Branch v. Carolina Shoe Company

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedFebruary 17, 1999
DocketI.C. No. 453005
StatusPublished

This text of Branch v. Carolina Shoe Company (Branch v. Carolina Shoe Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Branch v. Carolina Shoe Company, (N.C. Super. Ct. 1999).

Opinion

Upon review of the competent evidence of record with respect to the errors assigned, and finding no good grounds to receive further evidence or rehear the parties or their representatives, the Full Commission modifies and affirms the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

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Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Leave to Re-Open the Record in this case. In the discretion of the Full Commission, plaintiff's motion is denied.

The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties as:

STIPULATIONS
1. All parties hereto are subject to and bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

2. An employer-employee relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant-employer at all relevant times.

3. Plaintiff's average weekly wage was $448.00.

4. Plaintiff suffered a compensable injury as a result of an occupational disease on or about 22 March 1994, involving her right foot. The claim was accepted as compensable.

5. All medical records can be admitted into evidence subject to the right of either party to depose the treating physician.

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The Full Commission finds as facts the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff is a married woman born on 17 March 1954. She graduated from high school.

2. Plaintiff began working for defendant employer in 1973. She left defendant's employ in 1981, then returned in 1984. Plaintiff left again in 1990, but continued to work for defendant part-time. She returned to full time work for defendant in 1992. Several months later, she became a "utility person," a job which involved being proficient in all the jobs in her department. Plaintiff would fill in where necessary and assist in the training of new employees. She continued as a utility person until 22 March 1994. Plaintiff's average weekly wage at this time was $448.00.

3. Sometime before March 1994, plaintiff began to experience pain in her right foot. She was ultimately diagnosed as having a Morton's neuroma, which defendants accepted as an occupational disease sustained on 22 March 1994. On 10 May 1994, Dr. Donald B. Glugover performed an excision of the interdigital (between the third and fourth toes) neuroma of plaintiff's right foot.

4. Plaintiff returned to work on 11 July 1994, working approximately four hours a day.

5. On 26 September 1994, a Form 21 Agreement was filed, whereby defendants agreed to pay weekly compensation in the amount of $298.69, based on an average weekly wage of $448.00. The Agreement was approved by the Commission on 11 October 1994.

6. Plaintiff continued to experience pain in her right foot. She presented to Dr. J. Alfred Moretz who referred her to Sports Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center. Plaintiff participated in physical therapy during the month of September.

7. On 24 October 1994, Dr. Moretz took plaintiff out of work because of her complaints of pain, the pathology of which was not understood, and referred her to psychologist, Dr. D. Scott Cutting. Over the next several months, plaintiff was seen by orthopedic surgeons, Drs. W. Hodge Davis and Robert D. Tisdale, neurologist, Dr. Thomas J. Fox, and psychologist, Dr. Cutting. On 2 February 1995, Dr. Davis performed a resection of recurrent neuroma on plaintiff's right foot.

8. On 20 March 1995, plaintiff returned to work in the tag room, a different position for her. Her job consisted of sorting papers, or tags, hand stamping papers, and stapling papers. The job was a regular position with defendant-employer. Plaintiff was allowed to either stand or sit while performing the job. Plaintiff continued to work in the tag room at the time of the hearing before a deputy commissioner in February 1997, but was working only between two to four hours per day, five days a week.

9. On 20 March 1995, plaintiff also began daily participation in physical therapy at the Burke Rehabilitation Center. On 30 March 1995, she presented to Dr. Paul Jaszewski, an anesthesiologist and pain management specialist, at the Pain Management Center at the orthopaedic hospital in Charlotte. Plaintiff complained of a persistent burning in her right foot, swelling, bluish discoloration and hypersensitivity in her right foot, with pain radiating into her calf. Dr. Jaszewski diagnosed plaintiff as having reflex sympathetic dystrophy ("RSD").

10. Dr. Jaszewski next saw plaintiff on 11 April 1995. Her condition had not changed. He performed a sympathetic block, which completely relieved plaintiff's pain, a result which was consistent with a diagnosis of RSD. He placed plaintiff in an inpatient program of physical therapy. Some improvement was gained initially, but thereafter plaintiff's complaints worsened.

11. On 18 May 1995 Dr. Jaszewski tried a second block which was a good sympathetic block but did not significantly reduce her pain. This could mean that plaintiff's problem was not RSD, was RSD which was no longer responding to blocks, or that plaintiff's pain was exaggerated. A functional capacity exam was performed and, based on the results, Dr. Jaszewski released plaintiff to return to light duty work, four to six hours a day, with restrictions that fell within the parameters of her job in the tag room.

12. Plaintiff continued to see Dr. Davis, who also recommended that plaintiff to return to work for six hours per day for six weeks, then increase to eight hours per day. Plaintiff did not comply with these recommendations and, at the time of the hearing before the deputy commissioner, continued to limit her working hours to four or less hours per day.

13. On 19 September 1995, Dr. Jaszewski noted that plaintiff was improving and she was not displaying symptoms of RSD, yet her complaints of pain had not decreased. On 27 September 1995, Dr. Jaszewski again noted that plaintiff's foot appeared almost normal and showed no signs of RSD. Nevertheless, she continued to complain of significant pain. A diagnostic spinal block provided complete relief of pain for a short period of time, which would indicate that her pain was not RSD but was somatic pain related to the original neuroma and surgery. On 17 October 1995, Dr. Jaszewski found that plaintiff was at maximum medical improvement and gave her a rating of twenty percent permanent partial disability in her right foot, in accordance with the findings of Dr. Davis.

14. Dr. Jaszewski last saw plaintiff on 8 April 1996. He found no dramatic changes in her condition and a fairly normal appearing right foot. Plaintiff complained of low grade pain in her left foot and upper extremities as well as the ongoing right foot pain, which Dr. Jaszewski attributed to neuritis. He had no medical explanation for the left foot and upper extremity complaints. He recommended that plaintiff attempt to increase her hours of work and stated that her condition should not interfere with her performance of the tag room job.

15. On 24 April 1996, plaintiff presented to neurologist Dr. W. Michael Nesbit. Dr. Nesbit diagnosed mild RSD and myofascial pain of the right foot and depression. He determined that plaintiff's left foot and upper extremity problems were the result of a combination of poor posture, dysfunctional gait, and deconditioning, indirectly the result of the compensable foot injury because of her inactivity and disuse of the right foot. Plaintiff's major problem was deconditioning, and he recommended increased activity and psychologic treatment. He did not believe she was at maximum medical improvement.

16. Dr.

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Branch v. Carolina Shoe Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/branch-v-carolina-shoe-company-ncworkcompcom-1999.