Brandon Daniel Ruiz v. State of Iowa

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: March 14, 2025
• Docket: 24-0085
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–0085

Submitted February 19, 2025—Filed March 14, 2025

Brandon Daniel Ruiz,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Iowa,

Appellee.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tamra J. Roberts,

judge.

An applicant for postconviction relief seeks further review of a court of

appeals decision that affirmed the dismissal of his second application as

untimely. Decision of Court of Appeals and District Court Judgment

Affirmed.

Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Jessica Donels (argued) of Parrish Kruidenier, LLP, Des Moines, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee. 2

Christensen, Chief Justice.

In this postconviction-relief (PCR) appeal, the applicant challenges the

dismissal of his untimely second PCR application. The district court denied the

applicant’s first PCR application on the merits, and the court of appeals affirmed

the decision. Due to filing delays from the applicant’s appointed counsel at the

district court level and the time it took on appeal, by the time procedendo was

issued, the three-year PCR statute of limitations had already run. This rendered

the applicant’s second application untimely, and the State moved to dismiss the

action.

One day after the State moved to dismiss the second application, the

applicant’s appointed counsel moved to withdraw “due to high case load.” The

district court denied this request, explaining that “there are no other contract

attorneys with the public defender’s office to handle PCR cases in this county.”

Appointed counsel subsequently entered her appearance but did not file

anything on the applicant’s behalf. Nevertheless, she represented the applicant

at the unreported hearing on the motion to dismiss and requested an additional

thirty days to file a brief that she ultimately never filed.

The district court concluded that the second application was time-barred

and dismissed it. A split panel of the court of appeals affirmed, and we granted

further review. On our review, we also affirm the dismissal of the applicant’s

second PCR action. The applicant failed to preserve his equitable tolling

argument, just as he failed to present any specific ways that PCR counsel could

have prevented the district court from dismissing his action as time-barred.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Brandon Ruiz was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse in 2018

following a bench trial in which the district court concluded that the State proved

one count of sexual contact between Ruiz’s genitals and four-year-old A.R.’s 3

mouth. The district court acquitted Ruiz of six other second-degree sexual abuse

counts alleging different sex acts. Ruiz moved for a new trial, arguing in relevant

part that A.R.’s testimony was inconsistent with prior statements that she had

given to the State’s expert, Dr. Harre. The district court denied this motion.

In its written verdict, the district court explained that it was “able to

reconcile the conflicts in the testimony by the simple fact that a six-year-old child

would be far more comfortable talking to a doctor in a medical setting than she

would be talking to two lawyers and a Judge in front of Ruiz.” It also recognized

that more than a year and a half had passed since the incidents occurred. The

district court sentenced Ruiz to a term of incarceration not to exceed twenty-five

years, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. State v. Ruiz, No. 18–

1260, 2019 WL 3729562, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2019). Procedendo was

issued on December 10, 2019.

On January 22, 2020, Ruiz filed his first PCR application with a request

for appointment of counsel. The district court appointed counsel to Ruiz on

April 1 and ordered counsel to confer with Ruiz and recast his application with

specific claims for relief by June 30. It also ordered the State to file an answer

by July 30. Although the State filed its answer within its deadline, counsel for

Ruiz did not file a recast application until February 1, 2022. This recast

application alleged that trial and direct appeal counsel were ineffective in various

ways, including trial counsel’s failure to challenge inconsistencies in A.R.’s

testimony.

On May 5, 2022, after a hearing on the merits, the district court denied

Ruiz’s application. Regarding the alleged inconsistencies in A.R.’s testimony, the

district court concluded that trial counsel’s testimony and the evidence

supported the fact that confronting A.R. with the inconsistencies in her other

statements of abuse “would have likely affirmed these other allegations of sexual 4

abuse [against Ruiz] and adopted that as her further testimony in the trial

supporting the other counts alleged against Ruiz.”

On July 13, 2023, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial

of his first PCR application. In doing so, it determined that Ruiz failed to preserve

his claim that trial counsel’s “half-hearted and timid” closing statement, which

Ruiz believed failed to emphasize the inconsistencies in A.R.’s testimony, was

ineffective assistance. Ruiz v. State, No. 22–0913, 2023 WL 4529424, at *1 (Iowa

Ct. App. July 13, 2023). Had Ruiz preserved this claim, the court of appeals

concluded that he failed to prove the elements of ineffective assistance because

trial counsel’s closing “succinctly summarize[d] the problems with the child’s

testimony.” Id. Plus, “the trial court dismissed most of the charges, finding Ruiz

guilty of only one act of sexual abuse.” Id. Procedendo was issued on August 23,

2023—after the three-year PCR statute of limitations ran because procedendo

was issued from the direct appeal of his conviction on December 10, 2019.1

On September 5, 2023, Ruiz filed a second pro se PCR application,

asserting actual innocence and ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate

counsel in his first PCR proceeding. Despite the new claim of actual innocence,

Ruiz’s application did not allege any new facts. The district court appointed

counsel eight days later and directed counsel to confer with Ruiz and recast the

application by December 12 or file a statement that no recast application would

be forthcoming.

The same day that Ruiz filed his second PCR application, the State moved

to dismiss his application as untimely. The next day, counsel moved to withdraw

“due to high case load.” In rejecting that request, the district court explained

1Under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2023), “applications must be filed within three years

from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” 5

that “there are no other contract attorneys with the public defender’s office to

handle PCR cases in this county.” Appointed counsel entered her appearance on

behalf of Ruiz two days later but proceeded to file nothing on Ruiz’s behalf. Ruiz

could not file any pro se documents on his behalf, nor could the district court

have considered any because he had representation. See Iowa Code § 822.3A(1)

(2023) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . , an applicant seeking relief under

section 822.2 who is currently represented by counsel shall not file any pro se

document, including an application, brief, reply brief, or motion, in any Iowa

court. The court shall not consider, and opposing counsel shall not respond to,

such pro se filings.”).

On November 8, the district court conducted a hearing on the State’s

motion to dismiss via videoconference. The hearing was unreported, so we have

no transcript on appeal to review exactly what transpired. Instead, we must rely

on the district court’s order granting the motion, which noted the appearance of

Ruiz’s counsel at the unreported hearing, as well as her request for thirty days

to file a brief on Ruiz’s behalf.2 Yet, as the order states, counsel never filed that

brief or any additional pleadings prior to the deadline. The district court

acknowledged Ruiz’s specific arguments of ineffective assistance and actual

innocence in his application. After the district court “considered the arguments

2In State v. Brown, 16 N.W.3d 484, 487 (Iowa 2025), we recently addressed how parties

can create a record of the proceedings when a transcript is unavailable under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.806. There, the court reporter died before the transcript could be prepared, but our appellate rules allow for this process whenever a party deems it necessary for the appellate record regardless of the reason for the transcript’s unavailability. Id.; see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.806(1). Rule 6.806 “permits a party to file a statement describing the evidence ‘prepared from the best available means, including the party’s recollection,’ with the opposing party permitted to file objections or proposed amendments to the other party’s statement within ten days.” Brown, 16 N.W.3d at 487 (quoting Iowa R. App. P. 6.806(1)–(2)). If there are discrepancies, the district court must settle them and any objections, then approve a final version of the statement. Id.; see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.806(3). Neither party requested this procedure. 6

of counsel and the applicable law,” it dismissed Ruiz’s appeal as untimely

without addressing the merits of Ruiz’s application.

Ruiz’s counsel filed a timely notice of appeal and an application to

withdraw, leading to the appointment of current appellate counsel. We

transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court’s

dismissal of Ruiz’s second application over the dissent of one judge. The

dissenting judge concluded that “Ruiz was denied his statutory right to effective

assistance of postconviction counsel” and would have reversed the dismissal and

remanded “so that [Ruiz] may have the chance to address the State’s motion to

dismiss.” We granted Ruiz’s application for further review.

II. Analysis.

Ruiz asks us to reverse the district court’s dismissal of his untimely second

application and adopt an equitable tolling doctrine for applicants when

“extraordinary circumstances outside their control,” including PCR counsel’s

ineffectiveness, “delay[] their applications beyond the three-year limitation.”

Before we can address this request, we must determine whether it is properly

before us. Quoting a footnote from our ruling in State v. Williams, 895 N.W.2d

856, 859 n.2 (Iowa 2017), superseded by court rule on other grounds, Iowa R.

Crim. P. 2.33, Ruiz asserts that he did not have a duty to raise this claim before

the district court because “it would make little sense to require a party to argue

existing law should be overturned before a court without the authority to do so.”

But that statement in Williams addressed an argument from the state, who

prevailed at the district court level when the district court denied the defendant’s

motion to dismiss. Id. at 859. As the party who did not prevail at the district

court level, it did not change Ruiz’s error preservation obligations. “It is a

fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both

raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” 7

Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Meier v. Senecaut,

641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2022)). Because this did not occur, we will not

consider his equitable tolling claim further. See Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d

434, 437 (Iowa 2022) (declining to consider applicant’s argument that

constitutional principles entitled him to pursue his untimely fourth application

for PCR because the applicant did not raise the issue in district court).

Recognizing his error preservation problem, Ruiz maintains that he is

entitled to relief because his appointed counsel in this action provided ineffective

assistance that resulted in structural error. The right to effective assistance of

PCR counsel is statutory. See Iowa Code § 822.5; Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248,

250 (Iowa 2011). Ordinarily, an applicant presenting this claim must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that PCR counsel failed to perform an essential

duty, which resulted in prejudice. Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251. In claims of

structural error, the applicant is not required to show specific prejudice, as the

“underlying criminal proceeding is so unreliable the constitutional or statutory

right to counsel entitles the defendant to a new proceeding without the need to

show the error actually caused prejudice.” Id. at 252. This includes when

“counsel is completely denied, actually or constructively, at a crucial stage of the

proceeding.” Id. That is what Ruiz maintains happened here.

Namely, Ruiz contends that he was constructively without counsel

because his appointed PCR counsel “fail[ed] to present any arguments on [his]

behalf.” He compares his situation to Lado v. State, in which we found “Lado’s

counsel committed structural error that constructively denied Lado the right to

counsel and rendered the postconviction relief proceeding inherently unreliable.”

Id. at 249. There, Lado’s appointed counsel “sat silent and did not respond” to

the state’s motion for summary judgment and dismissal due to untimeliness. Id.

at 252–53. But unlike Ruiz’s counsel, the district court expressly warned Lado’s 8

counsel upon appointment that “Lado’s application was under a rule 1.944

dismissal notice for failure to prosecute.” Id. at 250. Counsel ignored this

warning and took no action to prevent or rectify the dismissal, prompting the

district court to dismiss Lado’s case for failure to prosecute the action under

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.944 without addressing the merits. Lado, 804

N.W.2d at 250. On appeal, we held that counsel committed structural error

because “Lado was constructively without counsel during his postconviction

relief proceeding as his application was dismissed without any consideration of

its merits or meaningful adversarial testing.” Id. at 253.

Significantly, that was Lado’s first PCR attempt, so the district court would

have never heard his case on the merits had we not reversed and remanded to

the district court. Id. at 249. Conversely, Ruiz had appointed counsel in his first

PCR action that assisted him with his case, and the district court examined his

claims on the merits. Despite the court of appeals’ holding that Ruiz failed to

preserve error on his argument on appeal from that PCR denial, it, too, proceeded

to analyze the merits of Ruiz’s nonpreserved argument when it affirmed the

district court’s decision just two months before Ruiz filed the application at issue

here. Between the direct appeal of his conviction and his first PCR action,

multiple courts have reviewed the merits of Ruiz’s conviction.

This case also differs from Lado because Ruiz’s application was not

dismissed for failure to prosecute under rule 1.944. Instead, the district court

dismissed Ruiz’s application because it was time-barred under Iowa Code

section 822.3. This section is clear that the ineffective assistance of first PCR

counsel is not a reason to extend the statute of limitations on an applicant’s

second PCR application, as it states, “An allegation of ineffective assistance of

counsel in a prior case under this chapter shall not toll or extend the limitation 9

periods in this section nor shall such claim relate back to a prior filing to avoid

the application of the limitation periods.” Id.

Thus, Ruiz’s suggestion that counsel could “have challenged the series of

structural errors [from first PCR counsel] that led [his] second PCR application

to be time-barred” is meritless. As the court of appeals observed, “[I]t is not clear

to us how complaints about first PCR counsel would have shown that Ruiz’s

second PCR application met an exception to the statute of limitations. And Ruiz

neither connects the dots to illustrate the significance nor provides any authority

in support.” We need not speculate over what may have happened had Ruiz’s

counsel made the argument he now proposes about his first PCR counsel’s

ineffectiveness because it still would have required dismissal under Iowa Code

section 822.3.

The only exception to the statute of limitations under Iowa Code

section 822.3 that could possibly apply here is for “a ground of fact or law that

could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Ruiz recognizes

the importance of this argument, asserting in his brief that counsel “could have

pointed out that [his] pro se petition alleged new facts that were previously

unavailable.” Regardless of whether counsel pointed this out at the hearing, we

assume that the district court read the petition and noticed Ruiz’s allegation of

new facts. In fact, its dismissal ruling acknowledged Ruiz’s claim of actual

innocence and declared that it had “considered the arguments of counsel and

the applicable law.” For all we know on this record, Ruiz’s counsel raised the

arguments at the hearing that he is now advocating for on appeal.

Notably, despite Ruiz’s claim in his pro se application that there were new

facts that were previously unavailable, Ruiz never listed these new facts or

discussed how they were previously unavailable. In response to the application’s

question for “[f]acts supporting application within personal knowledge of 10

applicant,” Ruiz merely wrote, “Opinion of Ct. of appeals; Petitioner is actually

innocent.” In response to the application’s question for a list of the “documents,

exhibits, affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting this application,” Ruiz

reported, “None. Public record.”

“[W]here a claimant alleges counsel’s failure to pursue a particular course

breached an essential duty, there is no such duty when the suggested course

would have been meritless.” State v. Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Iowa 2015);

see also State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Iowa 2001) (en banc) (“Because

[defendant’s] argument has no merit, his counsel was not ineffective for failing

to make this challenge.”). The record before us prevents us from determining

what course of action counsel took to investigate or address Ruiz’s allegation of

new facts, let alone whether counsel purposely decided not to pursue Ruiz’s

claim of new facts because it was meritless. Rather, all we can glean from this

record is that counsel appeared at the hearing and requested thirty days to file

a brief that she subsequently never filed. For all we know, the absence of that

brief could have been a conscious decision on counsel’s part after she

investigated Ruiz’s alleged new facts and found them meritless.

We only decide claims of ineffective assistance “on direct appeal when the

appellate record is adequate,” and the record here falls short. Goode v. State, 920

N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 2018). Ruiz asks us to “remand for further proceedings

to give [him] the opportunity to develop his claims at trial” because the statute

of limitations under chapter 822 forecloses his ability to seek relief for his

ineffective assistance in a new PCR action. As we have stressed throughout this

opinion, the problem with remand is that Ruiz does not state any “specific ways

in which counsel’s performance was inadequate and identify how competent

representation probably would have changed the outcome.” Dunbar v. State, 515

N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994). 11

Ruiz speculates that counsel could have taken certain actions to prevent

dismissal for untimeliness, but we do not know what actions counsel took at the

hearing, whether counsel investigated Ruiz’s claim of actual innocence, and what

counsel’s strategy—if any—was for not filing the brief that she requested at the

hearing. Even Ruiz’s suggestion on appeal that counsel should have pointed out

that he was alleging new facts in his application falls short of providing any

insight into what those new facts are or when or how he discovered them.

In sum, because this is not a case of structural error as described in Lado,

“we decline to remand [Ruiz’s] claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction

counsel raised for the first time on appeal to the district court to hear and

decide.” Goode, 920 N.W.2d at 527.

III. Conclusion.

For these reasons, we affirm the decisions of the court of appeals and

district court.

Decision of Court of Appeals and District Court Judgment Affirmed.