Bramlett v. Saul, Commissioner of SSA

E.D. Texas

Bramlett v. Saul, Commissioner of SSA

DecidedJuly 7, 2024

Docket2:21-cv-00178

StatusUnknown

This text of Bramlett v. Saul, Commissioner of SSA (Bramlett v. Saul, Commissioner of SSA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Bramlett v. Saul, Commissioner of SSA, (E.D. Tex. 2024).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION

PENNY LYNN BRAMLETT, § o/b/o MONTGOMERY BRAMLETT § § Petitioner, § § v. § Case No. 2:21-cv-0178-JRG-RSP § COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY § ADMINISTRATION, § § Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER Currently before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Dkt. No. 29), filed by Petitioner on June 26, 2024. The motion seeks compensation of $8,682.98 for attorney fees, without costs due to Petitioner’s IFP status. The Commissioner has responded that he does not oppose the requested award of fees. (Dkt. No. 30). The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. §2412, allows a prevailing party in litigation against the United States, including a petitioner for Social Security benefits, to recover her attorney’s fees “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” Id. at §2412 (d)(1)(a). The Supreme Court has explained that “EAJA fees are determined not by a percent of the amount recovered, but by the ‘time expended’ and the attorney’s ‘hourly rate,’” which is statutorily capped. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002). See generally, Murkeldove v. Astrue, 635 F.3d 784, 789 (5th Cir. 2011). The Commissioner does not contend, nor does the Court find, that the position of the government was substantially justified or that any special circumstances exist rendering an award unjust. The Court finds that Petitioner’s requested fee is not unreasonable and has been agreed to by the Commissioner. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant shall pay Petitioner $8,682.98 in EAJA fees. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010), this award will be payable to Petitioner, by delivery to her counsel of record, Michael T. Kelly, Morgan & Weisbrod, P.O. Box 821329, Dallas, TX 75382-1329.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION

PENNY LYNN BRAMLETT, § o/b/o MONTGOMERY BRAMLETT § § Petitioner, § § v. § Case No. 2:21-cv-0178-JRG-RSP § COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY § ADMINISTRATION, § § Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER Currently before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Dkt. No. 29), filed by Petitioner on June 26, 2024. The motion seeks compensation of $8,682.98 for attorney fees, without costs due to Petitioner’s IFP status. The Commissioner has responded that he does not oppose the requested award of fees. (Dkt. No. 30). The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. §2412, allows a prevailing party in litigation against the United States, including a petitioner for Social Security benefits, to recover her attorney’s fees “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” Id. at §2412 (d)(1)(a). The Supreme Court has explained that “EAJA fees are determined not by a percent of the amount recovered, but by the ‘time expended’ and the attorney’s ‘hourly rate,’” which is statutorily capped. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 794, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002). See generally, Murkeldove v. Astrue, 635 F.3d 784, 789 (5th Cir. 2011). The Commissioner does not contend, nor does the Court find, that the position of the government was substantially justified or that any special circumstances exist rendering an award unjust. The Court finds that Petitioner’s requested fee is not unreasonable and has been agreed to by the Commissioner. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant shall pay Petitioner $8,682.98 in EAJA fees. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010), this award will be payable to Petitioner, by delivery to her counsel of record, Michael T. Kelly, Morgan & Weisbrod, P.O. Box 821329, Dallas, TX 75382-1329.

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