In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________
No. 02-24-00202-CR ___________________________
BRANDON WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1781183
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brandon Williams appeals three felony convictions for possession of three
different controlled substances with the intent to deliver. See Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. §§ 481.112(a), 481.1123(a).1 Williams challenges his convictions by raising seven
issues related to the trial court’s admission of evidence offered by the State and the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the element of “possession” under the
accomplice-witness rule. Because the trial court did not reversibly err by admitting the
challenged evidence and the nonaccomplice-witness evidence sufficiently tends to
connect Williams to the offenses, we affirm.
I. Background
At a jury trial, Williams pleaded “not guilty” to three charges of possession with
intent to deliver a controlled substance, specifically fentanyl (count one), cocaine (count
three), and methamphetamine (count five). The State presented nine witnesses,
including an eyewitness, a forensic chemist, a co-defendant, and a variety of law
enforcement officers.
Ruth Lara Kissler testified that she was living at the Relax Inn in Fort Worth,
Texas, in 2022 and 2023. Kissler, a recovering drug addict, stated that “drug dealing
[was] going on” on the floor below hers. She claimed that she had called the police
1 Each conviction was a first-degree felony offense, as the aggregate weight of each controlled substance was four grams or more, but less than 200 grams. Id. §§ 481.112(d), 481.1123(d).
2 “[c]lose to 50” times while she was living there, but nothing was done to address the
issue. Kissler identified Williams as the person she had seen selling drugs at the hotel
and testified that he had tried to sell her oxycodone after she moved in. When Kissler
informed Williams that she was clean, he offered to give her the first one free. Kissler
testified that she eventually brought the issue to the attention of a Tarrant County
Sheriff’s Office deputy. Search warrants were obtained and executed shortly after she
made this report, resulting in Williams’s arrest. Kissler testified that the drug activity at
the hotel was “silent” after his arrest.2
Sergeant Sean Soria—with the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office—also testified.
Sergeant Soria stated that he was working with the narcotics enforcement team as a
plainclothes officer when he received a tip about possible drug deals occurring at the
Relax Inn. To verify the tip, Sergeant Soria conducted follow-up surveillance and
observed Williams 3 complete a “hand-to-hand interaction” with an unidentified
individual at the Relax Inn. Sergeant Soria explained that a hand-to-hand transaction is,
in his experience, consistent with narcotics distribution.
Sergeant Soria called another investigator to assist, and a traffic stop was initiated
on the person whom Sergeant Soria saw make the exchange with Williams. During the
Kissler moved out two months after Williams’s arrest but testified that things 2
were “silent for the duration” of her two remaining months at the hotel. 3 Sergeant Soria did not testify as to how Williams was first identified but did testify that he was familiar with Williams.
3 traffic stop, officers arrested the person for fentanyl possession, and the person then
identified “an individual matching [Williams’s] description” as having sold him the
fentanyl pills.
During the investigation, Sergeant Soria spoke with another “source of
information”4 who identified Williams “as a narcotics distributor” at the Relax Inn.
Sergeant Soria also received information that the narcotics that he was investigating had
been moved from a different room to room 142. Based on his investigation, Sergeant
Soria obtained narcotic search warrants for three rooms at the Relax Inn: 142, 145, and
150. Sergeant Soria—having information that Williams had a GPS ankle monitor 5—
coordinated the execution of the search warrants to coincide with Williams’s presence
at the Relax Inn. Williams’s GPS monitor showed him at the Relax Inn every day
between May 16 and 23, and the search warrants for the three rooms were executed on
4 This witness was never identified in the record. 5 Josette Phillips, an officer with pretrial probation, testified that she supervised everyone placed on GPS ankle monitors—including Williams. Officer Phillips also testified that the location of the Relax Inn was not Williams’s recorded home location nor his work location, as he was reportedly unemployed. During Officer Phillips’s testimony, the trial court admitted Williams’s GPS monitor logs showing where he was between May 16, 2023, and May 23, 2023. The trial court also admitted maps of Williams’s GPS locations from each of those days.
4 May 23, 2023. Sergeant Soria testified that Williams was arrested “around room 142”
and was staying in room 150.6 Jessica Campbell7 and Mitchell Green8 were also arrested.
The search of room 142 revealed a collection of various narcotics, including
methamphetamine, cocaine, and fentanyl, along with a small digital scale covered in
white powder. No narcotics were discovered in room 145 or room 150. Sergeant Soria
testified in front of the jury that Williams could have possession and control of the
seized narcotics, even if he was not inside room 142 at the time of the seizure.
When executing the search warrants, officers also searched Williams and his
vehicle and recovered two hotel key cards, both coded to open room 142. 9 Officers
recovered multiple stacks of cash from the glove compartment and center console of
6 Investigator Christopher Holland assisted with photographing room 150 and Williams’s vehicle that was parked outside room 150. In room 150, he photographed two receipts that had Williams’s name listed as the customer. 7 Campbell was arrested inside room 142 and testified as a co-defendant against Williams. The jury charge included an accomplice-witness instruction that was not contested by either party. 8 Green was arrested “around room 150” and did not testify. 9 Investigator Holland tested the key cards and stated that even though the door was already open, he heard the internal parts move (a “click” when the keys were held to the key reader). He also testified that he was able to manipulate the door handle after holding the cards to the key reader but was not able to do so beforehand.
5 Williams’s vehicle, along with paperwork related to his community supervision and GPS
monitor.10
After Sergeant Soria’s testimony, Campbell testified that she and Williams had
been good friends since 2007 and that he had been her cocaine supplier for more than
a year. Campbell stated that Williams paid for her to stay in room 142 at the Relax Inn
and that she helped him sell drugs. She admitted to helping bag up and sell cocaine,
methamphetamine, and fentanyl pills. Campbell also testified that Williams had multiple
rooms at the Relax Inn, but none were registered in his name to prevent law
enforcement from knowing about them. According to Campbell, the drugs—and the
scale to weigh the drugs—found in room 142 all belonged to Williams.
At the close of evidence,11 the jury found Williams guilty of all three counts and
assessed his punishment at confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
for a term of 99 years for each count, along with a fine of $20,000 for count one. The
trial court sentenced Williams accordingly, ordering the sentences to run concurrently.
This appeal followed.
Williams raises seven issues on appeal; we begin with his accomplice-witness
challenge.
The trial court admitted photographs of this paperwork as State’s exhibits 71 10
and 72. The defense did not present any witnesses during the guilt–innocence phase of 11
trial.
6 II. Accomplice Witness Challenge
In his seventh issue, Williams complains that the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions because the accomplice-witness testimony on the element of
possession was uncorroborated. Williams’s argument misapplies the standard of review
for the accomplice-witness rule, and we disagree that the evidence was insufficient to
support the element of possession—with or without Campbell’s testimony.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Article 38.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the accomplice-witness
rule: “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense
committed[,] and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission
of the offense.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14.
When evaluating the sufficiency of corroboration evidence under the
accomplice-witness rule, we “eliminate the accomplice testimony from consideration
and then examine the remaining portions of the record to see if there is any evidence
that tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime.” Malone v. State,
253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “To meet the requirements of the rule,
the corroborating evidence need not prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt by itself.” Id. Nor is it necessary for the corroborating evidence to directly link
the accused to the commission of the offense. State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 593
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App.
7 1999)). Rather, the direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence must show that
rational jurors could have found that it sufficiently tended to connect the accused to
the offense. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Joubert v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“There need be only some non-
accomplice evidence tending to connect the defendant to the crime, not to every
element of the crime.”).
We judge the sufficiency of nonaccomplice-witness evidence according to the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257.
Circumstances that are apparently insignificant may constitute sufficient evidence of
corroboration. Simmons v. State, 205 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no
pet.). We do not construe the nonaccomplice-witness evidence de novo but instead
defer to the factfinder’s resolutions. Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442.
Proof that the defendant was at or near the scene of the crime at or about the
time of its commission when coupled with other suspicious circumstances may tend to
connect him to the crime so as to furnish sufficient corroboration to support a
conviction. Id. at 443–44. But a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of a crime is
insufficient to corroborate accomplice-witness testimony. Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257.
Possession of the fruits of a crime may also be sufficient corroboration. Dillard v. State,
550 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Powell v. State, 219 S.W.3d 498, 505 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d); see Keith v. State, 384 S.W.3d 452, 457–58 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2012, pet. ref’d).
8 B. Analysis
Here, Williams attempts to use the accomplice-witness rule to exclude
Campbell’s testimony and to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the
element of possession. We note that in his brief, Williams acknowledges that the
evidence (excluding Campbell’s testimony12) “may tend to connect [him] generally with
possessing and selling drugs at the hotel” but argues that “it fails to connect him with
the drugs made an essential element of the indictment.”
The accomplice-witness rule is concerned with the tendency of the
nonaccomplice-witness evidence to connect the accused to the offense as a whole,
rather than to each individual element of the crime. See Joubert, 235 S.W.3d at 731. Thus,
we agree with Williams that the evidence—without Campbell’s testimony—is sufficient
to demonstrate that he dealt drugs from the Relax Inn at the time of the offenses, but
we disagree that this evidence is insufficient to corroborate his possession of the drugs
made the basis of his convictions under the accomplice-witness rule because it tends to
connect him to the offenses charged. See Malone, 253 S.W.3d at 257; see also Smith, 332
S.W.3d at 442.
The evidence shows that Williams was present at the Relax Inn when the search
warrants were executed and that he was arrested near room 142, the room where the
narcotics were recovered. In fact, the GPS log from Williams’s ankle monitor showed
The parties do not dispute that Campbell is an accomplice witness under the 12
rule.
9 that he was frequently at the Relax Inn in the days immediately before his arrest, despite
testimony that the hotel was neither his residence nor his place of employment.
Williams also had two key cards to room 142—despite his purported lack of
connections to the room—one on his person and one in his vehicle.13 The search of
Williams’s vehicle also resulted in multiple stacks of cash, which, according to Sergeant
Soria’s testimony, were consistent with someone who was the “head” of a drug
organization. See Dillard, 550 S.W.2d at 51; Powell, 219 S.W.3d at 505; see also Keith, 384
S.W.3d at 457–58.
Additionally, the State introduced testimony from Kissler that Williams had
attempted to sell her drugs at the hotel and testimony from Sergeant Soria that during
his surveillance of the Relax Inn he witnessed a “hand-to-hand interaction” consistent
with narcotics distribution between Williams and “an unknown individual.” A traffic
stop was then initiated on the unknown individual and resulted in an arrest for
possession of fentanyl. The individual identified a person matching Williams’s
description as the one who provided him with the fentanyl pills.
Thus, a rational juror could have found that the nonaccomplice-witness evidence
sufficiently tended to connect Williams to the commission of the offenses. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14; Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442; Joubert, 235 S.W.3d at 731.
Williams’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined Sergeant Soria regarding the 13
testimony that the key cards found on Williams’s person and in the vehicle were programmed to open room 142.
10 We overrule Williams’s seventh issue.14
III. Evidentiary Challenges
Williams’s first five issues challenge several evidentiary rulings by the trial court.
Issues one and two challenge the admission of evidence related to Williams’s pretrial
supervision and his use of a GPS ankle monitor as part of this supervision. Williams
claims the admission of the evidence that he was on pretrial supervision violated Rule
403 (issue one) and Rule 404(b)(1) (issue two). Issue three challenges the admission of
14 Even if we presume Williams’s seventh issue is really a general sufficiency challenge on the element of possession, our conclusion remains the same. In an evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility, and we presume the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Possession is “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38). Possession can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, and the evidence must establish that the accused’s connection to the drugs was more than fortuitous. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Considering the nonaccomplice-witness testimony above, as well as Campbell’s testimony that the narcotics in room 142 belonged to Williams and that he paid for the room in exchange for her assistance in selling them, we find that it is not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement for the jury to have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608. Even considering the affirmative links between Williams and the narcotics, we find the evidence supports at least six of the fourteen identified affirmative links: numbers 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, and 13. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161–62 nn.9, 12 (approving a non-exclusive list of fourteen possible factors that may circumstantially establish the legal sufficiency as to a knowing “possession”). Therefore, if this issue is a sufficiency challenge, it is likewise overruled.
11 State’s exhibits 71 and 72 under Rule 403. Issue four challenges the admission of
Sergeant Soria’s testimony that Williams could have possessed the drugs even though
he was not in the room when the drugs were seized. Issue five raises a hearsay challenge
to testimony from Sergeant Soria that one or more non-testifying witnesses had
identified Williams as a narcotics dealer and informed police that the drugs had been
moved to room 142 before the search warrant was executed.
We first address issue two, followed by issues one and three together, then issue
four, and finally issue five.
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Because the trial court “has
the best view of the evidence,” an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling
if it falls within the zone in which reasonable minds may differ. Inthalangsy v. State, 634
S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Jumper v. State, No. 02-22-00286-CR, 2024 WL
3059060, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 20, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). However, if the trial court’s decision falls outside the “zone
of reasonable disagreement,” it has abused its discretion. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d
372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).
If the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the complained-of evidence,
that error is reviewed as nonconstitutional error. Patterson v. State, 508 S.W.3d 432, 440
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (“The erroneous admission of evidence is
12 nonconstitutional error.” (citing Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 280 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010))). Nonconstitutional error will be reversed “only if it affects an appellant’s
substantial rights.” Id.; see Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b) (“Any other error, defect, irregularity,
or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
An appellant’s substantial rights are affected only if “the error had a substantial
or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91,
93–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “[W]e look to the entire record to determine whether
the erroneously admitted evidence had anything more than a slight effect on the jury’s
verdict.” Traylor v. State, 660 S.W.3d 214, 222 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.).
To determine the effect on the verdict, we consider (1) the character of the alleged error
and its connection with other evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the
verdict, (3) the existence and weight of additional evidence supporting the verdict, and
(4) whether the State emphasized the error. Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2021) (citing Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
“[A]n appellate court must disregard the error if the court, ‘after examining the record
as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight
effect.’” Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Solomon
v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).
B. Rule 404(b)(1)
In his second issue, Williams complains of the trial court’s admission of
testimony that he was on bond or pretrial supervision over his Rule 404(b) objection.
13 Williams complains that the State failed to offer evidence of any similarities under Rule
404(b)(2) between the offenses charged and that for which he was on bond. The State
claimed at trial that it could present the evidence from Williams’s GPS monitor logs
only through testimony from Officer Phillips, Williams’s pretrial supervision officer,
and contended it was “not for character evidence.” In other words, the evidence that
he was on bond was incidental to establish a different fact of consequence.
1. Applicable Law
Character evidence is generally inadmissible because it may “weigh too much
with the jury” and encourage it “to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny [a
defendant] the fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.” Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S. Ct. 213, 218 (1948). It is inadmissible “to prove that on
a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” Tex.
R. Evid. 404(a). Specifically, “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). This rule prohibits
admission of evidence to prove a person’s character “from which the trier of fact is
then to infer that the person acted in conformity with that character trait on the
occasion in question.” Johnston v. State, 145 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
However, under Rule 404(b)(2), this evidence may be admissible for another purpose,
including “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
14 “[T]he propensity to commit crimes is not a material fact in a criminal case[.]”
Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 87–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). But extraneous
misconduct evidence may “be admissible if [it] is logically relevant to prove
some . . . fact” other than character propensity. Johnston, 145 S.W.3d at 219. Evidence
of extraneous misconduct must tend to enhance or diminish the probable existence of
a fact of consequence in the case. Id. at 219 n.9. Even “a small nudge toward proving a
fact of consequence” satisfies relevancy. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 370.
A fact of consequence may be “either an elemental fact or an evidentiary fact
from which an elemental fact may be inferred.” Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016). Extraneous misconduct evidence may be admissible to rebut a
defensive theory that negates an element of the charged offense. Johnston, 145 S.W.3d
at 219; Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
2. Analysis
During Officer Phillips’s testimony, defense counsel did not make a Rule 404(b)
objection until after Officer Phillips stated that her role was to “supervise defendants
[who] are on pre-trial probation” and on a GPS ankle monitor. Officer Phillips then
confirmed that she supervised Williams, and she identified him in open court.15
15 Officer Phillips specifically testified that she was assigned to supervise Williams’s GPS ankle monitor while he was on pretrial probation before there was any objection to her testimony under Rule 404(b).
15 As a result, defense counsel’s belated objection to Officer Phillips’s testimony
failed to preserve this issue for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Tex. R. Evid.
103(a)(1)(A); see also Polk v. State, 729 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding
to preserve error on appeal by way of objection alone, “the objection must come before
the . . . question manifestly calling for objectionable testimony is answered in front of
the factfinder” (emphasis in original)). A timely objection “must be lodged at the earliest
opportunity, or as soon as the ground of objection becomes apparent.” Polk, 729
S.W.2d at 753 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it cannot be assumed or
inferred that Williams was unaware of the nature of Officer Phillips’s testimony,
considering the Rule 403 objection defense counsel raised on this same issue before
trial. 16 Thus, the objection was untimely, and Williams’s Rule 404(b) objection was not
preserved for appellate review.
However, even if this issue had been preserved, the objected-to testimony was
admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) for a purpose other than Williams’s propensity to
engage in criminal activity. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Instead, the evidence that he was
on bond was introduced incidentally, and only to establish that Officer Phillips was
familiar with Williams and was responsible for his GPS monitor records. Williams spent
a great deal of time at the Relax Inn, even though he neither lived nor worked there,
and thus he had—at the very least—the opportunity to engage in the alleged crimes in
The nature of the running objection made before trial began was restricted to 16
Rule 403—“more prejudicial than probative.”
16 this case. The testimony that he was on bond was not offered to show that he engaged
in prior extraneous offenses. See id. His frequent presence at the location was a fact of
consequence for the alleged possession with intent to deliver charges, and the evidence
of any prior extraneous offenses was a predicate matter to establish Officer Phillips’s
knowledge. See Johnston, 145 S.W.3d at 219 n.9.
Additionally, one of the defensive theories raised by Williams at trial was that the
State failed to bring sufficient evidence that he possessed the seized drugs and related
paraphernalia. Thus the only means of introducing the information gathered from
Williams’s GPS monitor showing his frequent visits to the Relax Inn was through
Officer Phillips’s testimony and it was admissible to rebut his defensive theory that the
contraband was not his. See id. (permitting extraneous offense evidence to rebut a
defensive theory that negates an element of the charged offense).
Alternatively, even if the evidence was not admissible under Rule 404(b), there is
nothing to support that the evidence that Williams was on bond had any injurious effect
on the verdict. See Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 763. The evidence that Williams was on bond
during the events of this case was mentioned only four times in front of the jury:
(1) during Officer Phillips’s testimony about her supervision of Williams’s GPS monitor
while he was on bond; (2) during Sergeant Soria’s testimony about his knowledge of
Williams’s GPS monitor as a condition of his bond; (3) during Investigator Holland’s
testimony about the Tarrant County Community Supervision and Corrections
Department (CSCD) paperwork in State’s exhibits 71 and 72; and (4) during the State’s
17 closing argument that the Relax Inn location seen frequently on the GPS logs was not
Williams’s home address according to his bond. These instances did not spend an
inordinate amount of time on Williams’s status as a probationer, nor was it emphasized
to the jury. Macedo, 629 S.W.3d at 240.
Further, the evidence was only incidentally introduced to present Williams’s GPS
monitor logs. See id.; Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 370; Johnston, 145 S.W.3d at 219. There
was much more persuasive evidence to support the verdict than the evidence that he
was on bond: his presence at the location, his access to the room with the contraband,
his offering to sell drugs to Kissler, his selling drugs to an individual that was witnessed
by Sergeant Soria, and his large sums of money hidden in his vehicle. See Macedo, 629
S.W.3d at 240. Thus, the knowledge that Williams was on bond did not have any
substantial or injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. See id.; Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–
94.
Because the issue was unpreserved and because the evidence would have been
admissible under Rule 404(b)(2) and was not substantially injurious or influential on the
verdict, we overrule Williams’s second issue.
C. Rule 403
Williams makes two complaints about the admission of evidence in violation of
Rule 403. Issue one concerns the testimony that he was on bond for another offense at
the time of his arrest in this case. Issue three concerns the admission of State’s exhibits
18 71 and 72—CSCD paperwork found in Williams’s vehicle that documented his release
on pretrial supervision and the requisite electronic GPS monitoring.
Under Rule 403, a trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403. “Unfair prejudice refers to the
evidence’s tendency to tempt the jury into finding guilt on grounds apart from proof of
the offense charged.” Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Following a Rule 403 objection, the trial court has a nondiscretionary obligation
to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the unfair prejudice of its
admission. Sanders v. State, 255 S.W.3d 754, 760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet.
ref’d) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389). When the trial court overrules a Rule 403
objection, we presume the trial court applied a Rule 403 balancing test and determined
the evidence was admissible. Id.
The balancing test for a Rule 403 objection in the context of extraneous conduct
evidence17 includes four factors: (1) how compelling the extraneous offense evidence is
17 The pretrial discussion and objections included the State’s acknowledgement of the applicability of Rule 404(b) to the evidence that Williams was on bond as potential evidence of extraneous acts or offenses.
19 in making a fact of consequence more or less probable; (2) the potential the extraneous
offense evidence has to impress the jury in an irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time
needed to develop the evidence, distracting the jury from the consideration of the
indicted offense; and (4) the force of the proponent’s need for the evidence to prove a
fact of consequence. Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (citing
De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 348–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)), petition for cert. filed,
____ (U.S. Sept. 17, 2025) (No. 25-5665).
Prior to the start of trial, Williams’s counsel objected to the State’s request to
discuss that Williams was on bond when he was arrested in the instant case. See Tex. R.
Evid. 103(a)(1) (a party preserves a claim of error if the party, on the record, timely
objects to the admission of the evidence). Williams’s counsel argued that any mention
of Williams being on bond for a prior arrest—not the fact that he was wearing a GPS
monitor—was more prejudicial than probative. The State responded that it needed to
call a pretrial services officer as a witness in order to get into the GPS evidence in the
case and that it would be inevitable that the jury would discover Williams was being
supervised based on her job description.
We agree with the trial court that the testimony that he was on bond was a
necessary byproduct of the proper introduction of the GPS monitoring logs that
showed he was frequently at the Relax Inn despite his not living or working there, and
Officer Phillips was the only qualified witness to verify these records. See Montoya v.
20 State, 832 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no pet.) (holding the Texas
Rules of Evidence provide that records can be shown by the custodian or another
qualified witness). Further, all four Irsan factors weigh in favor of the admission of the
evidence as more probative than prejudicial.
First, the State aimed to establish that Williams’s presence at the Relax Inn was
due to his involvement with the distribution—and possession—of the controlled
substances seized. The testimony that Williams was on pretrial supervision was only
used to lay a predicate for the admission of the GPS logs, showing that he spent time
at the Relax Inn, making it more probable that he was part of the drug operation. See
Irsan, 708 S.W.3d at 617. Second, the record does not support—and Williams’s appellate
brief does not point to any evidence—that the testimony influenced the jury in any
manner, irrational or otherwise. See id. Third, the State did not spend an inordinate
amount of time on Williams’s pretrial supervision terms. See id. The testimony from
Officer Phillips that Williams was on bond amounted to less than five pages of the 196-
page reporter’s record of the guilt–innocence phase of trial.18 See id.
Thus, nothing in the record indicates that a decision was made on an improper
basis or that the testimony that Williams was on bond distracted the jury from the main
issues. See id. As a result, the trial court’s decision to allow this testimony was not outside
the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.3d at 391.
18 Further, the State did not have another witness to properly present the GPS logs for admission and to showcase the frequency of Williams’s visits to the Relax Inn.
21 We overrule Williams’s first issue.
In his third issue, Williams complains that the admission of State’s exhibits 71
and 72 was more prejudicial than probative. These exhibits are photographs of CSCD
paperwork bearing Williams’s name that provides (71) information about his next
appointment with Officer Phillips and (72) details related to his assigned GPS
monitoring device.19 Williams objected to the admission of both exhibits when they
were offered during his trial. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). The trial court overruled the
objection, and the exhibits were published to the jury. The entire testimony about these
two exhibits was as follows:
Q. What are we looking at in State’s Exhibit No. 71? A. This is community supervision paperwork that we located inside the glove box as well, with Brandon Williams’s name. Q. And that was with the cash? A. Yes, sir.
19 Although Williams contends on appeal that the evidence was not relevant, he did not make this argument to the trial court. See Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial.”). Additionally, Williams did not brief the issue of relevance. As a result, we decline to address this complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
Also in issue three, Williams alleges that the harm could not have been cured by the erroneous limiting instruction given. But Williams does not point to which part of the instruction was erroneous, nor does he provide any legal support for this assertion. We also note that he did not request any limiting instruction related to these exhibits during trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. We therefore likewise decline to address this complaint on appeal. See id.; Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
22 Q. What are we looking at in State’s Exhibit No. 72? A. Just more paperwork which has Mr. Williams’s name. Considering the same Irsan factors in the context of an extraneous conduct Rule 403
objection, the complained-of exhibits make it more probable that the stacks of cash—
folded into Williams’s paperwork—also belonged to him,20 thereby providing
circumstantial evidence linking him to the possession of the controlled substances with
intent to deliver, as alleged in the indictment. 21 See Irsan, 708 S.W.3d at 617.
Additionally, the CSCD paperwork reflecting Williams’s upcoming appointment
with Officer Phillips and the page explaining the GPS electronic monitoring program
have no more risk of irrational impression on the jury than testimony of the same from
Officer Phillips. See id. The paperwork merely lists the offense as “unknown,” again
posing little risk of any irrational, indelible influence upon the jury’s determinations.
The State likewise took very little time to develop this testimony—doing nothing more
than identifying the exhibits. Finally, these papers—found in the console of Williams’s
vehicle and bearing his name—substantially supported the State’s claim that the vehicle,
the stacks of cash within, and the key card for the room containing the controlled
substances were all his. See id.
State’s exhibit 68 depicts a stack of cash folded into—what appears to be—the 20
same GPS monitoring instructions found in exhibit 72, located in the console of Williams’s vehicle. This exhibit was admitted without objection. 21 When asked if “drug dealers usually keep money and drugs together,” Sergeant Soria testified that “they do their best to keep everything separate.”
23 Like the complained-of testimony from Officer Phillips, nothing in the record
suggests that the admission of these exhibits was outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.3d at 391. Further, the record supports that
neither the testimony nor the exhibits were more prejudicial than probative. See Tex. R.
Evid. 403.
We overrule Williams’s third issue.
D. Rule 704
In Williams’s fourth issue, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting Sergeant Soria’s testimony that Williams could still possess the drugs seized
in this case if he was not in the room at the time of the seizure. Williams objected to
the testimony on the ground that it called for an impermissible legal conclusion—and
he argues the same on appeal.22
The opinion of a nonexpert witness is not admissible unless the opinion is
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Tex.
R. Evid. 701. And generally speaking, “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it
embraces an ultimate issue.” Tex. R. Evid. 704. However, an opinion is inadmissible if
22 Williams specifically avers that his objection to this testimony was not made under Rule 704. Rule 704 is instructive, however, in our analysis of Sergeant Soria’s testimony.
24 it is a legal conclusion or amounts to little more than choosing sides as to how the case
should be ultimately decided. Gross v. State, 730 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1987, no pet.). The expression of guilt or innocence in any case is a conclusion to be
reached by the jury based upon the instruction given to them in the trial court’s charge
coupled with the evidence admitted by the judge throughout the course of the trial.
Boyde v. State, 513 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). No witness is competent to
voice an opinion as to guilt or innocence. Id.
When a witness who is capable of being qualified as an expert testifies regarding
events that he or she personally perceived, the evidence may be admissible as both Rule
701 opinion testimony and Rule 702 expert testimony. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531,
536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Police officers, although possessing both training and
experience, are not precluded from offering lay testimony based on their personal
observations. Id.; Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 364 (holding lay testimony is permitted when
the witness has personal knowledge of the events). An officer may also testify regarding
his inspection of the evidence. Mohler v. State, No. 02-15-00024-CR, 2016 WL 5442066,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 29, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 134–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(holding counsel not ineffective for not objecting to officer’s opinion testimony that
defendant had not been attacked); Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 364 (holding admissible
witness’s testimony that defendant was responsible for robbery); and Williams v. State,
417 S.W.3d 162, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (holding
25 admissible officer’s testimony that the crime scene suggested “something sexual” and
that it did not appear to be a “normal sexual assault”)).
Here, the prosecutor first asked Sergeant Soria whether Williams “could . . . still
have possession and control of [the] drugs” if he was not in the room where the drugs
were seized. Defense counsel objected to speculation and to improper legal conclusion.
See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Both were overruled and Sergeant Soria answered,
“Absolutely.” A bench conference and hearing outside the presence of the jury then
occurred, and when the jury returned, the prosecutor asked Sergeant Soria to repeat his
response. Sergeant Soria stated: “Again, based off my previous knowledge of [Williams]
at the location, [his] being observed having interactions at room 142, [his] having the
keycard for room 142 in his pocket, and . . . Jessica Campbell[’s] . . . identifi[cation] [of
Williams] as the owner of the drugs.”
First, the question asked Sergeant Soria if Williams could have possession and
control if he was not physically in the room when the drugs were seized, not if he did
have possession and control at that time. Second, the extended response from Sergeant
Soria explained what evidence could support the element of possession.
It is permissible for an officer to explain the evidence. See Mohler, 2016 WL
5442066, at *6. Sergeant Soria’s testimony was admissible as lay testimony because it
was rationally based upon his perception, assisted by his experience and training, and
was helpful to a determination of the facts at issue—if possession of drugs is possible
26 when a defendant is not holding the drugs in his hands at the time of his arrest and
what evidence might be helpful in making that determination. See Ortiz v. State, No. 2-
03-259-CR, 2005 WL 1994174, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 18, 2005, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding officer’s testimony was admissible
as lay testimony because it was helpful to a determination of a fact in question, i.e., the
defendant’s intent); see also Reece v. State, 878 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (holding that officer could testify based upon his training and
experience that the defendant’s actions were consistent with those of someone selling
drugs); Williams v. State, 826 S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
pet. ref’d) (holding that officer could give opinion as lay witness and expert witness that
he interpreted defendant’s actions to be a drug transaction).
Moreover, in light of the evidence that Williams tried to sell Kissler drugs, sold
fentanyl during a “hand-to-hand” transaction, possessed two key cards to the room
where the drugs and related contraband were found, paid for the room where the drugs
were found, used Campbell to help bag and sell the drugs, and had stacks of cash in his
vehicle, error, if any, was harmless here. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); see also Solomon, 49
S.W.3d at 365 (holding substantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission
of evidence if there is fair assurance the error did not influence the jury or had but a
slight effect).
We overrule Williams’s fourth issue.
27 E. Hearsay
In his fifth issue, Williams complains that Sergeant Soria should not have been
permitted to testify to information gained during the investigation that Williams was a
narcotics distributor at the Relax Inn and that the drugs had been moved to room 142
because the testimony amounted to “back door hearsay.”
Under the Texas Rules of Evidence, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d); see Guidry v. State, 9
S.W.3d 133, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[A] statement which is not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, but is offered for some other reason, is not hearsay.”);
Hernandez v. State, 585 S.W.3d 537, 554 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. ref’d)
(holding generally evidence that can assist the jury by providing context for a police
officer’s actions during an investigation is not considered hearsay); Sosa v. State, No. 05-
11-01294-CR, 2012 WL 5936295, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 28, 2012, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[I]f a statement is offered to show the
effect on the listener, rather than for the truth of the matter asserted, then the statement
is not hearsay.” (first citing Young v. State, 10 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1999, pet. ref’d); and then citing In re Bexar Cnty. Crim. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 224 S.W.3d 182,
189 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding))).
Within the context of the rule, a “statement” is “a person’s oral or written verbal
expression, or nonverbal conduct that a person intended as a substitute for verbal
28 expression.” Tex. R. Evid. 801(a). A “matter asserted” is any matter that (1) is explicitly
asserted and (2) is implied by a statement “if the probative value of the statement as
offered flows from the declarant’s belief about the matter.” Tex. R. Evid. 801(c).
Here, both the challenged statements were offered to give context to Sergeant
Soria’s investigation to prepare a narcotics search warrant and are not hearsay. See
Hernandez, 585 S.W.3d at 554.
Sergeant Soria testified that he received information from someone “frequent in
the . . . hotel scene in west Fort Worth” who identified Williams as a narcotics
distributor at the hotel and that he received a tip that the drugs had been moved to
room 142. This testimony was not offered to prove that Williams possessed the drugs
that may have been in room 142 of the Relax Inn, or even that he intended to sell these
drugs, but to establish what statements Sergeant Soria relied on in preparing the search
warrant. See Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (“[A] police officer may testify about anonymous tips received for the
purpose of showing why the investigation focused on a particular defendant.” (citing
Cano v. State, 3 S.W.3d 99, 110 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1999, pet. ref’d);
and Levario v. State, 964 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.)). This
testimony does little more than showcase the development of Sergeant Soria’s
investigation in preparing the search warrants and was therefore not hearsay.
29 But even if we presume the statements were offered for the truth of the matter
and are “back door hearsay,” we hold any error harmless under Rule 44.2(b). See Tex.
R. App. P. 44.2(b). The evidence that Williams frequently visited the Relax Inn, that he
had two key cards to room 142 where the drugs were discovered, that he had several
stacks of cash, that he had attempted to sell Kissler drugs, and that Sergeant Soria saw
Williams sell fentanyl in a “hand-to-hand” transaction all suggest that any error had no
influence, or at most a slight effect, on the verdict and was harmless. See Nguyen v. State,
693 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (citing Johnson v.
State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
We overrule Williams’s fifth issue.
IV. Cumulative Error Challenge
In his sixth issue, Williams claims that he was denied a fair trial because of the
cumulative effect of the alleged evidentiary errors in issues one through five. 23
A. Applicable Law
The doctrine of cumulative error provides that the cumulative effect of multiple
errors can, in the aggregate, constitute reversible error, even though no single instance
of error would. Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Priddy
v. State, No. 02-13-00586-CR, 2014 WL 5307180, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.
23 Williams’s brief takes the position “that the errors set out in issues one through six are in isolation sufficient to require reversal of the convictions.” As the cumulative error issue is raised in issue six, we read this to mean that the cumulative error argument refers only to the first five issues raised.
30 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). However, for the doctrine
to apply, the alleged errors complained of must actually constitute error. Gamboa v. State,
296 S.W.3d 574, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Priddy, 2014 WL 5307180, at *1. “The
doctrine of cumulative error . . . rarely results in reversal, and is predicated upon
meeting the standard of reversible error.” Vasquez v. State, No. 2-04-214-CR, 2006 WL
133462, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication).
B. Analysis
Here, as we have explained, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the complained-of evidence during the guilt–innocence phase of Williams’s
trial. We have likewise determined that, even if the trial court did abuse its discretion by
admitting any of the challenged evidence, Williams was not harmed by such admission.
Thus, as set out above, there are no errors in this case to cumulate. See Jenkins v. State,
493 S.W.3d 583, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (overruling appellant’s cumulative-error
complaint when he failed to show that the trial court erred “with respect to any point
of error”); Bell v. State, No. 02-18-00244-CR, 2019 WL 1967538, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth May 2, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Bell argues
that even if each of his previous points do not constitute harm sufficient for reversal,
their cumulative effect does, undermining the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
But his individual points either do not demonstrate reversible error or do not show that
he was harmed. Therefore, there is no error to cumulate.”); Baker v. State, No. 03-18-
31 00240-CR, 2019 WL 1646260, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 17, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (“Here, Baker’s cumulative-error contention lacks
merit because we have concluded, as to his preserved appellate issues, that one
complained-of error was harmless and that there was no error as to the remaining
complaints.”).
We overrule Williams’s sixth issue.
V. Conclusion
Having overruled all seven of Williams’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
/s/ Wade Birdwell
Wade Birdwell Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: October 23, 2025