Braheem Hartley v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: 25-3196
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-3196 __________

BRAHEEM HARTLEY, Appellant

v.

DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA; DELAWARE COUNTY TAX CLAIM BUREAU; JANINE HEINLEIN, Upset Tax Sale Coordinator Delaware County Tax Claim Bureau ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-03078) District Judge: Honorable Joshua D. Wolson ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 1, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and PORTER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 3, 2026) ___________

OPINION * ___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant, Braheem Hartley, was a homeowner in Delaware County,

Pennsylvania. In 2022, he fell behind on his property taxes. As a result, the Delaware

County Tax Bureau sold the property at an upset tax sale. Hartley attempted to pay the

back-taxes to redeem the property, but the Bureau denied redemption because his home

had already been sold. Hartley filed a Petition to Set Aside Tax Sale in the Court of

Common Pleas, claiming that (1) he had not been given proper notice of the sale under

the Pennsylvania Real Estate Tax Sales Law (RETSL), 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5860.101, et

seq.; and (2) he had exercised his right under the RETSL to redeem his property within

thirty days of the sale. Following a hearing, the Court of Common Pleas rejected

Hartley’s claims and denied the petition. Hartley did not appeal.

Hartley then commenced this action in the District Court against Delaware

County, the Bureau, and Janine Heinlein, the Bureau’s Upset Tax Sale Coordinator. In

the operative amended complaint, he asserted violations of his constitutional rights to due

process and against unlawful takings, a Monell claim, and state-law claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, conversion, and violations of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. By way of relief, he asked the District Court to reverse the

state court’s order denying his petition to set aside the tax sale; issue a declaratory

judgment; award compensatory and punitive damages; order the Bureau to return all

surplus proceeds from the sale and extinguish any remaining debt; and award him

attorney’s fees.

2 The County defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to

Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court

granted the motion on the ground that Hartley’s claims were barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. Hartley sought reconsideration, but the District Court denied relief.

Hartley appealed. 1

We see no reason to vacate the District Court’s decision. To the extent that

Hartley complained of injuries caused by the state-court ruling and asked the District

Court to review and reject that ruling, we agree with the District Court that his claims

were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5

F.4th 379, 385 (3d Cir. 2021); Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615

F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010). To the extent that he raised claims that were, or could have

been, presented in the state-court proceedings, those claims are barred by the doctrine of

res judicata. See Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010).

Even assuming that Hartley’s constitutional claims are not barred, they are

meritless. He asserts that he was denied due process when the Bureau rejected his

attempt to redeem his property after it was sold but before the sale was confirmed by the

Court of Common Pleas. Under Pennsylvania law, however, “there shall be no

redemption of any property after the actual sale thereof.” 72 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.

1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision. See In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 3 § 5860.501(c); see also id. § 5860.102 (providing that an “actual sale” occurs when there

has been “payment of the full amount of money agreed to be paid as the sale price”).

Accordingly, Hartley was afforded the process he was due under the RETSL.

Hartley next claims that the “grossly disproportionate” difference between his tax

debt ($2,728.08) and the value of his property ($220,000) renders the sale an unlawful

taking under the Fifth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Tyler v. Hennepin

County, in which the Supreme Court affirmed that a county has the authority to sell a

homeowner’s property to recover unpaid property taxes. 598 U.S. 631, 638–39 (2023).

Although Tyler went on to hold that the county’s retention of the surplus from the sale

constituted an unlawful taking, see 598 U.S. at 639, the RETSL expressly provides that

the excess funds recovered from an upset sale (beyond amounts due to taxing authorities

and lienholders) must be returned to the homeowner. See 72 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 5860.205(d)(5). 2

Finally, given that Hartley’s federal claims are barred or meritless, the District

Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the state-law claims. See Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir.

1999).

2 Hartley also claims that the County is liable for creating, maintaining, and enforcing unconstitutional customs, policies, and practices that resulted in violations of his federal and state constitutional rights, as described above. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A county cannot, however, be liable under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation. See Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 896 (6th Cir. 2025). 4 We have considered Hartley’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that

none warrants relief. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. All

pending motions, including Hartley’s emergency motions for a stay pending appeal, are

denied.