Brady v. Doe

598 S.W.2d 338, 1980 Tex. App. LEXIS 3193
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 19, 1980
DocketB2307
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 598 S.W.2d 338 (Brady v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brady v. Doe, 598 S.W.2d 338, 1980 Tex. App. LEXIS 3193 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Eileen Brady, appellant, brought suit, as next friend of the unborn child of Jane Doe, seeking to enjoin Jane Doe, appellee, from having an abortion. At the temporary injunction hearing it was stipulated that Jane Doe was an actual person; she was an adult; she resided in Houston, Harris County, Texas; she was then in approximately her tenth week of pregnancy; and she was contemplating an abortion and would, unless restrained, terminate her pregnancy by means of an abortion.

After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s application for a temporary injunction and dismissed the cause with prejudice stating that Eileen Brady had no standing to bring the suit and that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) was binding upon the court and precluded the relief sought. Brady has perfected this appeal.

Tex.R.Civ.P. 44 provides that “[mjinors . . who have no legal guardian may sue and be represented by ‘next friend’ . . . .” Eileen Brady sought to bring this suit as next friend of the unborn child of Jane Doe. However, when a suit is instituted by a next friend on behalf of a minor, the minor is the real party in interest. Safeway Stores, Inc. of Texas v. Rutherford, 130 Tex. 465, 111 S.W.2d 688 (1938). A minor is, necessarily, a person. The United States Supreme Court has ruled in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158, 93 S.Ct. at 729, that “. . . the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” Thus, the unborn child of Jane Doe was not a minor. Eileen Brady had no standing under Tex.R.Civ.P. 44 since there was no minor to be the real party in interest. The trial court’s dismissal of the cause based on a lack of standing is, therefore, affirmed.

Pursuant to the doctrine first enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), the Supreme Court’s holding in Roe v. Wade, is the law of the land. Thus, prior to the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the woman and her physician.

All of appellant’s points of error have been considered and are overruled.

Affirmed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
598 S.W.2d 338, 1980 Tex. App. LEXIS 3193, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brady-v-doe-texapp-1980.