Braggs v. Hamm

District Court, M.D. Alabama·Decided December 29, 2020·No. 2:14-cv-00601·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD BRAGGS, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO. v. ) 2:14cv601-MHT ) (WO) JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his ) official capacity as ) Commissioner of ) the Alabama Department of ) Corrections, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER ON A PROCESS FOR FINALIZING THE PHASE 2A REMEDIAL ORDERS

In the current phase of this longstanding litigation about the provision of mental-health care in Alabama’s prisons, the court has entered a series of agreed-upon remedial orders, which are now in effect pending resolution of whether they comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). After substantial litigation regarding these orders, the issue of how to determine their compliance with the PLRA evolved into a broader question of how to put in place a durable remedial framework to conclude a significant part of this phase of the litigation beyond the orders at issue.

Now before the court are the parties’ proposals regarding a process for finalizing this relief. The court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions. For the reasons set forth below, the court will not adopt

either proposal in its entirety, although it has drawn primarily on the defendants’ proposal to develop the plan it lays out in this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History This court found in 2017 that the State of Alabama

provides inadequate mental-health care in its prisons in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (Thompson, J.); see

also Braggs v. Dunn, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (Thompson, J.) (supplemental liability opinion on periodic mental-health evaluations of prisoners in

2 segregation). Over the years since the court’s initial liability opinion, the parties have agreed to a series

of stipulations resolving significant aspects of the sprawling remedial disputes present in this phase of the litigation. For each stipulation, the court held an on-the-record hearing, reviewing in detail and clarifying

the terms of the agreement. At the request of the parties, the court then entered these stipulations as orders.

At the time it entered these orders, the court believed that the agreements met the ‘need-narrowness-intrusiveness’ requirements of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). See Cason v. Seckinger,

231 F.3d 777, 785 n.8 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing about or enter particularized findings concerning any facts or factors about which

there is not dispute. The parties are free to make any concessions or enter into any stipulations they deem appropriate.”). However, the orders generally did not

3 contain findings that the provisions of the stipulations met the PLRA’s requirements.

In February 2019, the defendants raised as an issue the possibility that these orders did not comply with the PLRA because they did not have PLRA findings. The court then scheduled a set of evidentiary hearings to determine

whether the stipulations met the ‘need-narrowness-intrusiveness’ standard of the PLRA. In the meantime, by agreement of the parties, the court

found that each of the orders “temporarily satisf[ied] the requirements of the PLRA,” pending a final determination after the scheduled hearings. Phase 2A Opinion and Interim Injunction (doc. no. 2716) at 4.

These hearings were continued multiple times. They were first continued at the parties’ joint request so that the parties could attempt to negotiate a resolution of the remedial disputes addressed by the stipulations

in light of the newly raised PLRA concern. During that process, the parties successfully negotiated certain remedial agreements related to suicide prevention. See

4 Joint Notice and Motion to Stay (doc. no. 2706) at 2-3. After a lengthy period of mediation, the parties

ultimately informed the court on March 20, 2020, that the negotiations on the remaining disputes had not been successful. See Joint Notice Regarding Monitoring and PLRA Negotiations (doc. no. 2775) at 1. The court

scheduled the hearings to begin on April 13, 2020. See Phase 2A Revised Remedy Scheduling Order (doc. no. 2778) at 5.

The day the parties informed the court that their negotiations had failed, the Alabama State Health Officer suspended all public gatherings of 25 or more people due to the onset of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic

in Alabama and across the country. See State Health Officer Issues Amended Health Order Suspending Public Gatherings, https://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/news/2020/03/20.htm

l (Mar. 20, 2020). Five days later, the first confirmed death of an Alabama resident due to COVID-19 was announced. See Alabama Announces First Death of a State

5 Resident Who Tested Positive for COVID-19, https://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/news/2020/03/25b.ht

ml (Mar. 25, 2020). On April 3, the State Health Officer issued a stay-at-home order requiring “every person in Alabama to stay at his or her place of residence except as necessary to perform essential activities.” Order of

the State Health Officer, https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/04/Final-State wide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf (Apr. 3, 2020).

As the threat of COVID-19 became apparent, the parties each moved to continue the April 13 hearings. See generally Defs.’ Unopposed Motion to Continue (doc. no. 2779); Pls.’ Motion to Continue (doc. no. 2780). In

their motion, the defendants aptly explained that, while “the medical and scientific community continues to analyze the nature of COVID-19, this global pandemic represents an unprecedented threat to public health due

to its contagious nature and rate of mortality for those at significant risk for complications.” Defs.’ Unopposed Motion to Continue (doc. no. 2779) at 2. They requested

6 a continuance to “protect the health of the inmates in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections.”

Id. at 3. The hearings were eventually rescheduled to start on September 14, 2020, with the duration of the temporary PLRA findings on the stipulated remedial orders extended

to December 30. See Phase 2A Opinion and Order Regarding Long-Term Suicide Prevention Stipulations (doc. no. 2977), 2020 WL 5658886 (M.D. Ala. 2020) at 5. Just

before the hearings were set to begin, at the close of the defendants’ pretrial brief, the defendants indicated an intent to move under the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1) & (b)(2), to terminate some or all of the orders scheduled

for consideration. See Defs.’ Pretrial Memorandum (doc. no. 2908) at 55-57. The court requested clarification of the defendants’ intent, and the defendants filed a formal motion to terminate. See generally Defs.’ Motion

to Terminate (doc. no. 2924). Under the PLRA, the defendants’ motion to terminate placed the burden on the plaintiffs to show that the

7 stipulated remedial orders remained necessary to correct a “current and ongoing violation” of federal law.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3); see also Opinion and Order Regarding the “Current and Ongoing Violation” Issue (doc. no. 2954), 2020 WL 5517262 (M.D. Ala. 2020). The statute also required the court to rule on the motion within 30

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