Bragg v. Geddes

93 Ill. 39
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1879
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 93 Ill. 39 (Bragg v. Geddes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bragg v. Geddes, 93 Ill. 39 (Ill. 1879).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Scholfield

delivered the opinion of the Court:

There can be no question but that all prior and contemporaneous agreements between Bragg and Smith, as to the terms of their agreement of dissolution of their real estate copartnership, are merged in their written agreement. That agreement bears date on the first day of May, A. D. 1869, and, after reciting the formation of the copartnership between them, their agreement to dissolve the same, the property acquired and by whom title is held, etc., proceeds in the following words:

“Now, these presents witnesseth that the said James Smith, in consideration of the premises, and of the sum of one dollar to him in hand paid by the said Frederick A. Bragg, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby sell, transfer, assign and make over unto the said Frederick A. Bragg, and to his assigns, all his, said Smith’s, right, title interest and claim in and to the lease of the said room and basement aforesaid, and in and to the chairs, desks, iron safe,' and all other furniture and fixtures used in said office or appertaining thereto, to have and to hold the same unto the said Frederick A. Bragg and his assigns.

“ And for and in consideration of the premises, and of the sum of one dollar, in hand paid by the said James Smith, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the said Frederick A. Bragg does hereby sell, assign, transfer and make over unto the said James Smith, all his (said Bragg’s) right, title, claim, interest and demand, in and to all of the outstanding claims and demands of every sort, commissions, real and personal estate and property, mining lands or interests, notes, bonds or obligations, contracts or property, or claims of any and every description whatsoever, held or owned, or claimed by or due or owing to said firm of F. A. Bragg & Co., saving and excepting the three several parcels of real estate and leases of said office, and the furniture and fixtures of the same, hereinbefore particularly described, and the interest in the said Minerva and Minna lodes, hereinbefore particularly described, and in reference to the said hereinbefore described three parcels of real estate, and the said interest in the said Minerva and Minna lodes.

“ It is hereby mutually agreed and understood as follows, to-wit :

“ 1st. That upon the said James Smith being fully reim- 1 bursed for all moneys expended by him, or which he may hereafter expend in the payment of the purchase money of, or other outlays in connection with, or on account of the said three several parcels of real estate hereinbefore described, situate in Cook county aforesaid, and the said undivided 600 feet of mining lands situate in Salt Lake county aforesaid, (including the necessary proportion of expenses for developing and working said mining lands,) with interest upon all sums advanced or expended by the said James Smith as aforesaid, at the rate of ten per cent per annum, that said Frederick A. Bragg shall be entitled to one-third of the net profits arising from the sale or other disposition of said three parcels of real estate situated in Cook county aforesaid, and to one-third of the net profits arising from the sale or working of the said mining lands situated in Salt Lake county aforesaid. * * *

“ 6th. That in the expenditure of money for the development and operations of the mines hereinbefore described, the said Frederick A. Bragg shall be only liable for such pro rata proportion of such expenses as his (said Bragg’s) undivided one-third interest in said six hundred feet shall bear to the amount expended by other owners for the same purpose, and the said Bragg reserves the right to terminate his liability at any time for further expenses connected with said mines, by giving written notice to the said James Smith.”

"Very clearly Bragg has no claim to a partnership in Smith’s interest in the “ Emma ” mine by virtue of anything to be found here. Here is an express surrender, by Bragg to Smith, of all his interest in mining lands or interests then owned by them, except as to the “Minna and Minerva” lodes; and there is no covenant or agreement giving Bragg an interest in such property to be acquired by Smith in the future. Smith’s obligations to Bragg, in regard to mining property, as defined by this instrument, are limited to the “ Minna and Minerva” lodes.

But Bragg, by his amendment to his bill, made on the hearing, alleges that subsequent to the making of the contract of dissolution, and about the 15th of May, 1869, he and Smith and Jones, Steele and Sheriffs, held a meeting at which it was agreed that all mining property acquired by Smith, while acting in Utah, should be for the benefit of said parties; that the parties should each advance the necessary funds for that purpose, but that Smith was to advance Bragg’s proportion, and that pursuant to that agreement Smith Avent to Utah in the month of May, 1869; that in January, 1870, Smith returned to Chicago, (having wasted and squandered the money previously furnished him,) for more money and to consult Avith his copartners; that in April, 1870, he was again sent to Utah by his copartners and supplied with funds by advances made in equal proportions by the copartners; and that, upon reaching Utah, in April, 1870, Smith purchased of Robert Bruce Chisholm and Woodman, a certain interest in the “ Emma” mine for $200, which sum he paid out of the money advanced by his copartners, etc.

It is necessary to see AAdiether this allegation is sustained by the evidence. Before referring to the evidence bearing upon the question, hoAvever, it is proper that we should determine the competency of certain evidence heard upon the trial of the cause in the Superior Court, to which objection was made by the counsel representing the executors and William B. Smith.

The defendants, Steele and Jones, Avere each examined as witnesses, and permitted to testify to facts occurring before the death of James Smith, and to declarations and admissions made by him.

The case claimed by Bragg is, these defendants were copartners with himself, Smith and Sheriffs; and the prayer of the bill is that upon a final accounting the trustees may be decreed to transfer, deliver and pay over to Bragg, and the other members of the copartnership, the respective interests that may be decreed to belong to each,—so that a decree in favor of the complainant would also be a decree in favor of Steele and Jones.

Under the old chancery practice, it is true, a complainant might obtain an order, as of course, to examine a defendant, and a defendant a co-defendant, as a witness, upon an affidavit that he was a material witness and was not interested on the side of the applicant, in the matter to which it was proposed to examine him. 1 Greenleaf’s Evidence, § 361. If interested, however, on the side of the applicant, in the matter to which it was proposed to examine him, his evidence could not be admitted. Dyer v. Martin, 4 Scam. 147.

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Bluebook (online)
93 Ill. 39, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bragg-v-geddes-ill-1879.