Brandt v. United States

155 Ct. Cl. 345, 1961 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 148, 1961 WL 8707
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 4, 1961
DocketNo. 235-60
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 155 Ct. Cl. 345 (Brandt v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brandt v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 345, 1961 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 148, 1961 WL 8707 (cc 1961).

Opinion

DuReee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff seeks to recover for each month since October 1, 1949, the difference between 75 percent of his monthly active duty pay at the time of his retirement in 1945 as a commander in the Navy, and increased disability retirement pay pursuant to one of the following computations alleged by plaintiff to be authorized under the Career Compensation Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 802, et seg.:

(1) 75 percent of the higher 1949 pay rates for a captain, or
(2) 75 percent of the higher 1949 pay rates for a commander, or
(3) 60 percent of the higher 1949 pay rates for a captain.

Plaintiff served in the United States Navy from 1917 to 1945. On December 11, 1944, plaintiff underwent a routine physical examination. As a result of that examination he was hospitalized for treatment of an ocular deficiency which stemmed from an injury originally sustained in line of duty earlier in plaintiff’s military career. While in the hospital plaintiff was selected for future promotion to the rank of [347]*347captain by a board exercising authority under the Act of July 24,1941, 55 Stat. 603, and his selection was approved by the President on April 19, 1945. On May 3, 1945, a Board of Medical Survey found that plaintiff was unfit for full duty due to “insufficiency, ocular muscle,” and recommended that he be ordered to appear before a retiring board. This medical finding was in no way connected with plaintiff’s selection for promotion.

In a letter dated May 19, 1945, from the Chief of Naval Personnel, plaintiff was informed of his selection for promotion, and was advised that he would be assigned an appropriate billet in that rank at the earliest time consonant with the needs of the service.

A Naval Retiring Board, convened on June 20,1945, found plaintiff physically incapable of performing the duties of his rant. This finding was approved by the President, and on October 1,1945, plaintiff was placed on the retired list in the grade of commander. His retirement pay, computed pursuant to the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 367, was 75 percent of his salary as a commander at the time of his retirement.

On November 19,1949, plaintiff requested a decision of the Judge Advocate General as to his eligibility to receive disability retirement pay based on the rank of captain, presumably pursuant to certain provisions of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, supra. The decision rendered was in the negative. On September 29, 1954, plaintiff elected, under section 411 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, supra, to receive retirement pay based on laws in effect prior to that Act.

In June 1959, plaintiff applied to the Board of Correction of Naval Records for the correction of his record to show that he had elected to receive disability retired pay based on 60 percent of the pay of a captain under the higher rates prescribed by the Act of 1949. The request was denied on the grounds that his hospitalization at the time of selection precluded the promotion under the applicable statute and regulations issued thereunder, and that because he was retired prior to the enactment of the Act of 1949, he was not eligible for the benefits provided by the section thereof alleged to [348]*348permit computation of disability retirement pay based on the higher rank. Plaintiff contends that this ruling was arbitrary.

Plaintiff now claims that he was entitled under section 411 of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, supra, to elect to receive disability retirement pay at the rate of 75 percent of the basic pay of a captain, or, in the alternative, of a commander with over 22 years of service, under the higher pay rates prescribed in section 201 of that act. In effect, he asserts that he was entitled to apply the uniform 75 percent multiplier provided by the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942, supra, to the higher pay rates prescribed in the Act of 1949 (section 201a) for his grade and length of service, without regard to the percentage multipliers established under the 1949 Act.

This court ruled upon a similar assertion in Palmer v. United States, 139 Ct. Cl. 376, where we stated at page 384:

We do not believe that such a result was intended by Congress when they passed the Career Compensation Act. The act gave to those previously retired for physical disability a right to elect to have their pay computed in accordance with one of the two methods provided for in section 411, or continue to receive pay based upon the laws in effect prior to the passage of the Career Compensation Act. This did not mean that an election to receive disability retired pay under the Career Compensation Act should amount to a retirement under that act as those words are used in the Pay Readjustment Act.
The fourth paragraph of section 15 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 limits its benefits to the time of retirement under a provision of law. Since we hold that an election under section 411 of the Career Compensation Act by an officer previously retired for physical disability is not a retirement under that act, there is no provision of law under which he can have retirement pay based on 75 percent of the rates of the Career Compensation Act of 1949.

Plaintiff offers no argument sufficiently persuasive to reverse this position. It is apparent that plaintiff cannot select the 75 percent multiplier of the 1942 Act and apply it to the higher pay rates prescribed in the 1949 Act for the computation of his retirement pay, when no such provision is made in any statute. Having failed to qualify at a rate in excess of 60 percent as provided in the Act of 1949, plaintiff cannot now [349]*349claim increased retirement pay at 75 percent of the rates provided in that Act.

Plaintiff, relying on sections 411 and 402(d) of the Career Compensation Act, asserts further that he is entitled to elect to receive disability retirement pay based on the rank of captain. Plaintiff reasons that since section 411 of the Career Compensation Act permits him to elect to receive disability retirement pay pursuant to Title IV of the Act, section 402 (d) of that title, specifically the fifth proviso of section 402 (d),1 must be construed to authorize the computation of his disability retirement pay based on the rank of captain if he so elects. Plaintiff complains that the refusal of the Board of Correction of Naval Records to correct his record to show an election to receive disability retirement pay based on the rank of captain was therefore arbitrary.

Assuming for the moment that plaintiff is correct in reasoning that section 411 permits him to elect to receive disability retirement pay as prescribed in section 402(d), and that the fifth proviso of section 402(d) would permit him to receive such pay at the rank of captain, it seems clear that the election offered in section 4112 applies only to those who would meet the requirements of the section of the Act conferring the particular benefits elected. Therefore, the issue arises as [350]*350to whether plaintiff can qualify under the requirements of the fifth proviso of section 402(d) to receive disability retirement pay at the higher rank of captain.

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203 Ct. Cl. 459 (Court of Claims, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
155 Ct. Cl. 345, 1961 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 148, 1961 WL 8707, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brandt-v-united-states-cc-1961.