businesses, we would the City, Brandywine is a proper party to challenge this automatically nullify the restrictions on adult businesses scheme, and the suit survives the City’s subsequent optional operating in zone I-2, allowing adult businesses full access to and reversible amendment of the Ordinance. Because that zone and leaving all other zones’ restrictions unscathed. Article III permits our review of Brandywine’s claims, and The Ordinance provides no such directions. It does provide because these claims establish that the challenged Ordinance that “[s]hould any section or provisions of the regulations be, violates the First Amendment, I respectfully dissent. for any reason, held void or invalid, it shall not affect any other section or provision thereof which is not itself void or A. Standing invalid.” Thus, if Brandywine’s challenge could be separated into component parts, we could save the Ordinance by In holding that Brandywine lacks standing, the majority jettisoning only the offending part. But under Kentucky law, artificially slices Brandywine’s challenge into component which governs whether we may sever a problem provision parts—separating its challenge to the Ordinance as a whole from its neighbors, see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer into discrete challenges to the respective regulations Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988), a statute cannot simply governing zones B-3 and I-2. But we must evaluate the city’s shed its lone unconstitutional provision when—as is the case regulatory scheme in the aggregate: the First Amendment here—all of the statute’s parts are inseparably connected. See requires an adequate opportunity for adult businesses to KRS § 446.090. As I explained above, the First Amendment operate in a given city, not in any particular zone. A total ban doctrine governing this challenge demands that we view the in either zone would be perfectly legal so long as the other Ordinance in the aggregate. If the Ordinance provides provided sufficient space for adult businesses. See City of inadequate space for adult businesses, we must invalidate the Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). whole thing. Moreover, that a total ban in one zone is constitutional in some circumstances does not mean that it would be Brandywine’s challenge, including its requests for both constitutional alongside a total ban or other undue restrictions monetary and injunctive relief, necessarily engulfs the entire in all other zones. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ordinance. Brandywine’s lack of connection with zone I- Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981); Christy v. City of Ann 2—the supposed gap in its standing—is a red herring. Arbor, 824 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1987). Brandywine argues—consistent with the First Amendment’s approach to the regulation of adult businesses—that given zone I-2's restrictions, the restrictions on zone B-3 are unconstitutional.
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B. Mootness is no guarantee that MDOC will not change back to its older, stricter Rule as soon as this action terminates.” Id. at 1035.
The majority’s alternative basis for affirming the dismissal And in Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. of Brandywine’s request for injunctive relief—that the action 2003) (en banc), cert denied, Snyder v. Rosales-Garcia, 123 is moot—flatly contradicts the Supreme Court and our own S.Ct. 2607 (2003), we rejected the government’s assertion precedent. Because the City amended the Ordinance (less that an immigrant’s challenge to her detention was mooted by than a month) after Brandywine filed suit, the City retains the her parole, because the INS had the discretion to return her to burden of showing that its amendments moot this challenge. custody and the government had “made no . . . promise [that In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., her parole would continue uninterrupted].” Id. at 397. 528 U.S. 167 (2000), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case At no point has the City promised that the offending bears the formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely scheme is gone for good. Short of such an assurance, it clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be cannot meet its burden under Friends of the Earth. The expected to occur.” Id. at 190 (emphasis added). The majority’s refusal to hold the City to its burden is at odds with possibility looms that the City will reenact the prior version both Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent. And it risks of the Ordinance once this case is dismissed, and the City has producing a cycle of amendment, mootness, and offered no indication that its most recent amendment is reamendment—the very cycle that mootness doctrine permanent. And unlike a state or federal legislature, which prohibits. must massage the esoteric desires of scores of representatives in two houses, a city council can enact new measures with C. First Amendment relative ease. Indeed, the record demonstrates how readily and easily the City can amend the Ordinance: it did so twice Because Article III allows us to consider Brandywine’s in the five-month period between April 2001 and August First Amendment challenges to the Ordinance, as it existed 2001. when Brandywine filed its complaint, we apply the familiar standards espoused by the Supreme Court. A total ban on Yet the majority inverts the burden. According to the adult business receives strict scrutiny; the restriction of such majority, today’s case is moot because City officials have not businesses to certain areas, however, we analyze as a time, vowed to restore the offending provisions following place, and manner regulation. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46. dismissal. But Brandywine does not have to show that the Although the City prohibits adult businesses in zone B-3, it challenged conduct will occur again; the City must make it permits them in zone I-2. Moreover, a time, place, and “absolutely clear” that it will not. Thus, in Akers v. manner restriction must be justified without reference to the McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003), we content of the speech. Here, the ordinance is aimed not at the considered a challenge to certain regulations promulgated by content of adult businesses per se, but “rather at the the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), even secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding though these regulations had since been repealed. In rejecting community.” Id. at 47 (emphasis in original). the defendant’s contention that its voluntary repeal mooted the case, we noted that “as the promulgation of work rules We therefore reach the case’s crux: “whether the appears to be solely within the discretion of the MDOC, there [Ordinance] is designed to serve a substantial governmental
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interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.” Id. at 50. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the City’s interest is substantial, the Ordinance provides for inadequate alternative spaces for adult businesses to operate. Even in zone I-2, the one place in which the City purports to allow adult businesses, they would have to meet the requirements of a “conditional use.” The Ordinance defines a conditional use as one:
which is essential to or would promote the public health, safety, or welfare in one or more zones, but which would impair the integrity and character of the zone in which it is located, or in adjoining zones, unless restrictions on location, size, extent and character of the performance are imposed in addition to those imposed in the zoning regulation. When considered in conjunction with the entire Ordinance, the amorphous criteria that an adult business must satisfy hardly provide a guarantee that adequate alternative avenues exist. Cf. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. at 769-70 (invalidating restrictions on adult businesses that vest too much discretion to the government licensors). The First Amendment requires that the City “refrain from effectively denying [its citizens] a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 54. Under the Ordinance, any adult business that the City deems inconsistent with “the integrity and character of the zone” would find itself without any location in the City in which to operate—a result that the First Amendment prohibits.
Because I conclude that Brandywine has standing to challenge the Ordinance, that its challenge is not moot, and that the Ordinance violates the First Amendment, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for the issuance of an injunction and the computation of Brandywine’s damages. I respectfully dissent.