Brandon v. Department of Corrections

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedAugust 23, 2021
Docket3:21-cv-05417
StatusUnknown

This text of Brandon v. Department of Corrections (Brandon v. Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brandon v. Department of Corrections, (W.D. Wash. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 MYRON G. BRANDON, CASE NO. 3:21-CV-5417-JCC-DWC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER TO FILE AMENDED 12 v. COMPLAINT 13 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., 14 Defendants. 15

The District Court referred this action to United States Magistrate Judge David W. 16 Christel. Plaintiff Myron G. Brandon, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights complaint under 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Having reviewed and screened Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint under 18 28 U.S.C. §1915A, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 19 granted, but provides Plaintiff leave to file an amended pleading by September 24, 2021, to cure 20 the deficiencies identified herein. 21 22

23 1 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Dkt. 8. However, the Court declines to 24 rule on the request to proceed in forma pauperis until Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint. 1 I. Background 2 In the proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff, an inmate housed in the Monroe 3 Correctional Complex, alleges Defendants the State of Washington, Mark Wentworth, and Joan 4 Palmer provided Plaintiff with negligent medical care causing him to suffer a heart attack. Dkt.

5 10. 6 II. Discussion 7 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to screen 8 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or 9 employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the 10 complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 11 state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant 12 who is immune from such relief.” Id. at (b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Barren v. Harrington, 13 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998). 14 To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered a

15 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the 16 violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 17 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The first step in a § 1983 claim is therefore to 18 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 19 (1994). 20 To satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually 21 named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the 22 complaint. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 23 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a constitutional right when

24 1 committing an affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act, or omitting to perform an 2 act which is legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Sweeping 3 conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Leer, 844 F.2d 4 at 633. Further, a § 1983 suit cannot be based on vicarious liability alone, but must allege the

5 defendant’s own conduct violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 6 378, 385-90 (1989). 7 Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint suffers from deficiencies that require dismissal if 8 not corrected in an amended complaint. 9 A. Deliberate Indifference 10 Plaintiff alleges Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical need 11 when they failed to examine him for a year. Dkt. 10. Deliberate indifference to serious medical 12 needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 13 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal citation omitted); see Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 14 (1992). An Eighth Amendment medical claim has two elements: (1) “the seriousness of the

15 prisoner’s medical need and [(2)] the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.” McGuckin 16 v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. 17 v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). 18 A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in 19 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 20 F.2d at 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). “The existence of an injury that a reasonable 21 doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a 22 medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of 23

24 1 chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for 2 medical treatment.” Id. at 1059-1060. 3 If a plaintiff shows he suffered from a serious medical need, he must then show the 4 prison officials responded to the need with deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

5 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need requires “a purposeful act or failure 6 to act on the part of the defendant.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. In other words, “[a] defendant 7 must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need.” Id. A 8 prison official, accordingly, will not be found deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious 9 medical needs “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 10 safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the 11 inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 12 inference.” Id. 13 Plaintiff alleges he had a heart attack in 2016. Dkt. 10. In November 2017, non-party Dr. 14 Lisa Abraham ordered Plaintiff to have his heart examined within six months. Id. Plaintiff was

15 transferred to Washington Corrections Center from Washington State Penitentiary and did not 16 receive a physical nor was his heart examined from November 2017 through November 2018. Id. 17 On February 8, 2019, Plaintiff had a second heart attack. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants 18 Wentworth and Palmer failed to follow Dr. Abraham’s orders and provide Plaintiff with the 19 necessary medical examinations from November 2017 through November 2018. Id. 20 First, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show Defendants Wentworth and Palmer 21 were aware of Plaintiff’s condition and the orders from Dr. Abraham.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Albright v. Oliver
510 U.S. 266 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Barbara P. Hutchinson v. United States of America
838 F.2d 390 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
John C. McGuckin v. Dr. Smith John C. Medlen, Dr.
974 F.2d 1050 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung
391 F.3d 1051 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.
114 F.3d 1467 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Johnson v. Duffy
588 F.2d 740 (Ninth Circuit, 1978)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Brandon v. Department of Corrections, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brandon-v-department-of-corrections-wawd-2021.