Branch v. Finch

313 F. Supp. 337, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11986
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedApril 22, 1970
DocketCiv. A. T-4561
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 313 F. Supp. 337 (Branch v. Finch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Branch v. Finch, 313 F. Supp. 337, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11986 (D. Kan. 1970).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

TEMPLAR, District Judge.

This proceeding was instituted by plaintiff against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare as is authorized by and pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S.C. § 405(g), for the purpose of obtaining a judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Sections 216 (i) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) and 423. An affidavit being filed, this Court, on April 25. 1969, entered an order granting plaintiff leave to sue forma pauperis without securing costs.

Both parties in this action have submitted motions for summary judgment together with briefs to support their respective positions.

The plaintiff filed her application to establish a period of disability on February 28, 1968, as provided in Section 416 (i), and for disability insurance benefits, as provided under Section 423 of the Act. Claimant alleged, in substance, that she became unable to work because of a badly sprained back on September 23, 1967. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. On December 11, 1968, a hearing was conducted before the hearing examiner of the department, at which the plaintiff was present without an attorney. The hearing examiner filed his decision denying plaintiff’s application on December 30, 1968. The appeals Council upheld the decision of the hearing examiner upon the plaintiff’s request for review. The hearing examiner’s decision became the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The claimant will meet the earnings requirement until June 30,1972.

The hearing examiner determined that, in view of the claimant’s limited education and age, training for sedentary work would not be profitable for her. In his determination that the claimant is not entitled to a period of disability or to disability insurance benefits, the hearing examiner made the following findings:

“FINDINGS OF FACT
“1. The claimant is approximately 59 years of age and she has an eighth grade education.
“2. The claimant has worked as a laundry worker, waitress, maid, and nurse’s aide.
“3. In September 1967 the claimant began to suffer from back pain and she was treated for the condition at St. Francis Hospital, Topeka, Kansas.
“4. Orthopedic examination of the claimant’s back in May 1968 resulted in a diagnosis of mild musculoligamentous strain residuals with underlying mild lumbar degenerative joint disease.
“5. The claimant has not attempted to secure work since leaving her employment with the A. T. & S. F. Hospital, Topeka, Kansas, in 1967.
“6. While the claimant’s back condition has possibly prevented her from returning to work as a maid, she has not been prevented from working as a waitress, laundry helper, or nurse’s aide for a period of twelve months or more and she is currently able to engage in this type of activity.
“CONCLUSION OF LAW
“The claimant has not been prevented from engaging in substantial, gainful activity for a period of twelve months *341 or more at any time prior to the date of this decision and she is presently able to work as a waitress, laundry helper, or nurse's aide.'' (Record P. 9, 10).

The primary issue before this Court is whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision that plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or to disability insurance benefits and specifically whether plaintiff has been unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.

The definition of disability set forth in § 423(d) (1) provides:

“(d) (1) The term ‘disability’ means—
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months * *
“(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) (A)—
(A) an individual * * * shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. * * * ”
* * * •* * *
“(3) For purposes of this subsection, a ‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”
* * * * -x- *
“(5) An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Secretary may require.”

The word “any” as used in the phrase “any substantial gainful activity” must be read in light of what is reasonable and not what is merely conceivable. See Huneycutt v. Gardner, 282 F.Supp. 405 (M.D.N.C.1968).

This Court recognizes that judicial review of final decisions of the Secretary is a defined and limited one. See Folsom v. O'Neal, 250 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1957); Gordon v. Celebrezze, 253 F.Supp. 779 (D.Kan.1965); Jones v. Celebrezze, 246 F.Supp. 701 (D.Kan.1965); and Shonk v. Gardner (Templar, J., No. T-4354, unreported). The Court pointed out in Gardner v. Bishop, 362 F.2d 917, 919 (10th Cir. 1966), that findings of fact by the Secretary and the inferences drawn from such findings should not be disturbed by a reviewing court, “if there is substantial evidence to support them. Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Stated in a different manner the evidence must be such, if the trial were to a jury, as would justify a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury. If there is only a slight preponderance of the evidence on one side or the other, the Secretary's finding should be affirmed. See Underwood v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Charles v. Califano
464 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Kansas, 1978)
Spatola v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare
429 F. Supp. 21 (S.D. New York, 1977)
Keef v. Weinberger
404 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Kansas, 1975)
Everitt v. Weinberger
399 F. Supp. 35 (D. Kansas, 1975)
Thomas v. Weinberger
398 F. Supp. 1034 (D. Kansas, 1975)
Wren v. Weinberger
390 F. Supp. 507 (D. Kansas, 1975)
Stone v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare
388 F. Supp. 994 (D. Kansas, 1974)
Hofacker v. Weinberger
382 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. New York, 1974)
Chittenden v. Weinberger
370 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Kansas, 1974)
Brown v. Richardson
361 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. California, 1972)
Lucas v. Richardson
348 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Kansas, 1972)
Adams v. Richardson
336 F. Supp. 983 (D. Kansas, 1972)
Walker v. Richardson
339 F. Supp. 853 (D. Kansas, 1971)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
313 F. Supp. 337, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11986, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/branch-v-finch-ksd-1970.