1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRANDON GENTRY, No. 2:22-cv-00720-DC-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 14 MANTECA POLICE DEPARTMENT, et MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR al., IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL 15 SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. 16 (Doc. No. 16) 17 18 This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the 19 alternative, partial summary judgment. (Doc. No. 16.) Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the pending 20 motion was taken under submission to be decided on the papers. (Doc. No. 17.) For the reasons 21 explained below, Defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part. 22 BACKGROUND 23 This civil rights action arises from Plaintiff’s encounter with two local law enforcement 24 officers during a traffic stop, some of which was captured on the officers’ body worn cameras. 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 A. Factual Background1 2 On October 17, 2020, Plaintiff Brandon Gentry was driving a white 2020 Honda Accord 3 in Manteca, California with two passengers when he was pulled over by Defendants Devin 4 Brooks and Raul Hernandez, who were on duty as sworn California law enforcement officers for 5 Defendant Manteca Police Department. (DUF ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 6, 8.) Specifically, at 10:27 p.m., 6 approximately four hours after sunset (PUF ¶ 44), Defendant Brooks noticed that the front 7 windows of Plaintiff’s vehicle were tinted and decided to stop the vehicle for violating California 8 Vehicle Code section 26708 (DUF ¶ 2). Defendant Brooks activated his lights and followed 9 Plaintiff’s vehicle into a restaurant parking lot. (DUF ¶¶ 4–5.) At the time of the traffic stop, the 10 front windows of Plaintiff’s vehicle were tinted. (DUF ¶ 3.) 11 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez both approached Plaintiff’s parked vehicle in the 12 restaurant parking lot. (DUF ¶ 6.) As they approached, Defendant Brooks smelled “burnt” 13 marijuana coming from an open window of Plaintiff’s vehicle.2 (DUF ¶ 7.) Defendant Hernandez 14 saw a bullet on the lap of a passenger in the rear right seat of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (DUF ¶ 8.) 15 Defendant Hernandez asked the passenger where the gun was located, and the passenger 16 responded that it was in his pocket. (DUF ¶¶ 8–9.) Defendant Hernandez secured the gun from 17 the passenger. (DUF ¶ 9.) 18 Defendant Brooks ordered Plaintiff to exit the vehicle. (DUF ¶ 11.) Plaintiff was holding a 19 small bag as he prepared to exit the vehicle but left the bag in the vehicle after being instructed to 20 do so by Defendant Brooks. (DUF ¶ 11.) Upon exiting the vehicle, Plaintiff was placed in
21 1 This factual background is derived from the undisputed facts as stated by Defendants and responded to by Plaintiff (Doc. No. 16-2) (“DUF”)), the additional undisputed facts as stated by 22 Plaintiff (Doc. No. 25-1) (“PUF”)), declarations and exhibits filed by the parties in support of 23 their respective briefs (Doc. Nos. 16-3, 16-4, 25-2), and body worn camera footage lodged with the court (Doc. Nos. 16-5, 26). Plaintiff stated his undisputed facts in his response to Defendants’ 24 undisputed facts, concurrently filed with his opposition to the pending motion. (Doc. No. 25-1.) Plaintiff’s undisputed facts are numbered 39 through 44, consecutively following Defendants’ 25 undisputed facts numbered 1 through 38. (Id. at 10–11.) Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s undisputed facts in their reply to the pending motion. 26
27 2 Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant Brooks smelled marijuana coming from an open window of Plaintiff’s vehicle but disputes the “nature and quality of the smell” because “no 28 evidence is presented for this beyond the supposition of the officer.” (Doc. No. 25-1 at 3.) 1 handcuffs alongside the other passengers and placed in the backseat of a patrol vehicle. (DUF 2 ¶ 12.) 3 After detaining Plaintiff, Defendant Brooks searched the bag Plaintiff left in the vehicle. 4 (DUF ¶ 13; PUF ¶ 40.) Plaintiff’s bag contained a large amount of cash wrapped with rubber 5 bands. (DUF ¶ 13.) When Defendant Brooks showed Defendant Hernandez the contents of 6 Plaintiff’s bag, Defendant Hernandez stated, “Holy fuck, dude.” (PUF ¶ 40.) Defendant Brooks 7 and Defendant Hernandez also fist bumped each other. (PUF ¶ 41.) Thereafter, Defendant Brooks 8 motioned toward his body worn camera and stated “confidential.” (PUF ¶ 42.) At that time, both 9 Defendant Brooks and Defendant Hernandez deactivated their body worn cameras. (PUF ¶ 42.) 10 The cash from Plaintiff’s bag was placed into another bag, stored in a lock box in the back 11 of Defendant Brooks’s patrol vehicle, and brought to the police station for counting. (DUF ¶ 22.) 12 The parties dispute the amount of cash found in Plaintiff’s bag. A Manteca Police Department 13 sergeant, who ran the cash through an automatic money counter at the police station while 14 Defendant Brooks and Defendant Hernandez were present, determined the total was $73,032. 15 (DUF ¶¶ 23–24.) Plaintiff asserts he had $100,000 in his bag at the time he was detained (DUF 16 ¶ 25) and thus, $26,000 was missing when the money was counted at the police station (PUF ¶ 17 43). 18 In addition to that bag containing cash, officers on the scene located marijuana in the 19 trunk of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (DUF ¶ 14.) Specifically, officers located 25 individual packets of 20 marijuana, each marked with a net weight of 3.5 grams, for a total net weight of 87.5 grams. 21 (DUF ¶ 14.) 22 Following the search of Plaintiff’s vehicle, Defendant Brooks noticed that Plaintiff was 23 sweating in the back of the patrol vehicle. (DUF ¶ 15.) Defendant Brooks tried “water-falling” 24 water into Plaintiff’s mouth, but it splashed on Plaintiff. (DUF ¶ 15–16.) Defendant Brooks asked 25 Plaintiff if he wanted to exit the patrol vehicle to drink water. (DUF ¶ 16.) Once Plaintiff was 26 outside of the vehicle, Defendant Brooks started to pour water into Plaintiff’s mouth. (DUF ¶¶ 17, 27 29.) Defendant Brooks did not apply a control hold to Plaintiff when he was outside of the vehicle 28 in handcuffs. (DUF ¶ 29.) Then Plaintiff suddenly collapsed to the ground, shaking and foaming 1 around his mouth. (DUF ¶ 17.) 2 While Plaintiff was on the ground, Defendant Brooks asked Plaintiff if he experiences 3 seizures and had just had a seizure. (DUF ¶¶ 18–19.) The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was 4 able to respond to Defendant Brooks’s questions regarding seizures. While Defendants assert that 5 Plaintiff responded to Defendant Brooks’s questions in the affirmative (DUF ¶ 18), Plaintiff 6 disputes he was “able to respond during his seizure” or “that he in fact knowingly and 7 intelligently responded to the officer” (Doc. No. 25-1 at 6). 8 Following his collapse, Plaintiff was transported to the hospital by ambulance. (DUF 9 ¶ 20.) Plaintiff told a doctor at the hospital that he has seizures and takes an anti-epileptic drug for 10 seizures but missed several doses because his jaw had been wired shut after he was shot in the 11 neck in an unrelated incident. (DUF ¶ 21.) 12 Because Plaintiff was transported to the hospital following the traffic stop, rather than 13 hand Plaintiff the citations, Defendant Brooks mailed to Plaintiff the citations for a violation of 14 California Vehicle Code section 26708 (tinted windows), and misdemeanor violations of 15 California Health and Safety Code section 11359(b) (possession of cannabis for sale) and 16 11360(a) (transportation of cannabis). (DUF ¶ 26.) 17 B. Procedural Background 18 On April 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint initiating this action against Defendants 19 Manteca Police Department, Officer Devin Brooks, and Officer Raul Hernandez (collectively, 20 “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1.) In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts two causes of action against 21 Defendant Manteca Police Department: a federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating 22 Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 23 and a state law claim for negligent hiring, retention, training, supervision, and discipline. (Id. at 24 6–12.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts five causes of action against Defendants Brooks and 25 Hernandez: a federal claim under § 1983 for violating Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, 26 and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and state law claims for conversion, 27 intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 28 negligence. (Id.) 1 On June 8, 2022, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to voluntarily dismiss his § 1983 2 claim against Defendant Manteca Police Department. (Doc. No. 9.) The only claim remaining 3 against Defendant Manteca Police Department is Plaintiff’s state law claim for negligent hiring, 4 retention, training, supervision, and discipline. 5 On July 1, 2024, Defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment, or in the 6 alternative, partial summary judgment. (Doc. No. 16.) On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an 7 opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 25.) On August 8, 2024, 8 Defendants filed their reply thereto. (Doc. No. 32.) 9 LEGAL STANDARD 10 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 11 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 13 law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is 14 evidence in the record sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving 15 party. Id. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in 16 the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in 17 the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. 18 The moving party “initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 19 material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex 20 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish this by “citing to 21 particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored 22 information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the 23 motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by showing that such 24 materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 25 cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). 26 “Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense (i.e., an issue 27 on which it bears the burden of proof), the defendant must establish ‘all of the essential elements 28 of the . . . defense to warrant judgment in [its] favor.’” Menzel v. Scholastic, Inc., No. 3:17-cv- 1 05499-EMC, 2019 WL 6896145, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted). 2 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving 3 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material facts exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 4 v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 5 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). The nonmoving party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 6 of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits or 7 admissible discovery material in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 56(c)(1); Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A trial court can 9 only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). The 10 nonmoving party does not need to establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor to 11 establish a factual dispute. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a 12 jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of 13 Ariz., 391 U.S. at 288–89. 14 ANALYSIS 15 A. Section 1983 Claim 16 Under § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of any [state law] subjects, or causes to 17 be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 18 immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 19 § 1983. The statute “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 20 for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) 21 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a 22 plaintiff must establish: (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution, and (2) the 23 alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 935 24 (9th Cir. 2002). 25 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Brooks and Hernandez violated his 26 “right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures” under the Fourth and Fourteenth 27 Amendments, his “right to not be deprived of property without due process of law” under the 28 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his “right to equal protection of the laws” under the 1 Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 1 at 6–7.) Plaintiff’s complaint does not specifically allege 2 how the conduct of Defendants Brooks and Hernandez during the traffic stop violated Plaintiff’s 3 constitutional rights, so Plaintiff’s theory of liability is not entirely clear. 4 In the pending motion, Defendants Brooks and Hernandez contend they are entitled to 5 summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because they did not violate any of Plaintiff’s 6 constitutional rights by stopping his vehicle for a traffic violation, ordering him out of his vehicle, 7 placing him in handcuffs, detaining him in the back of a patrol vehicle, or not using a control hold 8 while giving him water. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 5–8.) Defendants Brooks and Hernandez further argue 9 they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s claim to the extent it is based on 10 allegations that they stole money from his bag because they “could not have known at the time 11 the theft was a violation of a constitutional right.” (Id. at 8.) 12 In his opposition to the pending motion, Plaintiff argues only that there is “a material 13 question of fact remaining as to whether the officers [] had probable cause to stop his vehicle,” 14 and that Defendants Brooks and Hernandez are not entitled to qualified immunity because “no 15 reasonable officer in the year 2020 could have believed that theft of $26,000.00 of evidence 16 during an investigation ‘was lawful.’” (Doc. No. 25 at 7–9.) Plaintiff does not explicitly address 17 how Defendants Brooks and Hernandez violated his constitutional rights by ordering him out of 18 his vehicle, placing him in handcuffs, detaining him in the back of a patrol vehicle, or failing to 19 use a control hold while giving him water. Plaintiff merely states that “because the issue of the 20 facts surrounding the probable cause for [the traffic] stop is potentially dispositive of most, if not 21 all, of the legal and constitutional issues here . . . these questions thus become ones of fact for a 22 jury, rather than of law for the court.” (Id. at 7.) As Defendants note in their reply, “[i]t appears 23 Plaintiff is arguing that the facts underlying the traffic stop are disputed and thus, all contact and 24 interactions between Plaintiff and [Defendants Brooks and Hernandez] after the traffic stop are 25 necessarily disputed.” (Doc. No. 32 at 5.) 26 As this civil case involves § 1983 claims for constitutional violations, Plaintiff’s 27 arguments are misplaced. “It is widely acknowledged [] that ‘[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree 28 doctrine . . . is inapplicable to civil § 1983 actions.’” Orellana v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 12- 1 cv-01944-MMM-CW, 2013 WL 12122692, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2013), aff’d, 630 F. App’x 2 730 (9th Cir. 2016). “When a plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries suffered during 3 successive steps of state action—e.g., search, arrest, interrogation, detention, and trial—each 4 stage of conduct must be separately judged by the constitutional standard applicable to the 5 particular right violated, whether Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” Reich v. 6 Minnicus, 886 F. Supp. 674, 685 (S.D. Ind. 1993). “However, a plaintiff who suffers a 7 constitutional deprivation early-on may, under § 1983, recover for his later injuries, even during 8 later constitutional stages in the process, if the injuries are reasonably foreseeable consequences 9 of the earlier deprivation of rights.” Id. at 685. 10 Plaintiff has not raised any genuine dispute of material fact regarding the constitutionality 11 of Defendants Brooks and Hernandez conduct in ordering him out of his vehicle, placing him in 12 handcuffs, detaining him in the back of a patrol vehicle, or failing to use a control hold while 13 giving him water. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated that injuries he suffered were a reasonably 14 foreseeable consequence of Defendants Brooks and Hernandez stopping him for a traffic 15 infraction in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Orellana, 2013 WL 12122692, at *6 (“[I]t 16 is not sufficient for [a plaintiff] to show that [a] traffic stop was unconstitutional in order to 17 recover damages resulting from [their] arrest. [Plaintiff] must also show that the arrest was 18 unconstitutional, or that the later injuries were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the 19 unconstitutional traffic stop.”); see also Reyes v. City of Glendale, No. 05-cv-0253-CAS, 2009 20 WL 2241602, *14 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2009) (“The [c]ourt agrees that plaintiff has failed to 21 present evidence that the traffic stop was unreasonable, and that, even if it were, this would not 22 render plaintiff’s entire detention unreasonable. Therefore, plaintiff may not rely on the initial 23 stop to survive summary judgment.”). Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for 24 constitutional violations is predicated on Defendants Brooks and Hernandez ordering him out of 25 his vehicle, placing him in handcuffs, detaining him in the back of a patrol vehicle, or not using a 26 control hold while giving him water, the court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary 27 judgment on that claim. 28 As for whether Defendants Brooks and Hernandez are entitled to summary judgment on 1 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim to the extent it is predicated on the constitutionality of the traffic stop and 2 alleged theft of money from Plaintiff’s bag, the court addresses the parties’ respective arguments 3 below. 4 1. Traffic Stop for Tinted Windows 5 The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. 6 Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop “constitute[s] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning” of the Fourth 7 Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Under the Fourth Amendment, “an 8 officer [can] initiate a brief investigative traffic stop” based on “reasonable suspicion,” meaning 9 “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 10 activity.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020); see also United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 11 F.3d 1101, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring reasonable suspicion for investigative traffic 12 stops). The reasonable suspicion standard “is not a particularly high threshold to reach.” United 13 States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Reasonable suspicion 14 requires more than a “mere ‘hunch,’” but “the level of suspicion the standard requires is 15 considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously 16 less than is necessary for probable cause.” Glover, 589 U.S. at 380 (citation omitted); see also 17 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (the decision to stop a vehicle is also 18 reasonable “where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 19 occurred”). 20 California Vehicle Code section 26708(a) provides: “A person shall not drive any motor 21 vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed or applied upon the 22 windshield or side or rear windows.” Cal. Veh. Code § 26708(a)(1). However, “clear, colorless, 23 and transparent material may be installed, affixed, or applied to the front side windows, located to 24 the immediate left and right of the front seat if the following conditions are met: (1) [t]he material 25 has a minimum visible light transmittance of 88 percent (2) [t]he window glazing with the 26 material applied meets all requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205 (49 27 C.F.R. 571.205), including the specified minimum light transmittance of 70 percent . . . .” Cal. 28 Veh. Code § 26708(d). 1 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez argue that they did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth 2 Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by conducting a traffic stop 3 on Plaintiff’s vehicle because the traffic stop was supported by probable cause, or at minimum, 4 reasonable suspicion. (Doc. Nos. 16-1 at 6; 32 at 3.) In the pending motion, Defendants Brooks 5 and Hernandez argue that they had probable cause to stop Plaintiff’s vehicle for having front 6 tinted windows in violation of California Vehicle Code section 26708. (Doc. Nos. 16-1 at 6.) 7 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez emphasize that Plaintiff stated at his deposition that his 8 vehicle’s front windows were tinted at the time of the stop. (Id.) 9 In his opposition to the pending motion, Plaintiff asserts that there is a material question 10 of fact as to whether Defendants Brooks and Hernandez had probable cause to stop his vehicle. 11 (Doc. No. 25 at 6.) Plaintiff contends that California Vehicle Code section 26708 prohibits 12 excessive tinting of windows, but not all tinting, meaning “tinting is not the violation, the amount 13 of tinting is.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues Defendants Brooks and Hernandez have not provided 14 “evidence on the nature or extent of the tinting on [Plaintiff’s] vehicle” or “evidence on what they 15 perceived or observed,” beyond the fact that the windows were tinted. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff further 16 argues there are “facts and evidence . . . in the record (the video, time of night, etc.)” that 17 contradict Defendant Brooks’s and Defendant Hernandez’s account that they had probable cause 18 to conduct a traffic stop. (Id.) Namely, Defendants Brooks and Hernandez pulled Plaintiff over 19 for a traffic stop around 10:30 p.m. at night and “windows to Plaintiff’s vehicle were down” 20 during the stop, “rendering the officers unable to see what tinting, if any, the windows in fact 21 had.” (Id.) 22 In their reply, Defendants Brooks and Hernandez argue that the traffic stop was conducted 23 based on Defendant Brooks’s observation that Plaintiff’s vehicle had tinted windows prior to the 24 stop, and “[t]hat is all that is required to establish reasonable suspicion of a violation [of] 25 California Vehicle Code section 26708.” (Doc. No. 32 at 3.) 26 As Plaintiff emphasizes, not all tinting is illegal under California Vehicle Code section 27 26708. “[W]hile excessively-tinted windows are illegal, California law permits tinting of the 28 windshield and front driver and passenger side windows where the tinting permits light 1 transmittance of at least 70 percent and meets the other requirements of [section] 26708(d)(2).” 2 United States v. Ybarra, No. 22-cr-00347-BLF-VKD, 2023 WL 4188219, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 3 2023) (citing United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Due to such 4 statutory nuances, an officer cannot ‘justify a traffic stop’ with the bare-bones conclusion that a 5 car’s ‘windows were tinted.’” United States v. Salas, 766 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1073 (S.D. Cal. 6 2025). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether Defendants Brooks and Hernandez “had a 7 particularized and objective basis for suspecting that [Plaintiff’s] vehicle had a window tinting 8 that violated the California Vehicle Code.” Ybarra, 2023 WL 4188219, at *5–6; see also Salas, 9 766 F. Supp. 3d at 1073. 10 For example, in United States v. Pullen, No. 1:20-cr-00195-JLT, 2022 WL 4586177 (E.D. 11 Cal. Sept. 29, 2022), the district court found that officers had reasonable suspicion to make a 12 traffic stop based on tinted windows where they testified they “could not see clearly into the 13 driver’s window and saw, instead, a silhouette” when they viewed the vehicle sometime around 14 4:00 to 4:30 p.m., video footage from body worn cameras showed the windows were tinted, and 15 photos taken by an officer demonstrated the opacity of the tint on the vehicle’s windows. Pullen, 16 2022 WL 4586177, at *3–4. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that officers 17 “reasonably suspected illegal window tinting, because the windows were tinted to some degree 18 and the windows appear[ed] to be overly tinted in at least some images.” United States v. Pullen, 19 No. 23-10036, 2024 WL 2843036, at *2 (9th Cir. June 5, 2024). Likewise, in Ybarra, the district 20 court concluded that an officer “had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that [a] 21 vehicle had unlawfully tinted windows” where he did not merely observe “some tint on the 22 vehicle’s windows” but rather observed “the windows appeared to [] be excessively dark, such 23 that they did not permit a sufficiently clear view of the interior of the vehicle.” Ybarra, 2023 WL 24 4188219, at *7; see also Adom v. City of Los Angeles, No. 5:21-cv-00711-JFW-KES, 2023 WL 25 3958913, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:21-cv- 26 00711-JFW-KES, 2023 WL 3958883 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-55558, 2025 WL 27 88846 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (officers had reasonable suspicion to justify initiating a traffic stop 28 for illegally tinted windows where “[t]he tint was so dark, [one officer] could not see inside the 1 vehicle, consistent with an illegal level of tint based on his experience”). 2 Here, Defendants’ argument that the traffic stop of Plaintiff’s vehicle was supported, at 3 minimum, by reasonable suspicion because Defendant Brooks observed Plaintiff’s vehicle had 4 tinted windows prior to the stop, and Plaintiff later admitted his windows were tinted, is 5 misplaced. The fact that Plaintiff’s vehicle had windows that were tinted is not sufficient, on its 6 own, to establish reasonable suspicion of a violation of California Vehicle Code section 26708, 7 because that statute does not prohibit all tinting. Rather, Defendants Brooks and Hernandez must 8 demonstrate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Plaintiff’s vehicle had a window 9 tinting that violates California Vehicle Code section 26708. As Plaintiff argues, there remains a 10 genuine dispute of material fact regarding Defendant Brooks’s and Defendant Hernandez’s 11 observations prior to the stop, beyond the undisputed fact that Plaintiff’s windows were tinted. 12 (See Doc. No. 25 at 7.) For instance, Plaintiff calls into question whether Defendant Brooks could 13 have observed the tint on Plaintiff’s windows because the traffic stop occurred at night, several 14 hours after sunset, and Plaintiff’s windows were down during the stop. (Id. at 6–7); see e.g., 15 Pullen, 2022 WL 4586177, at *4 (noting “it is within the common experience that lighting can 16 impact how dark window tinting appears”). Thus, when viewed in a light most favorable to 17 Plaintiff as the nonmoving party, this evidence creates a genuine dispute of fact as to whether 18 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez had reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff’s vehicle for having 19 illegally tinted windows in violation of California Vehicle Code section 26708. 20 Accordingly, the court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 21 § 1983 claim to the extent that claim is predicated on the constitutionality of the traffic stop. 22 2. Alleged Unreasonable Seizure (Theft of Plaintiff’s Money) 23 “Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages unless 24 their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 25 person would have known.’” Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2019) 26 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In cases where the defense of qualified 27 immunity is raised, the plaintiff must show that “(1) the official violated a statutory or 28 constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged 1 conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). A district court may exercise its 2 discretion to analyze the qualified immunity prongs in either order, and the resolution of the 3 second prong may obviate the need to address the first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 4 (2009). 5 “A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 6 would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 7 11–12 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). Although “a case directly 8 on point” is not required, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 9 question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. “Plaintiffs must point to prior case law that 10 articulates a constitutional rule specific enough to alert these deputies in this case that their 11 particular conduct was unlawful. To achieve that kind of notice, the prior precedent must be 12 ‘controlling’—from the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court—or otherwise be embraced by a 13 ‘consensus’ of courts outside the relevant jurisdiction.” Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 14 911 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). 15 “In cases alleging unreasonable searches or seizures, [the Supreme Court has] instructed 16 that courts should define the ‘clearly established’ right at issue on the basis of the ‘specific 17 context of the case.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 18 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in 19 particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. 20 at 742. “The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly 21 established.’” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742) (emphasis in original). 22 Thus, this inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the particular case, rather 23 than as a broad general proposition. Id. 24 According to Plaintiff, after searching his bag during the traffic stop, Defendants Brooks 25 and Hernandez “took approximately $25,000 of Plaintiff’s money and booked [the remaining] 26 $73,032 into evidence” in violation of his constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 36.) Defendants 27 Brooks and Hernandez deny they stole money from Plaintiff “at any point during the traffic stop, 28 arrest, or when the money was seized,” but argue “even if the allegations are assumed to be true,” 1 they are entitled to qualified immunity because they “could not have known at the time the theft 2 was a violation of a constitutional right based on Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 3 2019).” (Doc. No. 16-1 at 8.) 4 In Jessop, officers executed a search warrant on three of the plaintiffs’ properties as part 5 of an investigation into illegal gambling machines. Jessop, 936 F.3d at 939. Following the search, 6 officers claimed they had seized approximately $50,000 from the properties, but the plaintiffs 7 alleged “that the officers had actually seized $151,380 in cash and another $125,000 in rare 8 coins” and “stole the difference.” Id. at 939–40. The plaintiffs brought suit against the officers 9 who conducted the search, alleging § 1983 claims for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 10 violations. Id. at 940. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. 11 The district court granted the officers’ motion on the basis that “any alleged theft of property 12 which was initially lawfully seized from plaintiffs pursuant to a valid search warrant did not 13 violate their then clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.” Jessop v. City of Fresno, No. 14 1:15-cv-00316-DAD-SAB, 2017 WL 3264039, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2017), aff’d, 918 F.3d 15 1031 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that plaintiff “failed to 16 show that it was clearly established that the [officers] alleged conduct violated the Fourth 17 Amendment.” Jessop, 936 F.3d at 942. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[i]t has never addressed 18 whether the theft of property covered by the terms of a search warrant, and seized pursuant to that 19 warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 941. The Ninth Circuit noted that only the Fourth 20 Circuit had addressed the question and did so in an unpublished decision. Id. “The lack of ‘any 21 cases of controlling authority’ or a ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ on the 22 constitutional question compel[ed] the conclusion that the law was not clearly established at the 23 time of the incident.” Id. at 942. In other words, “[a]lthough the [officers] ought to have 24 recognized that the alleged theft of [the plaintiffs] money and rare coins was morally wrong, they 25 did not have clear notice that it violated the Fourth Amendment—which . . . [was] a different 26 question.” Id. Because there was no clearly established right, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the 27 question of whether the alleged theft was in fact a constitutional violation. Id. at 942 (“[W]e need 28 not decide whether the [] [o]fficers violated the Fourth Amendment.”). 1 In his opposition to the pending motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Brooks and 2 Hernandez “knew, or should have known, and constitutionally must have known their theft of the 3 $26,000.00 violated the [Fourth] [A]mendment,” pursuant to Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194 4 (9th Cir. 2017). In Brewster, officers impounded the plaintiff’s vehicle because plaintiff had a 5 suspended license. Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1195. When the plaintiff “appeared at a hearing . . . with 6 proof that she was the registered owner of the vehicle and her valid California driver’s license,” 7 the government “refused to release the vehicle before [a] 30-day holding period had lapsed.” Id. 8 Although the district court found that the seizure of the plaintiff’s vehicle did not “present a 9 Fourth Amendment problem because ‘the state has an important interest in . . . keeping 10 unlicensed drivers from driving illegally,” the Ninth Circuit disagreed. Id. at 1197. The Ninth 11 Circuit reasoned that “[b]ecause a 30-day impound is a ‘meaningful interference with an 12 individual’s possessory interests in [his] property,’” the Fourth Amendment was implicated by the 13 government’s actions. Id. at 1197. “The exigency that justified the seizure [of the plaintiff's 14 vehicle] vanished once the vehicle arrived in impound and [the plaintiff] showed up with proof of 15 ownership and a valid driver’s license.” Id. Thus, the government’s impoundment of the vehicle 16 “constituted a seizure that required compliance with the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1196–97. 17 Plaintiff argues that Brewster “must control: if the rote 30-day seizure of a citizens’ 18 vehicle for 30 days is constitutionally infirm—because the government’s justification for the 19 continued seizure had evaporated—then [Defendant] Brooks’[s] and [Defendant] Hernandez’s 20 private pecuniary purpose in seizing, holding, and possessing Plaintiff’s $26,000.00 in perpetuity 21 must, by force of logic, violate the constitution all the same.” (Doc. No. 25 at 8.) Plaintiff points 22 out that the court in Jessop recognized the import of Brewster in suggesting that an officer’s 23 alleged theft could implicate the Fourth Amendment. (Id.); see also Jessop, 936 F.3d at 941-42. 24 However, Jessop held that “[e]ven if the facts and reasoning of Brewster would dictate the 25 outcome [of Jessop], . . . [Brewster] was not clearly established law when the [officers] executed 26 the search warrant” at issue in 2013 since Brewster was decided in 2017. Jessop, 936 F.3d at 942. 27 Plaintiff insists that “[b]ecause Brewster was decided in 2017, and [Defendants Brooks and 28 Hernandez] stole Plaintiff’s money in 2020,” the law was clearly established for the purposes of 1 this case. (Doc. No. 25 at 9.) 2 Plaintiff’s reliance on Brewster to demonstrate that the law clearly establishes Defendant 3 Brooks’s and Defendant Hernandez’s alleged theft violated the Fourth Amendment is unavailing. 4 As the Ninth Circuit noted in Jessop, “Brewster’s reasoning suggests that [an officer’s] alleged 5 theft of [a plaintiff’s] property could [] implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Jessop, 936 F.3d at 6 941. However, “Brewster’s facts vary in legally significant ways from those in this case” because 7 Brewster “concerned the government’s impoundment of a vehicle,” whereas Plaintiff argues “that 8 [Defendants Brooks and Hernandez] stole [his] property.” See id. Plaintiff fails to point to any 9 case law that “articulates a constitutional rule specific enough to [Defendants Brooks and 10 Hernandez] in this case that their particular conduct was unlawful.” See Sharp, 871 F.3d at 911. 11 Absent controlling precedent or a consensus of cases on the issue presented by this case, the court 12 concludes that any alleged theft by Defendants Brooks and Hernandez during the traffic stop of 13 Plaintiff’s vehicle did not violate Plaintiff’s “clearly established” Fourth Amendment rights.3 14 Thus, Defendants Brooks and Hernandez are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 15 Therefore, the court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 16 § 1983 claim to the extent that claim is predicated on the alleged theft of Plaintiff’s money. 17 B. Conversion Claim 18 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s conversion 19 claim on the basis that they are immune from liability under California Government Code section 20 822. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 9.) California Government Code section 822 provides that “[a] public 21 employee is not liable for money stolen from his official custody,” but is not “exonerate[d] . . . 22 from liability if the loss was sustained as a result of his own negligent or wrongful act or 23 omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 822. 24 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez argue that “[t]o prove a claim for conversion[,] the 25 Plaintiff must show that after [the money] was seized pursuant to his arrest[,] one or both 26
27 3 Having concluded that Defendants Brooks and Hernandez did not violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right, the court does not reach a determination as to whether the alleged theft 28 of Plaintiff’s money in fact violated the Fourth Amendment. 1 [o]fficers actually took the money he claims is missing.” (Doc. No. 16-1 at 9.) In their view, 2 “Plaintiff’s claim is based solely on his belief he had exactly $100,000 in his bag at the time of 3 the stop.” (Id.) Defendants Brooks and Hernandez contend “Plaintiff has no evidence that [they] 4 (or anyone else) took any portion of the money seized from him.” (Id.) Defendants Brooks and 5 Hernandez further contend that Plaintiff has failed to provide “evidence as to the identity of the 6 alleged thief as required to prove [a claim for conversion].” (Doc. No. 32 at 8.) 7 Plaintiff argues that Defendants Brooks and Hernandez are not immune from liability 8 under California Government Code section 822 because there is a genuine dispute of material 9 facts as to “whether [Defendants] Brooks and Hernandez caused [] theft by their ‘negligence or 10 wrongful act or omission.” (Doc. No. 25 at 9.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that “he has testified 11 [at his deposition] that he had $26,000.00 stolen by [Defendants Brooks and Hernandez]” and his 12 “testimony is evidence, and this evidence controverts the facts surrounding the precise caveat” in 13 California Government Code section 822, that a public employee is not immune if a “loss was 14 sustained as a result of his own negligence or wrongful act or omission.” (Id.) 15 The court agrees with Plaintiff that there is a genuine dispute of material facts as to 16 whether Defendants Brooks and Hernandez caused theft by their “negligence or wrongful act or 17 omission,” such that they are not immune to liability under California Government Code section 18 822. Although Defendants Brooks and Hernandez contend Plaintiff has no evidence that they 19 took any portion of the money seized from him, Plaintiff’s testimony is evidence. Plaintiff asserts 20 that he had $100,000 in the bag inside of his vehicle. (DUF ¶ 25.) It is undisputed that when a 21 sergeant from Defendant Manteca Police Department ran the money through an automatic money 22 counter following the traffic stop, the total was $73,032. (DUF ¶¶ 23–24.) Plaintiff deduces 23 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez stole the difference (approximately $26,000.00) during the 24 search of his vehicle. (Doc. No. 25 at 9) (citing Plaintiff’s deposition testimony). A reasonable 25 trier of fact could find based on Plaintiff’s testimony, coupled with the video footage of the 26 reaction and statements made by Defendants Brooks and Hernandez upon finding the bag of 27 money, that money was missing from Plaintiff’s bag following the traffic stop as a result of 28 Defendant Brooks’s and Defendant Hernandez’s wrongful conduct. Thus, Defendants Brooks and 1 Hernandez have not met their burden of showing that they are entitled to immunity under 2 California Government Code section 822 as to Plaintiff’s conversion claim. 3 Therefore, the court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 4 conversion claim. 5 C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional 6 Distress, and Negligence 7 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez similarly move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 8 claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 9 and negligence on the basis that they are immune from liability under California Government 10 Code section 820.4. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 10–11.) California Government Code section 820.4 11 provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission, exercising due care, in the 12 execution or enforcement of any law,” but is not “exonerate[d] . . . from liability for false arrest or 13 false imprisonment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.4. 14 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez argue that undisputed evidence demonstrates they 15 acted with “due care” in their interactions with Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 10-11.) To support 16 their argument, Defendants Brooks and Hernandez rely on the declaration of their police practices 17 expert, Travis Norton, who previously worked for the Oceanside California police department 18 and retired as a lieutenant overseeing professional standards unit/training. (Doc. No. 16-4.) In his 19 declaration, Mr. Norton opines that Defendant Brooks’s and Defendant Hernandez’s conduct was 20 in accordance with California Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”). (Id.) Specifically, 21 Mr. Norton opines that Defendants Brooks and Hernandez followed POST regulations in stopping 22 Plaintiff for a violation of California Vehicle Code section 26708, detaining Plaintiff, handcuffing 23 Plaintiff, placing Plaintiff in the back of a patrol car, and providing Plaintiff water without a 24 control hold. (Id. at 3–8.) Defendants Brooks and Hernandez contend that Plaintiff has not 25 presented any expert testimony to contradict Mr. Norton’s declaration or raise a triable issue of 26 fact as to the issues on which he has opined. (Doc. No. 32 at 5–6.) 27 In his opposition to the pending motion, Plaintiff argues Defendants Brooks and 28 Hernandez are not immune from liability under California Government Code section 820.4 1 because “[d]ue care is [] a question of fact.” (Doc. No. 25 at 9.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues there 2 are material questions of fact regarding whether Defendants Brooks and Hernandez “acted 3 properly in not holding or supporting Defendant as he had a seizure and fell,” “while they were 4 ‘waterfalling’ water into his mouth” without a control hold, and “whether stealing $26,000.00 of 5 evidence was done in ‘due care’ during the ‘execution’ of the laws of the State of California.” 6 (Id.) 7 Here too, the court agrees with Plaintiff that there are genuine disputes of material fact as 8 to whether Defendants Brooks and Hernandez exercised “due care” in their interactions with 9 Plaintiff. Although Defendants Brooks and Hernandez insist that Mr. Norton’s declaration 10 regarding POST standards conclusively establishes that they acted with due care, a reasonable 11 trier of fact could draw other inferences and come to an alternative conclusion. As discussed 12 above, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that money was missing from Plaintiff’s bag as a 13 result of Defendant Brooks’s and Defendant Hernandez’s wrongful conduct and thus done in the 14 absence of due care. Likewise, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Defendants Brooks 15 and Hernandez did not exercise due care when providing Plaintiff with water because no control 16 hold was applied. See J.A. v. Madera County, No. 1:21-cv-00252-ADA-EPG, 2023 WL 425819, 17 at *8 n.7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2023) (“Logically, the exercise of due care required by [California 18 Government Code section 820.4] presupposes the employee was not negligent or acting in an 19 intentionally injurious manner.”) (citation omitted). Because there are fact issues as to whether 20 Defendants Brooks and Hernandez exercised due care, Defendants Brooks and Hernandez have 21 not demonstrated they are entitled to immunity under California Government Code section 22 820.4.4 23 Accordingly, the court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 24 claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 25 and negligence. 26 4 For the same reasons, the court is not persuaded by Defendant Brooks’s and Defendant 27 Hernandez’s argument that they are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 28 negligence claims because Plaintiff was lawfully arrested (Doc. No. 16-1 at 10). 1 D. Negligent Hiring, Retention, Training, Supervision, and Discipline 2 The California Tort Claims Act provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 3 statute[,]” a public entity “is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or 4 omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815; 5 see also Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co., 155 Cal. App. 3d 405, 409 (1984) (“[I]n absence of 6 some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be 7 liable.”) (emphasis in original). A direct claim of negligence against a public entity must be 8 “founded on a specific statute either declaring the entity to be liable or creating a specific duty of 9 care apart from the general tort principles embodied in [California] Civil Code section 10 1714[.]” de Villers v. County of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 251 (2007) (emphasis in 11 original.) 12 “California courts have held that a public entity cannot be held directly liable for the 13 negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of police officers or other public employees because 14 there is no statutory authority for imposing such liability.” Reel v. City of El Centro, No. 22-cv- 15 526-W-KSC, 2022 WL 14915608, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2022); see also McCullough v. City 16 & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 24-cv-03260-JCS, 2024 WL 4353061, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 17 2024) (“It appears to be well-established that under California law, there is no statutory basis for 18 alleging a claim of negligent hiring or supervision against a governmental entity.”); Estate of 19 Osuna v. County of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (noting that 20 “California law does not recognize a general duty of care on the part of supervisors with respect 21 to negligent hiring, retention, or training”). 22 The California Supreme Court has recognized that under some circumstances, a public 23 entity can be held vicariously liable for negligent hiring, retention and supervision by its 24 employees. C.A. v. William S. Hart Union, 53 Cal. 4th 861, 865 (2012). “A public entity is liable 25 for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the 26 scope of his employment if the act or omission would . . . have given rise to a cause of action 27 against that employee or his personal representative.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). However, a 28 plaintiff must allege a special relationship in order to bring a negligent hiring claim against a 1 public entity. “Absent such a special relationship, there can be no individual liability to third 2 parties for negligent hiring, retention or supervision of a fellow employee, and hence no vicarious 3 liability under section 815.2” William S. Hart Union, 53 Cal. 4th at 877; see also Willis v. City of 4 Sacramento, 2014 WL 1027070, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) (dismissing negligent hiring, 5 supervision, and retention claim against sheriff due to plaintiff’s failure to allege a special 6 relationship with sheriff). 7 Defendant Manteca Police Department moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 8 negligent hiring, retention, training, supervision, and discipline claim on the basis that it is 9 entitled to immunity pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 11.) 10 Specifically, Defendant Manteca Police Department argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a 11 statutory basis for his negligent hiring, retention, training, supervision, and discipline claim. (Id.) 12 In his opposition to the pending motion, Plaintiff argues that the statutory basis for direct liability 13 against Defendant Manteca Police Department “finds its life in [sections] 822 and 820.4” of the 14 California Government Code, which “impose liability for negligent and wrongful acts or 15 omissions.” (Doc. No. 25 at 9–10.) Thus, Plaintiff argues the California Tort Claims Act is 16 “satisfied insofar as statutes do proscribe the conduct of the officer here.” (Id. at 10.) 17 Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, California Government Code sections 822 and 820.4 do 18 not provide a basis for direct liability against Defendant Manteca Police Department for negligent 19 hiring, retention, training, supervision, and discipline. As previously discussed, California 20 Government Code section 822 provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for money stolen 21 from his official custody,” but is not “exonerate[d] . . . from liability if the loss was sustained as a 22 result of his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 822. Likewise, 23 California Government Code section 820.4 states that “[a] public employee is not liable for his 24 act or omission, exercising due care, in the execution or enforcement of any law,” but is not 25 “exonerate[d] . . . from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.4. 26 Neither section imposes a specific duty of care on a public entity related to negligent hiring, 27 retention, training, supervision, and discipline or declares that a public entity can be liable for 28 such a claim. See de Villers, 156 Cal. App. 4th at 251. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to cite any authority 1 supporting the proposition that California Government Code sections 822 and 820.4 provide a 2 statutory basis for direct liability against Defendant Manteca Police Department for negligent 3 hiring, retention, training, supervision, and discipline. See Heflin v. County of Los Angeles, 438 4 Fed. Appx. 596, 597 (9th Cir. Jun. 16, 2011) (affirming the dismissal of a claim against a 5 California county on the ground that the county was not directly liable for its negligent hiring and 6 supervision of a deputy sheriff who allegedly assaulted the plaintiff and explaining that the 7 plaintiff “points to no statutory language supporting a negligent hiring or supervision claim 8 against a public entity”). Because Plaintiff has not identified a statute which imposes direct 9 liability on Defendant Manteca Police Department for negligent hiring, retention, training, 10 supervision, and discipline, this claim fails as a matter of law. 11 To the extent Plaintiff’s asserts a vicarious liability claim against Defendant Manteca 12 Police Department based on the conduct of Defendants Brooks and Hernandez, Plaintiff fails to 13 allege—let alone put forth evidence on summary judgment to demonstrate—the requisite facts for 14 such a claim. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Brooks and Hernandez were supervisory 15 employees that acted negligently in hiring, retaining, training, supervising, or disciplining 16 employees of Defendant Manteca Police Department. Nor does Plaintiff allege a special 17 relationship between himself and any supervisory employee of Defendant Manteca Police 18 Department. See Est. of Osuna, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 1183 (“The question is not whether the 19 arresting officers had a special relationship with the decedent, but rather whether the supervisors 20 responsible for hiring, training, disciplining, and so forth had such a special relationship.”); 21 Kendrick v. Cnty. of San Diego, 2018 WL 1316618, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2018), aff’d, 776 22 F. App’x 530 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Plaintiff does not allege a special relationship existed between 23 [decedent] and [sheriff]. Therefore, [the sheriff] cannot be personally liable for a claim of 24 negligent hiring and supervision and consequently, the [c]ounty cannot be vicariously liable under 25 California Government Code section 815.2.”). Thus, a claim for negligent hiring, retention, 26 training, supervision, and discipline based on a theory of vicarious liability against Defendant 27 Manteca Police Department still fails as a matter of law. 28 Accordingly, Defendant Manteca Police Department’s motion for summary judgment on 1 Plaintiff’s negligent hiring, retention, training, supervision, and discipline claim will be granted. 2 CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons discussed above, 4 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED in part 5 and DENIED in part as follows: 6 a. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Brooks and 7 Defendant Hernandez on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim to the extent that claim is 8 predicated on Defendants Brooks and Hernandez ordering Plaintiff out of 9 his vehicle, placing him in handcuffs, detaining him in the back of a patrol 10 vehicle, or not using a control hold while giving him water; 11 b. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Brooks and 12 Defendant Hernandez on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim predicated on the alleged 13 theft of Plaintiff’s money on the basis of qualified immunity; 14 c. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim to the extent 15 that claim is predicated on the constitutionality of the traffic stop of 16 Plaintiff; 17 d. Summary judgment is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for conversion, 18 intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional 19 distress, and negligence; 20 e. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendant Manteca Police 21 Department on Plaintiff’s claim of negligent hiring, retention, training, 22 supervision, and discipline; and 23 ///// 24 ///// 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 2. In light of this order, the court will set a date for a final pretrial conference by 2 separate order. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. □ 5 | Dated: _ October 3, 2025 EIU os Dena Coggins 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24