Brandeis v. Kenny

31 Pa. D. & C.2d 347, 1963 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 341
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County
DecidedJuly 19, 1963
Docketno. 63-1899
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (Brandeis v. Kenny) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brandeis v. Kenny, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 347, 1963 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).

Opinion

Honeyman, J.,

Plaintiffs instituted an action in trespass against defendant based upon an occurrence on October 21,1962, in which an automobile operated by wife-plaintiff came into collision with an automobile operated by defendant, as a result of which wife-plaintiff sustained certain personal injuries and husband-plaintiff incurred certain expenses and loss resulting from the damage to the automobile which he owned and which was operated by wife-plaintiff, as well as medical expenses incurred on behalf of the wife in effecting treatment and cure for her personal injuries. In this action both plaintiffs seek damages to compensate them for the injury, damage, and loss that they suffered as a result of the alleged negligence of defendant.

To the complaint that they filed, defendant filed preliminary objections in the nature of a motion for a specific complaint, particularly with respect to paragraphs five and seven thereof. Paragraph five of the complaint describes the injuries to wife-plaintiff as follows:

“5. As a result of the collision recklessly and negligently caused by defendant, plaintiff sustained injuries to her body viz; contusions of the left side of the head, more particularly in the temporal region; cerebral concussion, contusions of the chest, and ribs with resulting injuries to the respiratory system; contusions of both knees and right ankle; fracture of the left maxillary first and second bicuspids together with the involvement of the surrounding blood vessels, nerves and soft tissue; all of which have caused plaintiff severe pain and suffering, physical and mental shock and temporary total disability, which has prevented plaintiff from attending to her usual and daily duties.”

[349]*349Counsel for defendant contends that this is not sufficiently specific and particular. With this we cannot agree. We have reviewed the authorities in defendant’s brief, particularly previous opinions of this court: Winders v. Elby, 68 Montg. 288 (1952); Brehony v. Esrey, 60 Montg. 207 (1944).

In both of these cases the court directed an amended complaint to be filed to include more specific allegations of the personal injuries to plaintiff. However, a comparison of the averments in those cases and the averments in the instant case readily shows that the allegations herein are sufficient to apprise defendant of what he will be required to meet at trial. As Judge Forrest, now President Judge, said in his opinion in Pincus v. Wolf, 2 D. & C. 2d 389, 392 (1954):

“Pleadings should not be made instruments for the harassment and exasperation of litigants, bringing the judicial process into disrepute, but should help to narrow the issues and apprise defendant of what he will be required to meet at trial. If defendants still believe themselves unable from the pleadings alone to make adequate preparations for trial they may resort to the Pa. R. C. P. governing depositions and discovery, rules 4001, et seq., as amended April 12, 1954, and effective July 1,1954....”

Defendant also, in his preliminary objections, demands a more specific paragraph seven in the complaint. This paragraph is part of the complaint of husband-plaintiff and contains the allegations as to expenditures by him for medical care and treatment of wife-plaintiff. Defendant is entitled to have an enumeration in the complaint, in this regard, of the identity of the physicians and/or hospital or other institutions providing such medical services or treatment, the general nature thereof, as well as the amounts of money expended therefor, up to the date of the filing of the complaint or amended complaint. Obviously, [350]*350plaintiff cannot itemize such expenditures which occur after the filing of the complaint or amended complaint, and such itemization, if any, should be obtained through the employment of the rules of civil procedure pertaining to discovery. It may well be that paragraph seven of the instant complaint does not contain all of such expenditures and if it does not, then the objection of defendant is well taken and the complaint should be amended to include all expenditures by husband-plaintiff for the medical care and treatment of the wife-plaintiff up to the date of the amended complaint.

The third and last numbered paragraph of the preliminary objections is somewhat curious and unique. It states therein as follows:

“3. These preliminary objections shall be deemed to be continuing until the time of trial and require the complaint to be amended so that all claims for special damages are pleaded with particularity. At trial, any claim for special damages not pleaded with particularity will be objected to and the court will be asked to preclude any testimony concerning such claims.”

Counsel for defendant does not cite any authority whatsoever for the proposition above-recited. This court is of the opinion that those who promulgated the rules of civil procedure intended preliminary objections to mean precisely what the words imply, viz. objections at any stage of the pleadings to be disposed of prior to the disposition of the main issue in the case. Pa. R. C. P. 1028 (c) states as follows:

“(c) A party may file an amended pleading as of course within ten (10) days after service of a copy of preliminary objections. The court shall determine promptly all preliminary objections. If an issue of fact is raised, the court shall take evidence by depositions or otherwise.” 2A Anderson Pa. Civ. Prac., §1028.7 states as follows:

[351]*351“The court is required to determine all preliminary objections promptly. The effect of this provision is to stay the main action while the ancillary or collateral questions raised by the preliminary objections are determined.”

The above-cited procedural rule makes it mandatory that the court dispose of the preliminary objections promptly and preliminarily, unless the party whose pleading is attacked by the preliminary objections voluntarily files an amended pleading in an effort to meet such objections. Under our local administrative procedure, preliminary objections in any action at law are brought before the court by means of counsel for either party filing a praecipe with the court administrator. Matters of this sort are heard regularly once a month by our court and disposed of promptly thereafter. However, we cannot be charged with the knowledge of outstanding preliminary objections in every action filed and indexed in the prothonotary’s office. It would appear that unless and until either counsel chooses to follow our administrative procedure in order to have the matter disposed of by the court, that they have then brought about a stalemate in the particular action, precluding the matter from proceeding any further on the main issues.

Therefore, it is our opinion that preliminary objections cannot “be deemed to be continuing until the time of trial” as counsel for the defendant contends in his preliminary objections. Neither can preliminary objections be used as a substitute for discovery proceedings as counsel for the defendant contends in his brief, as well as in sample copies of letters which he represents to the court as having been sent to opposing counsel in the instant case as well as in similar situations in other matters. In such sample letter bearing no heading, counsel for the defendant states, inter alia:

[352]

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552 A.2d 313 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
31 Pa. D. & C.2d 347, 1963 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 341, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brandeis-v-kenny-pactcomplmontgo-1963.