UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
BRANDEN S. SMITH, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-315H-20-0117-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: May 24, 2024 Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Branden S. Smith , Clinton, Utah, pro se.
Christine Yen , Esquire, Stockton, California, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal of his termination from his position in the excepted service during his probationary/trial period. On petition for review, the appellant avers that he “did not receive any notification that [he] was supposed to confirm [he] was an employee” and alleges that his removal was the result of discrimination. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 4. Generally, we
1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2
grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the appropriate jurisdictional standard, we AFFIRM the initial decision. Only an “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, can appeal an adverse action to the Board. Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 8 (2017), aff’d sub. nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7513(d). As a nonpreference eligible who was terminated from a position in the excepted service, the appellant may appeal his termination to the Board only if he qualifies as an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). Martinez v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 5 (2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). Under this section, an “employee” is defined as the following:
[A]n individual in the excepted service (other than a preference eligible)—(i) who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; or (ii) who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). 3
Here, although the administrative judge correctly stated that only an “employee” as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) can appeal an adverse action to the Board, she erroneously analyzed the appeal pursuant to the definition applicable to individuals in the competitive service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-6; cf., 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). 2 However, insofar as the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege either (1) that he was not serving a probationary/trial period at the time of his termination 3 or (2) that he had 2 years of current continuous service prior to his removal, this error was harmless and a different outcome is not warranted. 4 ID at 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C); see also Panter v. Department of the Air Force , 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 2 Although a probationary Department of Defense employee in the competitive service who has not completed 2 years of continuous service has no statutory right of appeal, he has a regulatory right of appeal in certain limited circumstances. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A); 10 U.S.C. § 1599e(d); 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805-.806. 3 Assuming without deciding that the appellant was serving under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, he qualifies as an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) if and only if he was not serving a probationary or trial period at the time of his termination. See Martinez, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 6 & n.2; see also Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 47 F.3d 409, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) covers only excepted service employees serving “under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service”). 4 The agency’s response to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order provided the appellant with notice of the correct jurisdictional standard, i.e., it informed him that he must meet the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). IAF, Tab 5 at 15-17; see Scott v. Department of Justice, 105 M.S.P.R. 482, ¶ 6 (2007).
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
BRANDEN S. SMITH, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-315H-20-0117-I-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: May 24, 2024 Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Branden S. Smith , Clinton, Utah, pro se.
Christine Yen , Esquire, Stockton, California, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
FINAL ORDER
The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal of his termination from his position in the excepted service during his probationary/trial period. On petition for review, the appellant avers that he “did not receive any notification that [he] was supposed to confirm [he] was an employee” and alleges that his removal was the result of discrimination. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 4. Generally, we
1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2
grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the appropriate jurisdictional standard, we AFFIRM the initial decision. Only an “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, can appeal an adverse action to the Board. Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 8 (2017), aff’d sub. nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7513(d). As a nonpreference eligible who was terminated from a position in the excepted service, the appellant may appeal his termination to the Board only if he qualifies as an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). Martinez v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 5 (2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). Under this section, an “employee” is defined as the following:
[A]n individual in the excepted service (other than a preference eligible)—(i) who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; or (ii) who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). 3
Here, although the administrative judge correctly stated that only an “employee” as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) can appeal an adverse action to the Board, she erroneously analyzed the appeal pursuant to the definition applicable to individuals in the competitive service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-6; cf., 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). 2 However, insofar as the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege either (1) that he was not serving a probationary/trial period at the time of his termination 3 or (2) that he had 2 years of current continuous service prior to his removal, this error was harmless and a different outcome is not warranted. 4 ID at 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C); see also Panter v. Department of the Air Force , 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 2 Although a probationary Department of Defense employee in the competitive service who has not completed 2 years of continuous service has no statutory right of appeal, he has a regulatory right of appeal in certain limited circumstances. See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A); 10 U.S.C. § 1599e(d); 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805-.806. 3 Assuming without deciding that the appellant was serving under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, he qualifies as an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) if and only if he was not serving a probationary or trial period at the time of his termination. See Martinez, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 6 & n.2; see also Forest v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 47 F.3d 409, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that section 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) covers only excepted service employees serving “under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service”). 4 The agency’s response to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order provided the appellant with notice of the correct jurisdictional standard, i.e., it informed him that he must meet the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C). IAF, Tab 5 at 15-17; see Scott v. Department of Justice, 105 M.S.P.R. 482, ¶ 6 (2007). 5 Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter. 4
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following address: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 5
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx . 6
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives this decision. If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the address of the EEOC is: Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission P.O. Box 77960 Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: Office of Federal Operations Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 131 M Street, N.E. Suite 5SW12G Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of 7
competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following address: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 717 Madison Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
6 The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510. 8
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
FOR THE BOARD: ______________________________ Gina K. Grippando Clerk of the Board Washington, D.C.