Brandenburg v. . Office of the Secretary, Department of Health & Hospitals

716 So. 2d 100, 98 La.App. 3 Cir. 163, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 1500, 1998 WL 283050
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 3, 1998
DocketNo. 98-163
StatusPublished

This text of 716 So. 2d 100 (Brandenburg v. . Office of the Secretary, Department of Health & Hospitals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brandenburg v. . Office of the Secretary, Department of Health & Hospitals, 716 So. 2d 100, 98 La.App. 3 Cir. 163, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 1500, 1998 WL 283050 (La. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

IxWOODARD, Judge.

The plaintiff, Harold Brandenburg (Brandenburg), appeals the trial court’s judgment to uphold the State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals’ (DHH) denial of his [101]*101request for Medicaid assistance under the program’s spend-down medically needy provision. For the reasons assigned below, we affirm.

FACTS

The Medically Needy Program (MNP) provides Medicaid benefits to individuals or families “whose income and/or resources are sufficient to meet basic needs in a categorical assistance program but not sufficient to meet medical needs according to MNP standards.” DHH’s Medicaid Eligibility Manual § H-1010 (1992) (emphasis added). There are several classes of medically needy recipients. One group includes spend-down medically needy recipients, who “may qualify for the Medically Needy Program on the basis that countable income has been spent or [are] obligated to pay |2unpaid medical expenses.” DHH’s Medicaid Eligibility Manual § H-1011 (1996). Hence, the medical bills of these recipients are used to “spend-down” their excess income to an eligibility level known as the Medically Needy Income Eligibility Standard (MNIES). DHH’s Medicaid Eligibility Manual § H-1010.2 (1992).

Brandenburg, age sixty-eight now, initially applied for Medicaid assistance on January 8, 1996, but his social security income exceeded the maximum allowable limits for participation in the SSI-related Medicaid program. As a result, he was considered under the spend-down medically needy provision of Medicaid. After the appropriate calculations were made, Brandenburg had a negative remaining quarterly income. He was then certified for coverage from January 1, 1996 to March 31,1996, and the residual amount was carried over into his next certification period.

In March of 1996, Brandenburg reapplied for Medicaid assistance, but was, once again, only considered under the program’s spend-down medically needy provision for April, May, and June of 1996. However, the medical bills considered in the second quarter, along with the residual from the first spend-down, did not reduce Brandenburg’s income to the appropriate point of eligibility. He was then contacted and allowed to submit additional expenses, but in the end, his excess income was still not sufficiently consumed by his medical expenses.

Pursuant to Brandenburg’s request, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge on August 23, 1996. By written reasons dated April 29, 1997, the administrative law judge held that the evidence supported the rejection of Brandenburg’s application for participation in the SSI-related Medicaid program and the spend-down provision of the MNP.

On May 30, 1997, Brandenburg sought judicial review of that administrative decision. A certified copy of the administrative appeal record was then filed.into the record of the trial court’s proceedings on September 22, 1997. By judgment dated September 29, 1997, the trial court affirmed the administrative law judge’s ruling in favor of the DHH. Brandenburg devolutively appeals from that judgment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Acting pro se, Brandenburg contends that his medical bills were of a sufficient amount to make him eligible for participation in the spend-down medically needy program. He also contends that he has “been abused by the State of Louisiana” andjjthat it “has.not obey[e]d the federal law....” Furthermore, he criticizes the job performances of his attorney, Nina Coleman, a DHH Eligibility Determinations Examiner, David Glancy, the Bureau of Appeals Director, Gerard Torry, and the administrative law judge.

LAW

The only issue properly before us is whether Brandenburg incurred medical expenses that are sufficient to effectively reduce his income to the eligibility level. Brandenburg alleged in his petition to the trial court that the administrative law judge’s decision violated La.R.S. 49:964(G), one of the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides:

The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the ■ case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced be[102]*102cause the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(6) Not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court. In the application of this rule, the court shall make its own determination and conclusions of fact by a preponderance of evidence based upon its own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety upon judicial review. In the application of the rule, where the agency has the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by first-hand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the agency’s determination of credibility issues.
(7) In cases covered by R.S. 15:1171 through 1177, manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. In the application of the rule, where the agency has the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by firsthand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the agency’s determination of credibility issues.

|4Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court is, for the most part, confined to the record established before the agency. La.R.S. 49:964(F).

In order to determine if there was any error in the decisions below, we must apply the Medicaid rules and regulations to the facts of this case. The DHH’s Medicaid Eligibility Manual § H-1011.2 (1995) provides:

If there is excess income remaining after the regular MNP budget, certain medical bills incurred by the income unit are used in chronological order (the order in which services are furnished) to reduce the income (spend-down). If the benefit unit has enough medical bills to reduce countable income below the MNIES (or reduce excess income to zero) in a three-month period and other eligibility factors are met, they are eligible for Medicaid coverage for the remainder of the spend-down quarter.

According to the quarterly income worksheet for spend-down MNP (OFS Form 2-SD), the eligibility determination is made by taking the “Total Countable Quarterly Income” of the applicant and subtracting the quarterly MNIES to come up with an “Excess Income to Spend-Down.” From that amount, “allowable quarterly medical expenses” are then subtracted, resulting in an amount known as “Remaining Quarterly Income.” If that final amount is equal to or less than zero, then the applicant is deemed “income eligible.”

FIRST QUARTER ELIGIBILITY

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Related

§ 49:964
Louisiana § 49:964(G)

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Bluebook (online)
716 So. 2d 100, 98 La.App. 3 Cir. 163, 1998 La. App. LEXIS 1500, 1998 WL 283050, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brandenburg-v-office-of-the-secretary-department-of-health-hospitals-lactapp-1998.