Bragg v. State

134 Ala. 165
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedNovember 15, 1901
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 134 Ala. 165 (Bragg v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bragg v. State, 134 Ala. 165 (Ala. 1901).

Opinion

TYSON, J.

It is admitted that defendant was engaged in the practice of osteopathy as a profession and means of livelihood without having obtained a certificate of qualification from one of the authorized boards of medical examiners.

The most important question presented is whether the practice of osteopathy is “the practice of medicine in any of its branches or departments,” within the meaning of section 3261 of the Civil Code and 5333 of the Criminal Code. The contention of defendant is, that it is not. He predicates his insistence mainly, indeed, we may say wholly, upon the fact that in the practice of osteopathy no drugs or other medicinal substances are administered or applied, internally or externally; nor [171]*171is the knife used or any form of surgery resorted to in the treatment of diseases. In fact, the practitioners of that school of the healing art repudiate as remedial agents all drugs, medicinal substances and the knife and other surgical instruments and appliances, in the treatment of or allievation of diseases and, therefore, need have no knowledge of their use. They, of consequence, know nothing of the medicinal properties of drugs and other medicinal substance, or of the compounding and administer!ag of drugs in the cure of diseases. Their method of treatment is entirely external, consisting of “a system of manipulation of the limbs and body of the pail ent with the hands, by kneading, rubbing or pressing upon the parts of the body.” However, in order to practice the profession of osteopathy skillfully and scientifically, it is admitted, that the practitioner must know anatomy, physiology, hygiene, histology and pathology. Confessedly, the requirement of a knowledge on the part of the practitioners of all of these branches of the science of healing the sick or diseased is to enable him to skillfully determine the disease with which his patient is afflicted and to aid him in malting a proper application of his system of manipulation. For, it is entirely clear from the evidence that the practitioner does not make the same application of his remedy to all diseases, but that he applies such system of manipulation as is most remedial in alleviating or curing the particular disease he is called upon to treat. In other words, after a diagnosis of the disease of the patient, he applies the remedy most suitable to its cure, confining it, however,. to his system of manipulation as a remedial agent.

So, too, a practitioner of medicine is required to know anatomy,, physiology, hygiene, histology, and pathology, in order to enable him to skillfully and scientifically determine from what disease his patient is suffering, and after so determining he must also know how and what remedial agents should be prescribed for the alleviation or cure of the disease. So, after all, the only difference between the two is in the matter of therapeutics — that branch of medical science which considers the application of remedies as a means of cure. The former, as we have shown, applies his external remedies exclusively, [172]*172while the latter .prescribes internal or external, or both, as the exigencies of the case may require. The result sought to be accomplished by each is the same — to relieve the patient’s illness — to cure him. Both are practicing the art of healing or curing human diseases.

But, it is said the words “the practice of medicine” or “who practices medicine,” as used in the statutes, should not be extended to all practitioners of the art or science of healing or curing diseases, but that their proper interpretation or construction includes only those persons who employ medicinal substances or drugs as remedial agents for the alleviation or healing of diseases. This contention is based upon the proposition, that the word “medicine,” in its popular sense and as commonly understood, is a remedial substance, or ,dru,g; and that the practice of medicine, as popularly understood, inseparably includes as its great and overruling constituent the administration of drugs and other medicinal substances as remedial agents. Indeed, the whole superstructure of defendant’s theory, that as a practitioner of osteopathy he is not engaged in the practice of medicine, has for its foundation that the interpretation of the words “medicine” or “practice of medicine” must be accepted in the sense in which these words are commonly used. With this foundation or base destroyed, his theory must fall. In other words, if his premise is shown to be fallacious, of necessity his conclusion must be false. So, then, the question is, what is the correct rule of interpretation of these words ? Shall we interpret them in their popular sense or as commonly understood, or are they to be interpreted, being technical words, used in reference to a technical subject, according to- the meaning or use they have when applied to the particular art or science with reference to which they are used? ' It can not be well doubted that if they are technical words, having a technical meaning, when applied to the particular art or science to which they refer, that such use or meaning must be given to them, unless, from the context of the statutes, a different use or meaning is made apparent. — 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, (2d ed.), 13; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, (1st ed.), 324. This rule is stated by Mr. Endlich in his work on the Interpreta[173]*173tion of Statutes, (secs. 73,- 74 and 75, pp. 94, 95 and 96), to be that “the words of a statute are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. That is, in the construction of a statute, as in that of other instruments, words are to be understood, not according to their . mere ordinary general meanings, but according to their ordinary meaning as applied to the subject matter with regard to which they are used, unless, indeed, there he something requiring them to be read in- a sense which is not their ordinary sense in the English language as so applied. . * * * An obvious result of this rule is, that where technical words are used in reference to a technical subject, they are primarily interpreted in the sense in which they are understood in the science, art or business in which they have acquired it.” After showing the application of the rule in the construction of words and phrases having legal technical meanings, the author continues by saying : “But the rule giving to a word its technical meaning holds equally good in the construction of statutes dealing with other subjects as to which words and phrases used in a statute have acquired such a meaning, whether it be a legal technical meaning or not; i. e., whether it he a technical meaning which the word or phrase has acquired in the law, or a technical meaning which it has acquired in any other science, art, or business, if the enactment relates to any of these, the technical meaning -the word has in' 'the law, in any other1 science, in any art, or in any business, is to be given to- it, acordingly as the one or the other is the subject of the- enactment.”

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Bluebook (online)
134 Ala. 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bragg-v-state-ala-1901.