Bral v. City of New York

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Bral v. City of New York

221 A.D.2d 283, 634 N.Y.S.2d 98, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12134

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 28, 1995

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 221 A.D.2d 283 (Bral v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bral v. City of New York, 221 A.D.2d 283, 634 N.Y.S.2d 98, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12134 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Salvador Collazo, J.), entered July 12, 1994, which, insofar as appeal-able, denied defendant Quigg Construction’s renewed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The drastic remedy of summary judgment may not be granted if there is any doubt whatever as to the existence of an unresolved issue of fact (see, e.g., Phillips v Kantor & Co., 31 NY2d 307, 311; Ramsammy v City of New York, 216 AD2d 234, [284]*284236-237). Here, defendant Quigg Construction’s claim, that it did not perform any work at the site of the subject accident, was made solely by its principal and was otherwise unsupported. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, submitted documentary evidence in the form of a building permit issued to, and insurance certificates obtained by, defendant Quigg Construction for the worksite. Thus, there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Quigg actually performed the work. Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Rubin, Kupferman and Williams, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Salvador Collazo, J.), entered July 12, 1994, which, insofar as appeal-able, denied defendant Quigg Construction’s renewed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The drastic remedy of summary judgment may not be granted if there is any doubt whatever as to the existence of an unresolved issue of fact (see, e.g., Phillips v Kantor & Co., 31 NY2d 307, 311; Ramsammy v City of New York, 216 AD2d 234, [284]*284236-237). Here, defendant Quigg Construction’s claim, that it did not perform any work at the site of the subject accident, was made solely by its principal and was otherwise unsupported. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, submitted documentary evidence in the form of a building permit issued to, and insurance certificates obtained by, defendant Quigg Construction for the worksite. Thus, there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Quigg actually performed the work. Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Rubin, Kupferman and Williams, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

221 A.D.2d 283, 634 N.Y.S.2d 98, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bral-v-city-of-new-york-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack