Bradshaw v. Wade

CourtDistrict Court, D. Alaska
DecidedJuly 16, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00031
StatusUnknown

This text of Bradshaw v. Wade (Bradshaw v. Wade) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Alaska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bradshaw v. Wade, (D. Alaska 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

JOSHUA BRADSHAW, Plaintiff, Case No. 3:24-cv-00031-SLG v. WADE, et al., Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND DIRECTING SERVICE & RESPONSE TO CERTAIN DEFENDANTS

On January 31, 2024, self-represented prisoner Joshua Bradshaw (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil complaint and an application to proceed without prepaying the filing fee.1 On February 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a civil cover sheet.2 Plaintiff alleges Correctional Officer Brann Wade, Correctional Supervisor Gregory Steele, three unnamed correctional officers, and the Department of Corrections failed to protect him from harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.3 The Court has now screened Plaintiff’s Complaint in accordance with 28

1 Dockets 1-2. 2 Docket 3. 3 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (prison officials have a duty to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates, including a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Liberally construed,4 the Complaint contains sufficient facts, that accepted as true, state a plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment against the individual defendants. This means that those claims will

not be summarily dismissed at this time but may proceed to the next stage of litigation. However, the claim against the Department of Corrections must be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons expressed herein. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. SCREENING STANDARD

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a federal district court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.5 In this screening, a district court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.6

4 See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”) (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted) (a federal court must accept the allegations as true, construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor). 5 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A. 6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Case No. 3:24-cv-00031-SLG, Bradshaw v. Wade, et al. In conducting its screening review, a court must liberally construe a self- represented plaintiff’s complaint and give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.7 Before a court may dismiss any portion of a complaint, a court must provide a

plaintiff with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend or otherwise address the problems, unless to do so would be futile.8 Futility exists when “the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”9 I. Claims Against the Department of Corrections are Dismissed

The Department of Corrections is not a proper defendant. A defendant in a civil rights lawsuit must be a “person.”10 The State of Alaska and state agencies, such as the Department of Corrections, are not considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11 Further, the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives states sovereign immunity, which prohibits lawsuits against a state or the “arms of

the state” (the State’s governmental branches, divisions, offices, and departments), unless the state or agency’s immunity has been waived.12 The State

7 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). 8 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)). 9 See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). 10 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 11 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). 12 Alabama v. Pugh, 348 U.S. 781 (1978); In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). Case No. 3:24-cv-00031-SLG, Bradshaw v. Wade, et al. of Alaska and its agencies have not waived immunity for civil rights claims alleging violations of the federal Constitution. For this reason, all claims against the Department of Corrections are DISMISSED with prejudice.

II. Unnamed “Doe” Defendants Although federal courts do not generally favor actions against unidentified “Doe” defendants,13 a plaintiff may sue unnamed defendants when the identity of the alleged defendants is not known before filing the complaint.14 However, a Doe defendant cannot be served with process until he or she is identified by his or her

real name.15 The Court will not investigate the names and identities of unnamed defendants. If Plaintiff identifies a John Doe, he must file a motion to substitute his or her true name in this case.16 The Court may dismiss any unnamed defendants without further notice to Plaintiff if Plaintiff fails to (1) timely file a Notice of Substitution

identifying the defendant by name and (2) serve that defendant within 90 days of

13 See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). 14 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). 15 See Merritt v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1163 (“[w]here the identity of the alleged defendant is not known prior to the filing of a complaint, the [incarcerated pro se] plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants.”). See also Gillespie v.

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Related

Hans v. Louisiana
134 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1890)
Ex Parte State of New York, No. 1
256 U.S. 490 (Supreme Court, 1921)
Jenkins v. McKeithen
395 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 1969)
Boag v. MacDougall
454 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Gordon v. City of Oakland
627 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Edward G. Eldridge v. Sherman Block
832 F.2d 1132 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
Tyrone Merritt v. County of Los Angeles
875 F.2d 765 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Becker v. Oregon
170 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Oregon, 2001)
Wakefield v. Thompson
177 F.3d 1160 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
Gillespie v. Civiletti
629 F.2d 637 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)

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Bradshaw v. Wade, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bradshaw-v-wade-akd-2024.