Brandon Wells v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Opinion

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2026; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2025-CA-0872-MR

BRANDON WELLS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CR-00415

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND L. JONES, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: In this criminal case, Appellant, Brandon Wells (Wells),

appeals from an Order of the Warren Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress.

After our review, we affirm.

On June 2, 2021, a Warren County Grand Jury indicted Wells on

charges of Possession of a Handgun By a Convicted Felon and Persistent Felony

Offender in the First Degree (PFO).

On January 26, 2023, Wells, by counsel, filed a motion to suppress all

seized evidence. The trial court heard the motion on March 1, 2023. The

Commonwealth called Kentucky State Police Trooper Hall as a witness. Wells

testified on his own behalf. We have reviewed the recorded proceeding in its

entirety.

On April 14, 2023, following submission of memoranda, the court

entered an Order denying Wells’s motion to suppress as follows in relevant part:

Trooper David Hall . . . testified . . . about the traffic stop and subsequent arrest of the defendant on October 30, 2020.

According to the testimony given, Trooper Hall and his colleague, Trooper Trevor High, were patrolling the 1200 block of Nutwood Street in Bowling Green, Kentucky, following a lead, regarding a fugitive (not the defendant). Around 3:15 a.m., while on foot, they observed the defendant travel at a high rate of speed, make an abrupt turn; and rush into the driveway. Trooper Hall testified that the driver seemed to “speed up” upon seeing them, failed to use his turn signal, and that the tint on his windows appeared to be excessive.

The two troopers approached the defendant on the hunch that the driver may have been the target of their investigation and because they observed traffic violations. Upon reaching the driveway, Trooper Hall observed the driver exit the vehicle “in a manner consistent with fleeing the scene.” Nonetheless, the troopers were able to establish contact with the defendant and attempted to identify him. At that time, Trooper Hall observed what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette behind the defendant’s ear that, after a request to hand it over, the defendant threw to the ground and stomped.

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The troopers then detained the defendant and, in the course of doing so, a baggie of marijuana dropped from the defendant’s possession. Trooper Hall then went to his vehicle to retrieve a canine unit to perform a sniff test around the vehicle while Trooper High continued with the traffic stop. During the sniff search, the canine alerted to the driver side front door. Upon a search of the vehicle, Trooper Hall found a handgun in the floorboard of the passenger side.

Trooper Hall then confirmed the defendant’s identity and criminal status by running a search through his computer. The defendant was placed under arrest. A search incident to arrest occurred, producing methamphetamine contraband. A final search at the jail produced additional drug related material.

The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth that the initial

interaction between Wells and the troopers was properly characterized as a traffic

stop:

Trooper Hall’s sworn testimony indicates that he observed the defendant commit at least one traffic violation (turning without use of a turn signal), which is sufficient grounds to perform a traffic stop. . . .

Once an officer has sufficient grounds (i.e., probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred) to perform a traffic stop, they may do so “regardless of his or her subjective motivation . . . .” [Wilson v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001)].

There is no claim that the traffic stop was excessive in duration or that the troopers were sluggish in executing their duties. . . .

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The interaction between the troopers and the defendant were [sic], therefore, part and parcel of the lawfully conducted traffic stop. The defendant’s suspicious behavior and the presence of what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette were simply the next dominoes that fell in a chain of increasing suspicion and heightening probable cause.

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that there was no unreasonable search in the instant case and the troopers acted lawfully in stopping and detaining the defendant. Therefore, there is no basis on which to grant the defendant’s motion for suppression.

On August 15, 2023, Wells entered into a conditional guilty plea,

reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Wells pled guilty

to possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and was sentenced to serve seven

years. The PFO charge was dismissed.

Wells appeals. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress -- i.e., that the troopers did not have probable cause to initiate a

traffic stop, that they unconstitutionally prolonged the stop, and that they lacked

probable cause to search the vehicle.

“At a suppression hearing, the ability to assess the credibility of

witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony is vested in the

discretion of the trial court.” Pitcock v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Ky.

App. 2009). We review denial of a motion to suppress under a two-prong test.

Rhoton v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d 273 (Ky. 2020). “First, we review the trial

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court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Under this standard,

the trial court’s findings of fact will be conclusive if they are supported by

substantial evidence. Second, we review de novo the trial court’s application of

the law to the facts.” Id. at 275–76 (Ky. 2020) (footnotes omitted).

Wells’s argument regarding the validity of the traffic stop is

essentially a re-argument of his case.

It is well-established that the stopping of a vehicle and detaining of its occupants amounts to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. . . . The occurrence of a traffic violation is recognized as sufficient justification to warrant a stop of a motor vehicle.

Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 661–62 (Ky. App. 2006). As noted by

the trial court, “[A]n officer who has probable cause to believe a civil traffic

violation has occurred may stop a vehicle regardless of his or her subjective

motivation in doing so.” Wilson, 37 S.W.3d at 749.

We are satisfied from our review of the suppression hearing that the

trial court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, we

accept them as conclusive. And we conclude that the trial court correctly applied

the law to those facts in determining that “Trooper Hall’s sworn testimony

indicates that he observed the defendant commit at least one traffic violation

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(turning without use of a turn signal), which is sufficient grounds to perform a

traffic stop. . . .” (italics original).

Next, Wells contends that the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged.

We agree with the Commonwealth that the issue is not preserved. As the trial

court observed in its Order denying the motion to suppress, “[t]here is no claim

that the traffic stop was excessive in duration or that the troopers were sluggish in

executing their duties.” Although Wells does not request palpable error review in

his Appellant’s brief, he does so in his reply brief, stating that “if this court

believes the issue is unpreserved Wells request palpable error [sic].”

Under RCr[1]10.26, this Court may consider a palpable error “which affects the substantial rights of a party . . . even though insufficiently . . . preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.” However, “[a]bsent extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not engage in palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a request is made and briefed by the appellant.” Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008) (emphasis added). Wells does not mention RCr 10.26 in his reply brief, nor does he make any argument demonstrating entitlement to the relief sought. “It is not our function as an appellate court to research and construct a party’s legal arguments . . . .” Hadley v. Citizen Deposit Bank, 186 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Ky. App. 2005). Wells’s cursory request is insufficient to invoke review under RCr 10.26, and we decline to consider it. See Shepherd, 251 S.W.3d at 316.

1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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Wells’s third and final argument pertains to the search of the vehicle.

The general rule is that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions One of those exceptions is the automobile exception. . . .

Though the rule has frequently been couched in terms of exigency, there is no requirement of an independent finding of exigent circumstances when addressing automobiles. . . . Thus, the rule can now be expressed as follows: police may search a vehicle without a warrant if it is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime.

Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119, 127–28 (Ky. 2014) (internal

quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

Wells argues that there was no probable cause at the time the vehicle

was searched. We do not agree. The canine’s positive alert provided probable

cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. Morton v.

Commonwealth, 232 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Ky. App. 2007). Moreover, we agree with

the Commonwealth that probable cause existed independently of the canine alert in

light of the trooper’s observation of Wells’s behavior, including observation of a

marijuana cigarette behind Wells’s ear, which he proceeded to stomp on after

being asked to lay it on the ground. “The test for probable cause is whether, under

the totality of the circumstances, a fair probability exists that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Carlisle v.

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Commonwealth, 601 S.W.3d 168, 181 (Ky. 2020). As the trial court aptly stated,

“[t]he defendant’s suspicious behavior and the presence of what appeared to be a

marijuana cigarette were simply the next dominoes that fell in a chain of increasing

suspicion and heightening probable cause.”

Wells argues that the automobile exception does not apply because his

vehicle was parked at his home, citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.

Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985), for the proposition that the automobile

exception may be invoked “[w]hen a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it

is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used

for residential purposes -- temporary or otherwise.” Id. at 392.

We agree with the Commonwealth that this argument fails. Carney

involved very different facts.2 Moreover, the troopers did not initially “find”

Wells’s vehicle parked at his residence. Rather, they observed the vehicle while it

was travelling on a public road and making an abrupt turn without using a turn

signal. The car was only incidentally parked at the residence after having been

observed while actively in use on a public street.

We find no error. Accordingly, we affirm.

2 In Carney, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of a motor home did not violate the Fourth Amendment where a Drug Enforcement Administration agent had information that the motor home which was parked in a lot in downtown San Diego was being used to exchange marijuana for sex. Id. at 386.

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ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Roy Alyette Durham Russell Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Erik Farleigh Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky