Brandon Oakley v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 2024-SC-0361
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IMPORTANT NOTICE “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION”

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED” PURSUANT TO RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE (RAP) 40(D). THIS OPINION SHALL NOT BE CITED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE. UNDER RAP 41, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF KENTUCKY APPELLATE COURTS RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, THAT ARE FINAL UNDER RAP 40(G), MAY BE CITED BY A PARTY FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE POINT OF LAW BEING ARGUED BY A PARTY. IF AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT THE OPINION SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN THE DOCUMENT IN WHICH THE UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED. RENDERED: APRIL 23, 2026 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0361-MR

BRANDON OAKLEY APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE DANIEL BALLOU, JUDGE NO. 23-CR-00320

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Brandon Oakley appeals as a matter of right pursuant to Section

110(2)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution from his conviction and twenty-year

prison sentence after a jury trial in the Whitley Circuit Court. He argues that

the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for directed verdicts on

various assault and terroristic threatening charges. We affirm that it was

appropriate to allow the jury to resolve factual disputes in deciding whether to

believe the evidence for the Commonwealth over the evidence supporting

Oakley’s position.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Oakley enjoyed his birthday by drinking heavily and using a THC vape.

This led to an argument with his girlfriend outside a local gas station, and the

police were called. Officer Steven Hill responded to the domestic disturbance around 6:30 PM on September 16, 2023. Oakley’s girlfriend stated that there

was a verbal argument. Hill did not observe any argument when he arrived. Hill

could smell alcohol on Oakley. Oakley and his girlfriend gave Hill their

identification. Hill told Oakley he was not going to arrest him as long as Oakley

did not present a danger, had no warrants or detainers, and did not do

“something stupid.” Oakley said his father was coming.

While Hill waited on dispatch, Oakley’s behavior deteriorated. He slurred

his speech and forgot prior conversations. He stumbled around, wandering

close to the road and almost walked into a horse trailer pulling into the parking

lot. Hill tried to redirect Oakley out of the way. Oakley jerked his arm free from

Hill and backed away, balling his fist and ignoring commands to put down his

backpack. Hill drew his taser and eventually handcuffed Oakley for alcohol

intoxication.

Oakley’s lack of cooperation escalated. Oakley went limp and fell to the

ground while Hill was taking him to the cruiser. Oakley kicked at Hill. Oakley’s

girlfriend tried to calm him down, but he continued resisting. Oakley was

yelling obscenities like “F*** your momma!”, and “I’m gonna kill you!”, and “I’m

gonna shoot you, too, b****!”

An off-duty jailer, Conner Pennington, observed what was happening and

tried to help. Officer Hill tried to get Oakley in the cruiser, but Oakley braced

his foot against the cruiser door to prevent it from closing. Oakley kicked Hill in

2 the nose and spat on him. Oakley also kicked Pennington in the chest and chin

and spat on him.

Officer Dorman Patrick arrived on the scene to help. As Patrick tried to

secure Oakley’s legs, Oakley kicked Patrick in the groin, knocking off his body

camera, and spat on him. Officer Patrick repeatedly hit Oakley to subdue him

and gain his compliance. This resulted in a fracture to Patrick’s pinky finger

which required surgery and insertion of a plate to repair it. The Commonwealth

played the body camera footage from Officers Hill and Patrick which recorded

Oakley’s behavior and statements.

Oakley testified at trial. He admitted drinking heavily for his birthday,

consuming four cans of Four Loko which have an alcohol content of 12-13%,

and using a THC vape. Oakley claimed that he blacked out before the events

happened and could not remember anything until he woke up in jail.

Oakley moved for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s

case. He renewed the motion at the close of the defense case. The trial court

overruled these motions. The court gave a voluntary intoxication instruction to

the jury.

The jury found Oakley guilty of four counts third degree assault for

kicking and spitting on Officers Hill and Patrick, one count of fourth-degree

assault for kicking Pennington, three counts of terroristic threatening, one

count of resisting arrest, and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender

3 (PFO 1). 1 The jury recommended a twenty-year sentence. The trial court

entered a final judgment following the jury’s recommendation. Oakley appeals

to this Court as a matter of right.

II. ARGUMENT

Oakley argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for a directed

verdict. The standard for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence requires a

trial court to view all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the

non‑moving party; it may grant a directed verdict only when the evidence

cannot support a conviction. Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky.

1983). A directed verdict is improper if the evidence would allow a reasonable

juror to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In deciding the

motion, a trial court must accept the Commonwealth’s evidence as true,

leaving issues of credibility and the weight of the testimony for the jury.

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). On appeal, the

question is whether, considering all the evidence, it would be clearly

unreasonable for the jury to find the defendant guilty. Only in that

circumstance is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Id.

A. The evidence supported convictions for third-degree assault.

A person is guilty of third-degree assault when that person intentionally

causes or attempts to cause physical injury to a peace officer. Kentucky

1 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth dismissed one count of third-degree assault,

the third-degree escape charge, and the second-degree fleeing/evading charge. 4 Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.025(1)(a)(1). Oakley argues his voluntary

intoxication negated the intent element on all four charges. The Commonwealth

asserts there was ample evidence for the jury to find intent, which it can infer,

to support a conviction.

Voluntary intoxication is a question of fact for the jury to decide. It is a

defense only when a person is so intoxicated that it negates that person’s

ability to form the intent to commit a crime. King v. Commonwealth, 513

S.W.3d 919, 923 (Ky. 2017) (citing KRS 501.080(1)). “‘An accused is always

entitled to have this defense submitted to the jury if his evidence is sufficient to

indicate the degree of intoxication required . . . to prevent his forming an intent

to commit’ the crime charged.” King, 513 S.W.3d at 923 (quoting Parido v.

Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Ky. 1977)). Evidence of intent need not

be direct. “Intent can be inferred from the actions of an accused and the

surrounding circumstances. The jury has wide latitude in inferring intent from

the evidence.” Anastasi v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1988).

Both Officers Hill and Patrick testified and detailed their encounters with

Oakley. The Commonwealth played the videos from their body cameras. This

evidence showed Oakley participating in coherent conversations with Officer

Hill and his girlfriend. Oakley repeatedly expressed his desire not to go to jail.

The jury could conclude Oakley purposefully went limp and fell to the ground

to make it harder for Hill to take Oakley to the cruiser and that Oakley

5 purposefully stuck his foot between the door and the cruiser to keep the door

open.

This record provides substantial evidence for a jury to reject Oakley’s

intoxication defense and find he acted with the required intent. When there is

proof to support a defense of voluntary intoxication, it is the jury’s prerogative

to consider the evidence and decide whether to accept or reject it. King, 513

S.W.3d at 925. “The evidence of his intoxication was not so compelling as to

completely negate the issue of intent,” so it was not unreasonable for a jury to

find Oakley guilty of third-degree assault. Carver v. Commonwealth, 303

S.W.3d 110, 119 (Ky. 2010).

Oakley specifically argues that Officer Patrick’s broken finger resulted

from Officer Patrick striking Oakley in anger rather than from Oakley’s own

conduct. The record permitted the jury to infer that Oakley’s resistance and

repeated kicking precipitated Officer Patrick’s use of force and contributed to

the injury, and that Oakley attempted to cause physical injury by kicking and

resisting even if the precise moment of fracture occurred while Officer Patrick

was hitting Oakley. Under Benham, the question is not whether a different

inference was possible, but whether it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to

find the element satisfied. Here, it was not.

B. The evidence supported convictions for fourth-degree assault.

A person is guilty of fourth-degree assault when he intentionally causes

physical injury to another person. KRS 508.030. Physical injury means

6 “substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical condition.” KRS

500.080(17). Oakley argues this standard was not satisfied where Pennington

testified he suffered short-term pain and declined medical attention. The

Commonwealth argues that Pennington’s testimony that he was kicked in the

face and chest and suffered pain satisfies this element and that the statute

contains no duration requirement for how long the physical pain must last.

Pennington testified under oath that Oakley kicked his chest and chin

and that it caused him pain. This meets the standard for physical injury under

the misdemeanor assault statute. The jury was entitled to believe Pennington’s

testimony. The statutes and case law do not require a length of duration that a

victim must suffer. Certainly, a defendant can argue that physical contact was

so inconsequential that the touching did not cause pain. This was a question

for the jury to decide.

C. The evidence supported convictions for third-degree terroristic threatening.

A person commits terroristic threatening in the third degree when that

person “threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or serious

physical injury to another person.” KRS 508.080(1)(a). Oakley raises two

sufficiency challenges: (1) his intoxication negated the intent element; and (2)

the Commonwealth failed to prove at whom the threats were directed. The

statute does not require that the accused intend to carry out the threat or that

the victim hear the threat. The body camara footage clearly recorded Oakley

making threats while struggling with Hill and Patrick.

7 The jury could reasonably find that Oakley, despite his intoxication,

understood what was happening and acted intentionally. The body camera

videos from Officers Hill and Patrick recorded Oakley angrily yelling many

derogatory and violent statements as they were trying to arrest and subdue

him. These statements included “I’m gonna kill you!” and “I’m gonna shoot you,

too!” Yelling things like this while kicking, spitting, and struggling with others

creates a question of fact for the jury to decide.

Terroristic threatening in the third degree can be committed even if the

victim has no knowledge of the threat. Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24,

31 (Ky. 1997) (citing the commentary). The commentary to KRS 508.080

differentiates terroristic threatening from menacing which requires the victim

be placed in reasonable apprehension of immediate injury. KRS 508.050.

Oakley relies on Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023).

Counterman held that the First Amendment requires the prosecution to prove

that a defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature

of his statements, and that recklessness—consciously disregarding a

substantial risk that the statements would be viewed as threatening—is a

constitutionally sufficient mental state. Id. at 74.

Counterman involved a prosecution for ambiguous statements under an

amorphous statute. The Colorado statute prohibited repeated communications

“in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional

distress.” Id. at 70 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–3–602(1)(c) (2022)). Counterman

8 involved repeated, often ambiguous online communications to a civilian under

a stalking statute keyed to causing emotional distress. The Facebook messages

sent to a stranger in Counterman included “good morning sweetheart,” “was

that you in the white Jeep,” and “staying in cyber life is going to kill you.” Id. at

70.

Oakley’s case differs substantially from Counterman. It involved face-to-

face, explicit threats to kill or seriously injure police officers during an active

physical resistance to arrest. The specificity of Oakley’s threats made in this

context distinguishes his case from Counterman. Additionally, the trial court

instructed the jury on intent and voluntary intoxication. The jury rejected

Oakley’s defense, concluding he acted intentionally, and convicted him.

III. CONCLUSION

The Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to overcome the low

threshold for surviving a motion for directed verdict. Oakley testified in his

defense raising the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication. The trial court

properly submitted questions of fact to the jury. We affirm Oakley’s conviction

and sentence.

All sitting. All concur.

9 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Roy A. Durham Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky

Stephanie L. McKeehan Assistant Attorney General