Brandon McDuffie v. Jeremy Beck

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedOctober 29, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01205
StatusUnknown

This text of Brandon McDuffie v. Jeremy Beck (Brandon McDuffie v. Jeremy Beck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brandon McDuffie v. Jeremy Beck, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

BRANDON MCDUFFIE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-1205-bbc

JEREMY BECK,

Defendant.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Brandon McDuffie, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at the Waupun Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on McDuffie’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE McDuffie has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). McDuffie has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $44.03. McDuffie’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused.

“The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT According to the complaint, on February 13, 2025, McDuffie injured a finger on his left hand. Dkt. No. 1, ¶5. Dr. Reono Bertagnolli (not a defendant) ordered an x-ray and diagnosed McDuffie with a fractured finger; and Nurse Tonya Wesner (not a defendant) placed an order for a “soft splint” to protect the fractured finger. Id., ¶¶6-8. McDuffie made multiple attempts to retrieve the prescribed soft splint but Defendant Security Director Jeremy Beck either denied the requests or did not respond. Id., ¶¶3 & 9. McDuffie explains that inmates are entitled to have medically necessary soft splints; and Security Director Beck had no legitimate penological justification for denying it. Id. McDuffie experienced extreme pain and could not sleep at night due to accidently rolling over on his unprotected fractured finger. Id., ¶10. Additionally, McDuffie’s hand failed to heal properly and he can no longer make a fist with his left hand. Id., ¶11. He states that only three of his fingers can fully close into a fist. Id. This has made it difficult for him to grip objects in his daily living. Id. For relief, he seeks monetary damages. Dkt. No. 1

at 5. ANALYSIS “To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that he or she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that this deprivation occurred at the hands of a person or persons acting under the color of state law.” D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when he or she acts with deliberate indifference towards an inmate’s serious medical need. Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720-21 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). To state a claim, McDuffie must allege that: (1) he had an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) the defendant was deliberately indifferent towards it. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008). A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious; it needs only to be “a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” if not addressed. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant is deliberately indifferent when he or she “actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016). Examples of deliberate indifference include ignoring a request for medical assistance; refusing to take instructions from a specialist; persisting in a course of treatment known to be ineffective; choosing an easier and less efficacious treatment without exercising medical judgment; and delaying in treatment which serves no penological interest. Id. at 729-31. McDuffie alleges that he had a diagnosed finger fracture, which is an objectively serious medical condition. See Conley v. Birch, 796 F.3d 742

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Gayton v. McCoy
593 F.3d 610 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Duckworth v. Ahmad
532 F.3d 675 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Joseph Conley v. Kimberly Birch
796 F.3d 742 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Tyrone Petties v. Imhotep Carter
836 F.3d 722 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Brandon McDuffie v. Jeremy Beck, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brandon-mcduffie-v-jeremy-beck-wied-2025.